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ABSTRACT 
"Individualism" is a term that evokes a wide range of responses, particularly when deployed in 
the context of American history and society, with its supposed (and purportedly objectionable) 
tradition of so-called "rugged individualism." The images of the cowboy, frontiersman, and lone 
entrepreneur spring readily to mind, along with a long list of virtues embodied in these figures: 
self-sufficiency, drive, courage, gumption, and the like. It is the project of this dissertation to 
rehabilitate the concept of individualism as tool of the Left for resisting the ongoing assault of 
neoliberalism, particularly with respect to our educational institutions. I argue that the various 
problematic associations commonly made between individualism and various forms of right-
wing political and moral commitments, such as free-market capitalism, materialism, self-interest, 
and the like are historical mutations of an individualist tradition that is both fundamentally 
incompatible with those ideals, but which can also serve as a powerful tool for critiquing them. 
More specifically, I argue for an individualism that fuses the ontological commitments of the 
historical individualists with the left-individualist tradition in anarchist political theory. 
Individualism along the lines argued here is neither an enemy of democracy, communal identity, 
 or group resistance, but serves as a complement to and ally of those forms of leftist commitment. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly given the urgency of our current moment, 
individualism provides a powerful basis for critiquing the forces that genuinely oppose left 
movements. Ultimately I will argue not only that individualism is a much richer, more varied, 
and more philosophically tenable position than has been commonly assumed, but also that some 
form of individualist commitment is, rather than being incompatible with truly democratic 
commitment, actually a fundamental prerequisite thereof. In this, I hope to lend some support to 
Emerson's famous and cryptic contention that "individualism has never been tried." 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ANARCHISMS, SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL; INDIVIDUALISMS, RUGGED AND NOT-
SO-RUGGED 
 
The Problem: Rehabilitating Individualism 
“Individualism” is a term that evokes a wide range of responses, particularly when 
deployed in the context of American history and society, with its supposed (and purportedly 
objectionable) tradition of so-called “rugged individualism.” The images of the cowboy, 
frontiersman, and lone entrepreneur spring readily to mind, along with a long list of virtues 
embodied in these figures: self-sufficiency, drive, courage, gumption, and the like. Aside from 
the oftentimes vague appeal of these affective personality traits, there is also a countervailing 
sense that individualism as a more concrete philosophical doctrine is both morally and politically 
corrosive; that it undermines the very possibility of democratic community which has earned 
wide general endorsement in the era of modern liberalism, particularly within education, 
grounded as the field is in the various liberalisms of John Dewey, John Rawls, Hannah Arendt, 
and others.  
It is the project of this dissertation to rehabilitate the concept of individualism as tool of 
the Left for resisting the ongoing assault of neoliberalism, particularly with respect to our 
educational institutions. I argue that the various problematic associations commonly made 
between individualism and various forms of right-wing political and moral commitments, such 
as free-market capitalism, materialism, self-interest, and the like are historical mutations of an 
individualist tradition that is both fundamentally incompatible with those ideals, but which can 
also serve as a powerful tool for critiquing them. More specifically, I argue for 
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an individualism that fuses the ontological commitments of the historical individualists 
with the left-individualist tradition in anarchist political theory. Individualism along the lines 
argued here is neither an enemy of democracy, communal identity, or group resistance, but 
serves as a complement to and ally of those forms of leftist commitment. Furthermore, and 
perhaps more importantly given the urgency of our current moment, individualism provides a 
powerful basis for critiquing the forces that genuinely oppose left movements.  
 While it is the overall goal of this dissertation to clarify the concept of individualism and 
argue for its reconstruction as a tool for the left, it is critical to address at the outset the concept 
of anarchism as well, since it is also fundamental to the vision of individualism advocated here, 
and notoriously controversial. Before proceeding I will attempt to give something of an overview 
of anarchism as an ideology, as well as briefly laying out some of the major schools within 
anarchism. It should go without saying that the term “anarchy” and its etymological cousins 
(“anarchist,” “anarchism,” etc.) have earned themselves something of a bad rap both within the 
academy and without. These terms have come to be synonymous variously with “chaos,” 
“violence,” “disorder,” “mob rule,” and so on. As Peter Marshall puts the point in the 
introduction to his monumental history of anarchist theory and practice, “it is usual to dismiss 
[anarchism's] ideal of pure liberty at best as utopian, at worst, as a dangerous chimera.”1 
Individuals who describe themselves or their beliefs as anarchist are often labeled as terrorists, 
nihilists, or simply insane. George Woodcock notes that the figure of the anarchist is often 
dismissed as “a mere promoter of disorder who offers nothing in place of the order he destroys.”2 
The particulars of these misunderstandings are not necessarily important for us here, but it is 
                                                          
1 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), ix.  
2 George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2009), 11.  
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worth noting that they do differ significantly in their tone and origin. For a member of the 
general public, the term anarchism cannot but conjure up images of rioting in the streets and 
smashed storefront windows. The gradual and historical corruption of the associative content of 
“anarchism” in the public consciousness is a large topic that will be outlined more fully in the 
dissertation, but one imagines this sort of vulgar misunderstanding to be the progeny, in some 
sense, of Hobbes' famous characterization of the pre-Statist state of nature as the bellum omnium 
contra omnes,3 perhaps bolstered by the ubiquitous contemporary capitalist consensus regarding 
the supposed selfishness inherent in human nature, a position famously taken to its absurd logical 
conclusion by Ayn Rand.4 
 In the academy, the misunderstandings found in the wider public discourse regarding 
anarchism are significantly less prevalent, but this fact does not eliminate all obstacles to 
academic conversation regarding anarchism. Specifically, there is the widespread endorsement of 
Marxism of one type or another by broad swathes of academe, especially in the humanities and 
related disciplines, and the attendant attitudes toward anarchism with which the family of 
Marxisms is often associated. As David Graeber puts the point, “Anarchism, in the standard 
accounts, usually comes out as Marxism's poorer cousin, theoretically a bit flat-footed but 
making up for brains, perhaps, with passion and sincerity.”5 Marxism is generally seen, that is, as 
the more theoretically serious account both of social relations as they currently exist, and of the 
means to change them, as cast against the naive utopianism of the anarchist. There are, it should 
be noted, important and deep-rooted, historical dimensions to this antagonism as well, as it was 
                                                          
3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts 1 and II, A.P. Martinich and Brian Battiste, eds. (Peterborough, ON, CAN: 
Broadview, 2011), 123. 
4 See Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: Signet, 1964). For an excellent general consideration of 
Rand's relationship to contemporary capitalism, see Jennifer Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the 
American Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
5 David Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 3. 
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precisely the tension between Marx and the Russian communitarian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin 
that caused the split and ultimate dissolution of the First International at The Hague Congress in 
1872. The core of the disagreement between Bakunin and Marx had to do with competing 
interpretations of the events leading up to and following the Paris Commune's two-month 
existence in 1871. Bakunin saw the Commune as an opportunity for sustained decentralized 
organization between peasants and workers in opposition to all forms of State power, whereas 
Marx believed that the lesson of the Commune was that the workers needed a true political party 
to help them to seize power from the State, and he saw the role of the International as becoming 
that party. Bakunin, somewhat prophetically, argued that Marx's views would at best result in a 
changing of the authoritarian guard, and that a dictatorship of the proletariat was no less 
objectionable than one of the bourgeoisie.6  
 The second reason that it is useful to spend some time delineating, or at least positing for 
the sake of argument, some of the basic tenets of anarchist thinking is to avoid becoming mired 
in a sea of conflicting intuitions and commitments. The organization and development of sub-
categories of anarchism, unlike in Marxism and its descendants (Leninism, Maoism, 
Althusserianism, Gramscianism, etc.), does not follow the family-tree model just suggested, 
where one can tie relatively closely the content of one's positions to one or another major named-
tradition, founded by a discrete individual. In anarchism, generally speaking, individuals are 
grouped on the basis of either tactical commitments (insurrectionists, illegalists, anarcho-
communists, etc.) or a basic theoretical commitment (individualists, Christian-anarchists, 
                                                          
6 There is much excellent historical work done on this topic. See for example, Alvin W. Gouldner, “Marx's Last 
Battle: Bakunin and the First International,” Theory and Society 11, no. 6 (1982): 853-884; Donald Clark Hodges, 
“Bakunin's Controversy with Marx: An Analysis of the Tensions Within Modern Socialism,” American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 19, no. 3 (1960): 259-274; and August H. Nimtz, “Marxism Versus Anarchism: The First 
Encounter,” Science and Society 79, no. 2 (2015): 153-175.  
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feminist anarchists, etc.).7 Importantly, this manner of carving up the theoretical space does 
significantly less toward generating intra-group agreement than it does in the Marxist tradition. 
That is, it is far more likely that a random sampling of Gramscians will have a significant level 
of pre-established theoretical common-ground than a similar sampling of individualist anarchists, 
say. Where the Gramscians might have some slight disagreements about Gramsci's relationship 
to Croce or the details of universal intersubjectivity, it is likely that the individualist anarchists 
will have a hard time even getting their discussion past the level of the most basic tenets of 
individualism or their understanding of the nature of the individual itself. Whether or not this fact 
of near total theoretical openness in anarchism is a sign of theoretical underdevelopment or an 
encouraging sign of theoretical fertility is up for discussion. The point here is that, in order to 
avoid spinning our wheels on the slippery terrain of anarchist theory, it is useful to posit a 
provisional fixed point from which to begin. A traditional and, I find, useful such point is Peter 
Kropotkin's entry in the 1910 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica for “Anarchism:” 
the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is 
conceived without government - harmony in such a society being obtained, not by 
submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded 
between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of 
production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs 
and aspirations of a civilized being.8 
 
While there is some ambiguity even in this skeletal description of the anarchist framework to 
which one could object, amend, or add, I will operate with this basic understanding of anarchism 
in the rest of the dissertation.  
 
                                                          
7 Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, 5. 
8 Peter Kropotkin, "Anarchism, from The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910." Anarchist Archives. 
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/kropotkin/britanniaanarchy.html.  
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Schools of Anarchism: A Primer 
 As suggested above, the various schools of anarchist thought are resistant to easy 
categorization, and many have significant areas of overlap. This has become particularly true 
with the proliferation of hyphenated and double-hyphenated schools that attempt to hybridize 
what they see as the most important theoretical and tactical aspects of a number of other 
anarchist forms (e.g. “vegan-queer-anarchism,” “anarcha-trans-feminism,” “green-nihilist-
anarchism,” and so on). By way of overview, the major schools of anarchism are divided into 
two categories. The much larger and more influential of the two is often referred to as “social 
anarchism” and the smaller, more marginalized school is that of individualism.9 Given that the 
bulk of the dissertation will be dealing with individualism and individualist anarchism, I devote 
some time here to three of the major forms of social anarchism, namely mutualism, collectivism, 
and anarcho-communism, so as to communicate something of the theoretical landscape into 
which individualist anarchism fits. 
Mutualism 
 Mutualism is the oldest of the various schools of thought which explicitly refer to 
themselves as anarchist. Developed first by the French economic theorist Pierre Joseph 
Proudhon, mutualism was born out of Proudhon's radical theories of property and ownership as a 
way of making sense out of economic activity and social production in the face of the conviction 
that private property was at bottom philosophically corrupt and indefensible. Proudhon, famous 
for his various paradoxical slogans (“Anarchy is Order,” “God is Evil,” etc.)10 summed up his 
                                                          
9 See Carl Levy, “Social Histories of Anarchism,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 4, no. 2 (2010): 1-44.  
10 For more on Proudhon's obsession with paradox, see Woodcock, Anarchism, 91-121 and Marshall, Demanding 
the Impossible, 234-235. 
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view of property with the well-known claim that “Property is Theft.”11 Proudhon's critique of 
property is not quite as radical as it may seem at first pass, and indeed he is equally critical of 
communist theories of social organization as unacceptably disrespectful of individual rights to 
the products of their own labor, “As if the individual came into existence after society, and not 
society after the individual.”12 Rather than any global critique of property, Proudhon sought so 
chart a course between the gross accumulation of property in the hands of a few wealthy 
landowners (his principal target in critiquing property), on the one hand, and the erasure of 
individual dignity and labor which he saw as accompanying communism in all its forms. His 
answer to this puzzle was mutualism, which he argued would be able to function without any 
form of state power or capitalist economic control. He claimed that mutualism would be a 
“synthesis of the notions of private property and collective ownership” so as to avoid the 
potential dangers he saw in both of those concepts when established on their own and 
exclusively.13 Proudhon was perfectly content to have certain types of exclusive usufruct rights 
over land and other types of property, but argued that all of these types of possession must be 
temporary and conditional on continued use. In this connection, a distinction is sometimes made 
between personal property, which Proudhon favored, and private property, which he did not. The 
general principles of mutualism are familiar from market capitalism, though they also contain 
some built-in safeguards to prevent excessive property accumulation. Firstly, as with all forms of 
communitarian anarchism, the workers in a given industry are in control of their own means of 
production and are entitled to the fruits of their own labor (again, in the sense of personal 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that Proudhon's slogan is in a sense self-defeating, since the very concept of theft is only 
possible on the condition that one already has a concept of property itself in hand. See, Max Stirner, The Ego and its 
Own, ed. David Leopold, trans. Steven Byington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251. 
12 Quoted in Edward Hyams, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Revolutionary Life, Mind, and Works (London: John 
Murray, 1979), 85-86. 
13 Quoted in Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 242. 
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property, rather than private), which can be used in market exchanges.14 In this sense, mutualism 
subscribes to the labor theory of value. Proudhon believed that over time, as workers organized 
themselves and formed associations both large and small, and as credit was equalized across all 
productive citizens (Proudhon was in favor of a large centralized bank which could track credit), 
the functions performed by the State would either become obsolete or would be performed by 
other forces, and the need for political organization would disappear entirely in the face of 
improved economic organization.  
Collectivism 
 Collectivism as a doctrine developed out of Proudhon’s mutualism. The term was first 
explicitly used by the noted Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin during the early days of the first 
International Working Men's Association in Geneva in 1866.15 The IWMA was founded to bring 
together the various factions concerned with class struggle, labor, and anti-capitalist politics, and 
many of the members who attended the first congress could fairly be described as Proudhonists. 
Generally, they accepted the principle that society ought to be restructured as a coalition of 
individuals who are free to make contracts with one another under conditions of labor value 
exchange and free credit through a centralized people's bank. Bakunin generally accepted the 
tenets of mutualism, but disagreed significantly with Proudhon on a number of significant points. 
While it is difficult to characterize Bakunin as a thinker in any sort of broad terms, since he 
published so little and so much of it is fragmentary and incomplete, we can get a general sense of 
the areas of tension between his views and those of Proudhon. One of the key planks in the 
Proudhonist platform was the abolition of private ownership of land, a point on which 
collectivists generally agree. However, where Proudhon would maintain a robust sense of 
                                                          
14 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 243. 
15 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 7. 
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usufruct both for the land itself as well as for the products of one's labor on the land (which we 
have called here “possession” or “personal property”), the collectivists, including Bakunin, 
moved toward full collective ownership, both of the means of production as well as the land.16 
Bakunin only maintained any strong sense of private or personal property for the direct products 
of individual labor. In the mutualist framework, the workers associations and industrial groups 
were essentially just a means of harnessing the power of large-scale industry, something which 
Proudhon himself accepted as necessary only begrudgingly, valuing as he did the individual 
worker as the basic unit of social organization. Collectivism, however, fully embraces the need 
for collective association not as a distasteful necessity but as fundamentally beneficial for human 
flourishing and the economic viability of a stateless society. After the ultimate failure of the Paris 
Commune in 1871, Bakunin would point to that episode as a validation of his views, claiming 
that in the functioning of the commune “the action of individuals was almost nothing” and that 
“the spontaneous action of the masses should be everything.”17 In this sense, Bakunin rejected 
the lingering individualist tendencies in the mutualist program in favor of a higher degree of 
communal sensibility.  
 At the same time, Bakunin was also not, at least on the classical definition, a communist. 
Where the communist embraced the classic principle “from each according to his means, to each 
according to his needs,” Bakuninist collectivism held onto a sense of individual dessert and a 
right to the products of one's own labor, holding to the principle of “from each according to his 
means, to each according to his deeds.”18 Bakunin described his view, drawing on what he saw 
                                                          
16 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 8. 
17 Quoted in Daniel Guerin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) 35. 
18 Woodcock, Anarchism, 138. 
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as the guiding principles of the French Revolution, in his Federalism, Socialism and Anti-
Theologism, writing that the key problem to be solved by collectivism is  
to organize society in such a fashion that every individual, man or woman, coming into 
life, shall find as nearly as possible equal means for the development of his or her 
different faculties and for their utilization by his or her labour; to organize a society 
which, rendering for every individual, whoever he may be, the exploitation of anybody 
else impossible, permits each to participate in social wealth – which, in reality, is never 
produced otherwise than by labour – only in so far as he has contributed to produce it by 
his own labour.19  
 
Collectivism was thus defined, and could be still, as an exchange economy where the legal 
ownership of the of the instruments of production is held by a network of “collectivities” which 
are sorts of workers’ joint stock companies and which themselves serve, rather than individuals, 
as the fundamental unit of social organization. In the 1870’s and the 1880’s the anarchist-
communists, who wanted to abolish exchange value in all its forms, would break with the 
collectivists, and in so doing revived the tradition of radical communism that had existed in 
France in the 1840’s. 
Anarcho-Communism 
 Anarcho-communism, perhaps predictably, takes a step even further in the full 
communalization of property and the products of labor. As noted above, Bakunin maintained 
certain tendencies in his vision of collectivism which were seen by some in the anarchist 
movement of the time as problematically individualistic. Against this, the anarcho-communists 
held to the principle of distribution according to need, rather than dessert or actual productive 
labor. After the initial meetings of the IWMA, splits began to emerge between Bakuninist 
collectivists and the anarcho-communists, with the communist wing led by representatives of the 
                                                          
19 Quoted in Woodcock, Anarchism, 137. Italics mine. Going forward, all italics included in quotations are in the 
original unless otherwise noted, as here.  
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Spanish workers parties and the Italian anarchist and early advocate of collectivism Carlo 
Cafiero. An important set of victories were won by the anarcho-communists over the course of 
the 1870s at the various meetings of the important anarchist international group the Jura 
Federation, which finally adopted anarcho-communism as its official economic platform in 
1880.20 At this Congress, Cafiero presented a report that was later published in Le Révolté, an 
important anarchist periodical of the time, under the title “Anarchy and Communism”. In this 
report, Cafiero succinctly exposed the points of rupture with collectivism: rejection of exchange 
value; opposition to transferring ownership of the means of production to workers’ corporations 
(in favor of communal ownership without reference to the specific nature of the work being 
done, that is); and elimination of payment for productive activities. Furthermore, Cafiero 
suggested that anarcho-communism was the inevitable development of anarchism in Europe, and 
rejected the popular narrative that collectivism was a necessary step on the path to true 
communal ownership. Cafiero argued, rather, that collectivism of the type advocated by Bakunin 
was actually inimical to ultimate goals of anarchist society. On the one hand, he claimed that the 
demand for collective ownership of the means of production and the individual appropriation of 
the products of labor would cause the accumulation of capital and the division of society into 
classes to reappear. On the other hand, he maintained that retaining some form of payment for 
individual labor power would conflict with the socialized character (indivisibility of productive 
activities) already imprinted on production by the capitalist mode of production. As to the need 
for rationing products, which might occur after the revolutionary victory, nothing would prevent 
such rationing from being conducted not according to merits, but according to needs.21 
                                                          
20 Woodcock, Anarchism, 169. 
21 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 437.  
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 Another important exponent of anarcho-communism was Peter Kropotkin, another 
former collectivist who switched allegiances in the late 1800s. Kropotkin’s arguments in favor of 
the communist position at the 1880 Congress were the culmination of a slow evolution of his 
position from strict collectivism to communism, by way of an intermediate position where he 
saw collectivism as a simple transitional stage. The collectivists favored the ‘right to work’, 
which is ‘industrial penal servitude’. In Kropotkin’s view, their pro-worker policy sought to 
harness to the same horse the wage system and collective ownership, in particular through their 
theory of labor vouchers. Kropotkin opposed labor vouchers on the grounds that they seek to 
measure the exact value of labor in an economy that, being socialized, tends to eliminate all 
distinctions as far as contribution of each worker considered in isolation is concerned. 
Furthermore, the existence of labor vouchers would continue to make society a commercial 
company based on debit and credit. Hence he denounced labor vouchers in the following terms: 
“The idea... is old. It dates from Robert Owen. Proudhon advocated it in 1848. Today, it has 
become 'scientific socialism'”22 In general, Kropotkin believed that collectivism committed two 
major errors, both of them tied together by the same blindness. Specifically, “While speaking of 
abolishing capitalist rule, they intend nevertheless to retain two institutions which are the very 
basis of this rule – representative government and the wages system.”23 Kropotkin believed that 
in order for genuine anarchist goals to be achieved, only full communist ownership could be 
acceptable as an economic system.  
 
 
                                                          
22 Quoted in Alain Pengam, “Anarcho-Communism,” in Non-Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, eds. Maximilien Rubel and John Crump (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 60-82, 72-73. 
23 Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings, ed. Marshall S. Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 144. 
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Method of the Dissertation 
 Education has a fraught relationship with theory. There are longstanding debates 
surrounding the relative merits of various approaches to educational research, and indeed 
surrounding the definition of the term “research” itself. Historically this has manifested in the 
debate over qualitative versus quantitative methods in educational research that raged during the 
1980’s and into the 1990’s. This debate revolved generally around two axes, as outlined by 
Kenneth Howe, who’s work became a major factor in the dissolution of that debate. Howe 
describes both “literal” and “derivative” aspects to the debate between qualitative and 
quantitative methods.24 Literally, quantitative and qualitative approaches to educational research 
have distinct techniques and procedures for collecting and analyzing data. Derivatively, these 
methods differ in their “broader epistemological assumptions.”25 These epistemological 
differences rest on larger debates both in educational research and in the history of philosophy 
more generally. The two distinct approaches are, on the one hand, positivistic approaches to 
research which emphasize the objective, scientific quality of that research, and, on the other, 
more interpretivist understandings of the goals of research. Howe points out that many 
researchers (e.g. Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba,26 and John K. Smith27) have advocated what 
he calls “the incompatibility thesis.”28 Howe’s work ultimately terminates in his advocacy of 
what he calls “critical educational research,”29 a concept which is related to what others have 
                                                          
24 Kenneth Howe, “Getting Over the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate,” American Journal of Education 100, no. 2 
(1992): 236-256, 237.  
25 Howe, “Getting Over the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate,” 237.  
26 Yvonne S. Lincoln & Egon Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishers, 1985). 
27 John K. Smith, “Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to Clarify the Issue,” Educational 
Researcher 12, no. 3 (1983): 6-13. 
28 Kenneth Howe, “Against the Quantitative-Qualitative Incompatibility Thesis, or Dogmas Die Hard,” Educational 
Researcher 17, no. 8 (1988): 10-16.  
29 Howe, “Getting Over the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate,” 250.  
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called, in a similar attempt to bridge the qualitative-quantitative divide, “mixed methods 
research.”30   
Even more recently, however, discussions of the role of philosophical and theoretical 
methods of research have begun to develop in education as well. Despite helping to close the gap 
between qualitative and quantitative research, the work of Howe and others did not fully revolve 
the question of the role of theory in educational research. Indeed, Rene Arcilla diagnosed as 
recently as 2002 what he calls the “uncanny…established silence between philosophy and 
education.”31 Arcilla makes an impassioned plea for a bridge between philosophy and education 
similar to that constructed by the pioneering work of Howe. Since the publication of Arcilla’s 
article, and although it was by no means the first to directly address philosophy and education, 
philosophical analysis has made significant gains in terms of legitimacy as research.  
In contrast to the generally empirical (whether qualitative or quantitative) approach of 
much educational research, this dissertation participates directly in the tradition of theoretical, 
philosophical analysis. The analysis is not entirely conceptual, in that I argue that the conclusions 
of my investigation have decidedly real-world implications for how we ought to think about 
education, schools, and their place in society, and in the sense that there are significant historical 
considerations that are brought to bear on the discussion. At the same time, the method of 
argumentation is entirely theoretical in nature. Another way of putting this is that I will be 
addressing not the current actual state of education and schooling, or at least will only be doing 
so in the context of critique, but will focus more directly on a potential future state that I will 
argue is preferable to the status quo. In this sense, my argument will be prescriptive, though I 
                                                          
30 See R. Burke Johnson and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzi, “Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose 
Time Has Come,” Educational Researcher 33, no. 7 (2004): 14-26.  
31 Rene Arcilla, “Why Aren’t Philosophers and Educators Speaking to Each Other,” Educational Theory 52, no. 1 
(2002): 1-11, 2.  
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will also argue that the prescriptivism involved in specifically anarchist theory, such as it is, is 
exploratory and open rather than constricting. 
Significance: The Need for an Expanded Toolkit of Resistance 
In response to the establishment of the neoliberal economic hegemony and its incursions 
into education in various contexts, educational theorists have attempted to expose the 
corruptions, failures, and contradictions in the neoliberal, corporatist narrative. Innumerable 
studies trace back to the neoliberal global order, among other things: the troubling historical 
trends in school funding, the rise of school choice rhetoric, the continuing and worsening effects 
of racist educational and economic policies at all levels of government, the growing corporate 
influence on both k-12 and higher education, the profound and growing emphasis on concepts 
such as “accountability” and “standards.” The major assumption made in these exposé-style 
studies is that in order to solve, or even to properly address, these issues, we must chronicle in 
detail the injustices they perpetuate or cause and hold up their internal workings to others, be 
they the broader public or academic colleagues, ideally so as to shock them into anger and 
action. Typical of this mode of exposé thinking is Jean Anyon's conclusion to her book Radical 
Possibilities in which she writes that “my argumentation has aimed at a more radical 
consciousness in readers” which will counteract “the ideological battering most people receive as 
schoolchildren, the mangled news they imbibe from newspapers and television, and racial and 
class distortions pouring from the media.”32 Michael Apple's concluding reflections in Ideology 
and Curriculum echo Anyon's logic. He writes, “I have tried to illuminate how this close 
connection between power and control that exists between government and the dominant 
                                                          
32 Jean Anyon, Radical Possibilities: Public Policy, Urban Education, and a New Social Movement (London: 
Routledge, 2014), 172 
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classes...also exists between schools and these groups.”33 Maarten Simons, Mark Olssen, and 
Michael Peters introduce their collection on “studying the policy agenda of the 21st century” in 
this way, “Indeed re-reading education policies in view of gathering people around matters of 
concern-the focus of this handbook-could be regarded as a democratic act or an act of public 
advocacy” and they suggest that their ultimate goal is “turning education into a matter of public 
concern.”34 It is precisely in this sense that educational theorizing must engage in critique via 
illuminating the hidden connections, functionings, and contradictions in neoliberal political and 
economic agendas that I mean to refer to by using the phrase “the exposé method.”  
 At this point, I want to lodge two objections against the exposé method and the attendant 
solutions the method generally suggests (“democratize,” “localize,” “purge of racism,” etc.). The 
first objection, which at first may seem naive bordering on asinine but which I actually believe 
reveals a deep misunderstanding about the nature of neoliberal global capital on the part of 
advocates of exposé critique, is that the exposé method simply has a poor track record of 
generating changes of any kind in the public discourse surrounding education. This seems almost 
too obvious to merit much discussion, but think, for just one example, of the case of charter 
schools. In the face of mounting evidence that charter schools do not produce meaningfully 
better outcomes than their public counterparts35 as well as the even more troubling emerging 
evidence regarding potentially adverse racial and economic implications of large-scale charter 
takeovers on vulnerable communities,36 one is still hard pressed to find any high-ranking sitting 
                                                          
33 Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge, 1990), 160 
34 Maarten Simons, Mark Olssen, and Michael A. Peters, “Re-Reading Education Policies Part 1: The Critical 
Education Policy Orientation” in Re-Reading Education Policies: A Handbook Studying the Policy Agenda of the 
21st Century, Simons, Olssen, and Peters eds. (Rotterdam, NED: Sense Publishers, 2009), 30-31.  
 
35 Andrew Maul, “Review of Urban Charter School Study 2015” (Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center, 
2015). http://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-urban-charter-school 
36 For a painfully detailed case-study see Kristen L. Buras, Charter Schools, Race, and Urban Space: Where the 
Market Meets Grassroots Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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politician at any level of government (other than those with principled opposition to government 
activity of any kind) who is anything but emphatically supportive of charter schools. This is 
reflected in public opinion as well, with PDK International polling data holding steady at 70% 
support for the last five years.37  
 On the exposé model, the exposing of the problematic racial implications and the 
oftentimes suspicious flows of money into, through, and out of the large Educational 
Management Organizations (EMOs), coupled with the advancing of proposals to re-democratize 
public education ought to be enough to shock public opinion in some way back toward salvaging 
public education, but this has not happened. I want to suggest that this is because the exposé 
model fundamentally misunderstands the ideology of neoliberal global capitalism. At the root of 
this problem, I argue, is Karl Marx's original formulation of the nature of ideology, namely that 
ideology is that which people do “without being aware of it,”38 or, as Althusser later puts it, that 
ideology represents “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence.”39 That is, this orthodox understanding of ideology conceptualizes ideology as 
creating and relying for its persistence on a false consciousness on the part of those under it 
regarding the way things really are. We can see immediately why this understanding of ideology 
is amenable to the exposé method, which often goes about its aforementioned business of 
“illuminating,” “exposing,” and “mapping” the objects of its critique explicitly under the banner 
of “consciousness raising.” Again, the assumption of both vulgar Marxism and the exposé 
                                                          
37 William J Bushaw and Valerie J. Calderon, “The 46th Annual PDK/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward 
the Public Schools” Phi Delta Kappan International, 2015.
http://www.pdkintl.org/noindex/PDK_Poll46_2014.pdf 
38 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1, Ben Fowkes, trans. (New York: Penguin, 1982), 166-
67. 
39 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation” in Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-188, 162. 
18 
 
method is that through a detailed process of ideological demystification of some social 
phenomenon to reveal its underlying adverse material effects, false consciousness can be 
overcome and, by implication, social change can occur through the activity of the now 
enlightened citizenry. If one can clearly expose the ill-effects of neoliberal school reform and 
reveal the ideological nature of “school choice” and “competition” discourses, the hearts and 
minds of policymakers and the public can be changed and education can move in a different 
direction.  
 I contend that this understanding of ideology is no longer applicable; critical methods that 
utilize it as their guiding theoretical commitment are doomed to fail in the face of a capitalism 
which is no longer ideological in this sense. While this claim may appear sweeping, it is by no 
means new or reactionary, as arguments for the need to rethink ideological critique in light of 
recent developments in global capitalism have been advanced and refined since at least the early 
80s. Peter Sloterdijk, for instance, opens his extended analysis of contemporary hegemonic 
ideologies Critique of Cynical Reason with the following, “The discontent in our culture has 
assumed a new quality: It appears as a universal, diffuse cynicism. The traditional critique of 
ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism...this critique has remained more naive than the 
consciousness it wanted to expose.”40 For Sloterdijk, the modes of orthodox ideology critique 
have become stagnant, predictable, and themselves absorbed into the very functioning of 
hegemonic ideology more generally, and he goes as far as to isolate eight paradigmatic models of 
critique which function as models for all subsequent moves of unmasking and demystifying. The 
key point of his analysis is that when we examine the current status of ideological critiques of 
unmasking, i.e. the exposé method, we find “a clearly structured playing field with well-known 
                                                          
40 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 3. 
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players, established tactics, and typical fouls” where “each side has developed certain, almost 
rigged, moves of critique.”41 The predictable result of this stagnant culture of critique and its 
objects is a generalized attitude of cynical distance in the society at large. All of the exposures of 
the functioning of dominant ideology have been made, and the arguments and critical moves 
have been rehearsed over and over. It is no longer shocking (if it ever was) to hear the latest 
salacious exposé of capitalist exploitation or callous profit-maximization, and neoliberal global 
capital no longer relies on the mystification of its inner workings to persist, but rather is always 
already exposed, relying instead on the shoulder-shrugging cynicism of contemporary culture 
diagnosed by Sloterdijk. Even if we are ignorant of the precise details of how capital is callously 
or exploitatively operating in a given arena (e.g. we do not know that Volkswagen is knowingly 
cheating emissions tests), we know that it is doing so, and are no longer surprised to find out the 
details because the overarching structure of global capital is always the same. As Zizek 
characterizes the nature of the cynical subject, he “is quite aware of the distance between the 
ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the less still insists upon the mask.”42 In the 
context of this new type of cynical culture, where the mask of ideology is a transparent one, 
Zizek suggests a reformulation of Marx's understanding of ideology to reflect the fact that 
ideology is no longer that which we do without knowing we are doing but that which we know 
very well we are doing, but still continue to do.43 If this picture is right, and our society has 
shifted to what Sloterdijk refers to as the mode of “enlightened false consciousness” which has 
“learned its lessons in enlightenment, but...has not...put them into practice” and “no longer feels 
affected by any critique of ideology,”44 then the fact that the exposé method of critique has failed 
                                                          
41 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 90. 
42 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2008), 25. 
43 Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 25.  
44 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 5. 
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to generate change in education or elsewhere should not come as a surprise. On this view, the 
exposé method is doomed to fail because its entire critical project consists, finally, in telling 
people things they already know. The problem today is not that people care but do not know, as 
in traditional ideological critique. Rather, it is that they know but do not care, which is a scenario 
that the exposé method is ill equipped to deal adequately with.  
 The second objection I want to level against the exposé method of critique is that even 
the best-case scenarios, when the exposé method actually resonates with some sector of the 
public to the degree that they demand change and actually achieve their goals, the overall 
outcome is still negative. In such cases, the ultimate effect is does not fundamentally change the 
structures of neoliberal global capital, but actually reinforces them. This objection is best 
illustrated by an example. Think of the recent push for a fifteen-dollar minimum wage in the 
United States. The issue I want to highlight here is connected with what is presupposed in any 
demand made of the neoliberal capitalist order, and what the implications of making such 
demands are. One presupposition that seems to me to be made in the very act of asking, for lack 
of a better term, “the system” for something like an increase in pay (a decrease in police 
violence, etc.) is that the system has what you are demanding of it and can give it to you, if only 
you ask for it in the right way. Insofar as the public (or whomever) must ask the neoliberal 
structure to meet its demands (however supposedly progressive or revolutionary those demands 
may be) via the mechanisms of governmental or economic administration, the public cannot help 
but affirm its structural subservience to the power of the system more generally. Keeping with 
our example, while it is unambiguously true that a fifteen-dollar minimum wage would 
somewhat improve the lives of individuals who would receive higher pay, it is also undeniable 
that this change would have little to no impact on slowing the pace of the development of 
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neoliberal capital. Put another way, this demand, and others like it, are demands made of rather 
than against neoliberal capital, and they fundamentally support, rather than challenge, the 
continued existence of that system. The spirit of this line of critique is not new either; we have 
only to recall Jacques Lacan's admonishment of the student protests of May 1968 to see the 
radical heritage of the view I am advancing. Lacan, speaking in front of a large protest, accused 
the students of failing to truly challenge the fundamental existence of the structure they claimed 
to be against: “As hysterics, you demand a new master. You will get it!”45 A similar sentiment is 
echoed by the Bavarian anarchist Max Stirner, who critiqued the earlier French revolution in a 
precisely parallel fashion, writing “The revolution was not directed against the established, but 
against the establishment in question, against a particular establishment. It did away with this 
ruler, not with the ruler, on the contrary, the French were ruled most inexorably.” Later, he adds, 
in an even more Lacanian register, “Much as may be improved, strongly as 'discreet progress' 
may be adhered to, always there is only a new master set in the old one's place, and the 
overturning is a building up.”46 This last point is crucial, namely the idea that in overturning 
some particular piece of the established system of rule (changing the minimum wage, reducing 
police violence, etc.) the perverse outcome is that the system is actually strengthened. When a 
particular goal of a piecemeal reform agenda is fulfilled, those who were participants in that 
struggle tend to become mollified and return to their cynical participation in the system feeling 
satisfied with their victory, which is in fact a victory for the ruling ideology, which has escaped a 
struggle without its fundamental structures being questioned.  
                                                          
45 Quoted in Slavoj Zizek, “The Structure of Domination Today: A Lacanian View,” Studies in East European 
Thought 56 (2004): 383-403, 388. 
46 Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 100. 
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 This points to the second, and perhaps even more problematic assumption involved in 
demanding piecemeal reforms of the existing system, and brings us directly to the distinction 
between the anarchist and the reformer. In advocating for piecemeal changes to the system to 
alleviate localized contradictions and injustices we expose via our critique, the assumption is 
made that there is something fundamentally right about the existing structure, and all that is left 
is to smooth out the problems as we find them. For example, when I expose the ill-effects of a 
low minimum wage and demand a higher one, I have already accepted that people should have to 
work for wages at all, that money should be the primary mode of social exchange, that income 
level should be the measuring stick for quality of life, and so on. In other words, I have accepted 
all of the important premises of global capitalism. This view is perhaps most clearly expressed in 
Jean Anyon's call for a “kinder, gentler capitalism”47 through piecemeal reforms made to the 
current system. One cannot help but see in this Fukuyama-esque relationship to global capitalism 
an echo of the archetype of an abusive relationship, where one party consistently abuses the trust 
of the other, and the abused party justifies the continued relationship on the grounds that 
“somewhere deep down there is a good person” etc.  
 Though the anarchist will deeply disagree with the method of critique just espoused, 
which makes concessions to the system in the hope of changing it from within, it is also 
important to realize that the enemy identified in this critique is real and is one that anarchism as a 
philosophy and movement shares, namely neoliberal individualism. In the rest of this chapter I 
want to survey the origins of American rugged individualism as a personal and economic ideal, a 
discussion that will be continued in more detail in Chapter Two.  
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The American Tradition of Rugged Individualism 
There are deep cultural and historical associations with the figure of the rugged 
individual that run through American consciousness and naturally color our understandings of 
the concept of individualism writ large. That is, there are genuine and real reasons that people 
have come to associate individualism with the kind of selfish, capitalistic attitude embodied in 
contemporary neoliberal rationalisms. The phrase “rugged individualism” itself was first 
popularized by Herbert Hoover, who deployed it in an untitled campaign speech during the 1928 
presidential campaign on October 22 at Madison Square Garden in New York City. The speech 
emphasized what Hoover saw as traditional American ideals, including “self-government,” 
hostility to bureaucratic centralization, a refusal to look to the government for assistance or ways 
out of hardship, and the cultivation of initiative and innovation. The phrase “rugged 
individualism” itself appears only once in the text of the speech, but it represents a critical 
moment in American understandings of individualism as a philosophico-political doctrine. In the 
post-WWI era, Hoover argued, that Americans were “challenged with a peace-time choice 
between the American system of rugged individualism and a European philosophy of 
diametrically opposed doctrines – doctrines of paternalism and state socialism.”48 It is this 
dichotomous characterization of the relationship between rugged American individualism, on the 
one hand, and the socialistic and communal practices of Europe (or any variety of generalized 
“others”) that I argue has more than anything characterized the American understanding of 
individualism. As I will document in this section, this general formula of individualism as 
distinctly American and as a sign of mental, emotional, and economic fortitude, and collectivism 
as weak, paternalistic, and distinctly un-American has many valences, expressions, and 
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permutations, though the basic through line is the same. The purpose of this discussion is both to 
detail how individualism came to have the problematic ideological baggage that it currently has, 
as well as to set up a contrast class to the vision of individualism I will develop in the remainder 
of this dissertation, particularly Chapter Three. 
Rugged Individualism as Cultural Ideal 
 Though Hoover was perhaps the first to popularize the phrase “rugged individualism,” 
the spirit and vision embodied in that phrase were embedded in the American psyche much 
earlier in the country’s history. Interpreters of American society as early as the great political 
critic Alexis de Tocqueville identified this sense of rugged individualism as both central to 
American civil and cultural life as well as potentially damaging to the democratic prospects of 
the nascent nation. In his 1835 Democracy in America, de Tocqueville, referring to the 
predominant attitudes of competition and individualism among the American populace, writes 
“Selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public 
life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright 
selfishness.”49 Here we see the roots of the idea, which would eventually see its terminus in the 
right-individualist philosophy of Ayn Rand and neoliberal economics, that selfishness and 
individualism are inherently bound together, and that they are uniquely threatening to democratic 
society and social cohesion in general. Political philosopher Leo Strauss concurs with de 
Tocqueville’s diagnosis, but traces the cultural roots of rugged individualism back even further, 
namely to the work of John Locke, who has often been seen as the founding father of both 
laissez-faire capitalism and the concept of rugged individualism.50 The influence of Locke on the 
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American founding fathers (particularly Jefferson), the American revolution, and the 
Constitution of the United States itself, has been well documented,51 and Strauss suggests that it 
is particularly Locke’s vision of economic competition and the value of rugged individualism 
that shaped the early civic values of the United States. Strauss argues that Locke’s theory of 
property rights, in which the right of property is established through mixing one’s labor with a 
previously unowned resource, represents “the classic doctrine of ‘the spirit of capitalism’” and 
goes on to argue that Locke believed that “By building civil society on ‘the low but solid ground’ 
of selfishness or of certain ‘private vices,’ one will achieve much greater ‘public benefits’ than 
by futilely appealing to virtue, which is by nature ‘unendowed.’”52 This is perhaps the foundation 
of the ideal of rugged individualism, in which individuals are empowered to compete with one 
another for scarce resources and accumulate as many of those resources as possible. The 
important addendum to this ideal is that success in this social game is itself representative of a 
valuable internal quality, e.g. being a self-starter, having the entrepreneurial spirit, being a “go-
getter” and so on. The value place on these supposed personality and character traits is critical to 
understanding the American vision of rugged individualism as a cultural and personal ideal.  
 More recently, anthropologist Francis L.K. Hsu has brought to the fore the American 
sense of rugged individualism through comparative ethnographic studies, particularly examining 
America in relation to Japanese and Chinese cultures.53 Hsu argues that rugged individualism as 
a personal, cultural ideal has driven American society since the moment of its inception. Hsu 
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contrasts traditional Chinese culture, which is based on a highly structured set of prescribed 
social relations, with the rugged individualist imperative to strike out on one’s own and indeed to 
question the dictates of the current social order. Hsu suggests that this type of attitude is valuable 
to a degree, particularly in terms of generating certain forms of social progress, necessitating as it 
does the breaking of norms, questioning of traditions, and so on. At the same time, it can also be 
profoundly socially damaging. Hsu simultaneously echoes the warning of de Tocqueville and 
evokes some of the most pernicious historical examples of the rugged individualist spirit when 
he suggests that “To succeed, the rugged individualist is driven to treat all other human beings as 
things to be manipulated, coerced or eliminated, if they happen to get in the way of his forward 
march…the rugged individual is bound to be self-centered. He is taught to shape the world in his 
image.”54 For Hsu, examples of both large and small-scale social ills, such as the ideology of 
Manifest Destiny, embody and express the logical conclusions of the ideal of rugged 
individualism.  
 Perhaps nowhere is the personal ideal of the rugged individual expressed more fully than 
in the cultural artifacts of American society, particularly in literature, film, and advertising. 
Many studies have examined the ways rugged individualism has been culturally transmitted in, 
especially masculine, cultural artifacts such as sporting magazines,55 literature,56 and workplace 
norms,57 among others. However, I want here to focus on one particularly potent example of 
ideological rugged individualism in the American consciousness, namely the figure of John 
Wayne. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine in detail the large and varied 
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academic literature that has been produced around this actor, his work and his persona are of 
particular importance to understanding the personal and cultural ideal of rugged individualism in 
American culture. As Larry Van Meter has argued, “Even today, almost 40 years after his death, 
John Wayne stands for an ‘ideal’ masculinity.”58 Wayne’s professional career was characterized 
most notably by a number of successful Western films, including Stagecoach (1939), The 
Searchers (1956), Rio Bravo (1959), The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962), and True Grit 
(1969), for which he won an Academy Award. Wayne, a former college football player, was 
known for depicting Western heroes who were “unsentimental, hard, brutal if necessary, proudly 
anachronistic.,”59 and for his gruff and imposing on-screen persona. Jonathan Wyatt evocatively 
describes the sense he had of Wayne as a young child watching his films, “The heroes were 
strong, rugged men protecting children; pretty, skirted women; and good but ineffectual men 
from ruthless, mean men…all set amongst a pitiless, mean landscape and its downbeat, 
downtrodden, rundown towns.”60 Even contemporaneously, Wayne was seen as a masculine 
ideal, representing fundamental American values of competition and self-reliance. A 1950 article 
in the magazine The Saturday Evening Post about Wayne, entitled “The Ladies Like ‘Em 
Rugged,” ties Wayne’s ideal on-screen persona to his real life, and suggests in no uncertain 
terms that Wayne ought to serve as the ideal not only for American masculinity, but perhaps for 
the country’s own self-understanding. The article opens this way, “When John Wayne strides 
lankily down a Cowtown street, hands swinging free, ready to draw, millions of female hearts 
thump. Old Long Legs just acts natural – while husbands wonder why their wives have that 
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faraway look.”61 Here we see a number of the various ways in which Wayne represents the ideal 
of rugged individualism, aloof, sexually desirable, ready for a fight and capable of winning. This 
ideal is exemplified for Wyatt in an iconic line from The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, when 
Wayne’s character Tom Doniphon explains to a feminized lawyer (played by James Stewart), 
who Doniphon will eventually have to save, “Out here a man settles his own problems.”62 This is 
a direct endorsement of the competitive ethos of rugged individualism, and an implicit rejection 
of the sorts of communal identities and economic relationships that were increasingly visible on 
the world stage during Wayne’s heyday.  
 Indeed, it is critical to note that in many ways John Wayne’s persona was explicitly 
politicized, both by observers as well as by Wayne himself. Wayne was very public, for 
example, about his staunch anticommunist ideology and support for American capitalism. 
Indeed, when he began producing his own films in the 1950’s, some have argued that Wayne 
“ended up making propaganda, not art.”63 Wayne publicly positioned himself against “a liberal 
establishment that was feminized, and therefore worthy of populist disgust.”64  Wayne’s rugged 
individualist was the strongest available counterpoint to the popular images that drove 
communist hysteria during that era, and particularly the various feminized and homoeroticized 
caricatures that underwrote much of the ideological animus that was directed at communism as 
an ideology. In Wayne’s Big Jim McLain (1952), which revolves around Wayne’s character 
tracking down communists in post-war Hawaii, the prime villain is a feminized Russian named 
“Sturak,” played by Alan Napier, who speaks in a high pitched, lispy accent.65 This feminization 
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of communism and anything to do with non-American masculinity was a common tactic of the 
right at the time, and as William J. Mann notes, “For many, sexual perversion and political 
subversion became interchangeable. The Right linked homosexuality with sedition, equating it 
with moral weakness and conflating it with Communism.”66 Wayne represented the polar 
opposite of these figures, and embraced the ideological implications of that representation in his 
own political expression. In his commitment to capitalism as an economic doctrine, distrust of 
anything even remotely communistic, and embodiment of character traits such as grit, 
determination, and the like, John Wayne still serves as perhaps the best and most extreme 
example of what is mean by the phrase “rugged individualism” as a cultural and personal ideal, 
particularly of masculinity.  
There is, however, another important aspect to rugged individualism, namely the 
economic, to which I turn in the next section. Though the economic ideals of individualism will 
be detailed more directly in Chapter Two, I will here point out some examples of how the 
concept has influenced American economic and domestic policy, often to disastrous effect. The 
rejection of individualism in the sense described here is, I think, entirely justified, and it will be 
the project of Chapters Two and Three to distinguish the form of anarcho-individualism I 
advocate from these understandings of the term. 
Rugged Individualism as Economic and Policy Doctrine  
As suggested by the example of John Wayne, a key component of the rugged 
individualist mentality is a certain commitment to self-sufficiency, refusal to accept outside 
assistance, and resistance to communalism in all its forms. These commitments have variously 
found expression in public policy throughout the history of the United States, and continue to be 
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reflected in the country’s attitudes toward the poor, disabled, and the like. Perhaps fittingly, 
Hoover is again here one of the first to enact policies explicitly from the perspective of rugged 
individualism, and would continue his commitment to his vision of rugged individualism as 
president during the early years of the Great Depression. In the early 1930s, Hoover vetoed an 
important bill, the Muscle Shoals Bill, that would have appropriated funds for the government to 
build a dam on the Tennessee River and sell electricity, essentially nationalizing that utility in 
that part of the country.67 The idea behind the bill was both that the building of the dam would 
provide valuable and then-scarce jobs for a depressed region of the country as well as enable the 
sale of cheaper electricity than was being provided by private electric companies. The reasons 
Hoover cited for the veto explicitly appealed to the ruggedly individualistic values he had 
campaigned on and his economic faith in free market solutions. He wrote that the plan would 
“break down the initiative and enterprise of the American people” and would be a fundamental 
betrayal of the ideals of innovation and economic competition that he believed America was 
based on.68 This economic interpretation of rugged individualism as a philosophical basis for free 
market competition, entrepreneurship, and the like is one of the most powerful associations that 
has arisen in the discourse about individualism.  
Another powerful example of this discourse making its way into the political arena 
explicitly was the rhetoric and writing of Republican Senator from Arizona and presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater. Four years before running for President in 1964, Goldwater 
published The Conscience of a Conservative, a book that many credit with reigniting the 
conservative movement in the United States and laying the ideological groundwork for the 
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impending Reagan Revolution that would take place some twenty years later. The book, 
ghostwritten by noted conservative and longtime Goldwater speechwriter L. Brent Bozell Jr., 69 
was in many ways a distillation of American conservative principles, and in particular the 
doctrine of economic rugged individualism. Indeed, one contemporary commentator argued that 
the broad support Goldwater’s message was able to amass, particularly on college campuses, 
made him “the most attractive ‘conservative’ since Herbert Hoover.”70 Like John Wayne, 
Goldwater centered anticommunism in his political messaging, and called for a return to the suite 
of classical American values embodied in rugged individualism. In his analysis of Goldwater’s 
rhetoric and appeal John Hammerback argues that all of Goldwater’s various themes could be 
distilled down to the pervasive ideal of rugged individualism.71 Goldwater, like Wayne, went out 
of his way to project an image of rugged individualism in his personal life as well, desiring to 
appear as “manly, adventurous, simple, and unpretentious,” and often relating to his audiences 
stories of his forefathers, “as when he described his grandfather’s ‘courage and fortitude’ in 
crossing the Colorado River under attack by Indians.”72 This was also politically important, as it 
reformed the image of conservatism from one of aloof intellectuals that dominated the era, such 
as the figure of William F. Buckley. Goldwater’s policy positions flowed directly from his 
rugged individualist persona, for example by “de-emphasizing international cooperation, 
discontinuing conciliatory foreign policies, and challenging communism directly” as well as 
advancing simplified programs of taxation and regulation, positions that have become de rigueur 
for conservative politicians to this day.  
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Though Goldwater ultimately failed to reach the presidency, his policy influence would 
be dramatically felt in the election and presidency of Ronald Reagan. Reagan, who himself 
gained fame first as a film actor, was perhaps the most rhetorically and politically effective of 
any politician in U.S. history in advocating for the ideal of rugged individualism. As early as 
Reagan’s famous speech in support of Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, Reagan 
mobilized discourses of individualism versus communism and the value of individual work ethic 
and motivation.73 This theme continued throughout Reagan’s political life and played such a 
central role that Robert Rowland and John Jones have claimed that Reagan fundamentally 
redefined the “American Dream” in terms of “heroic individualism.”74 Reagan’s policy targets, 
which included “unreasonable bureaucrats, criminal-friendly judges, welfare cheats, spoiled 
college students, appeasement-minded liberals, soft-headed liberals, narrow-minded liberals” and 
any and all other forces that threatened to squelch American individualism,75 have come to serve 
as the policy agenda for the Republican party through the present day, and the policy positions 
he advocated are nearly all undergirded by a commitment to an economic and cultural form of 
rugged individualism. Valuing private property rights, freedom of expression, and so on at the 
individual level to the point of excluding nearly all other social values is the hallmark of political 
and economic rugged individualism. Reagan often mobilized ruggedly individualist, and 
importantly racialized, discourses of laziness and personal motivation, “law and order,” and 
personal freedom, even going so far as arguing that “if an individual wants to discriminate 
against Negros or others in selling or renting his house, he has a right to do so.”76 These sorts of 
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policy proposals, which also included cutting welfare benefits and other forms of the social 
safety net, are all fundamentally predicated on the idea that social problems are best addressed 
through individual and corporate initiative and creativity rather than government intervention, a 
hallmark of rugged individualism in the policy arena. As Rowland and Jones sum up the 
Reaganite vision of rugged individualism, Reagan  
presented a perfected and condensed form of ultimate definition as a means of reinforcing 
a small government perspective and in so doing recasting the meaning of the most 
important American political myth, the American Dream, in a way that placed 
responsibility for action on the individual rather than the government.77 
 
It is this view that supports the neoliberal narratives that so characterize our contemporary policy 
landscape, both within education and elsewhere. I will lay out in more detail in Chapter Two the 
historical development of these ideas particularly from the perspective of anarcho-individualism, 
but first want to point out briefly some of the ways these ideals of rugged individualism have 
manifested in education. 
 Perhaps predictably, educational policy did not escape the long-term effects of Reagan’s 
individualist revolution, and Reagan’s administration itself in many ways set the stage for the 
current neoliberal capture of public education. The 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform was a key moment in the intrusion of rugged individualism 
into the realm of public education. As Jal Mehta notes, “Perhaps the most fundamental shift in 
thinking that A Nation at Risk encapsulates is the elevation of the economic purposes of 
schooling over its many other purposes.”78 The economization of education, though it took many 
forms in the Reagan era, specifically with respect to international competition, was in many ways 
most concentrated on the role of education as a means of economic mobility, one’s success in 
                                                          
77 Rowland and Jones, “Reagan’s Farewell Address,” 638.  
78 Jal Mehta, “Escaping the Shadow: A Nation at Risk and Its Far-Reaching Influence,” American Education, 
Summer 2015: 20-44, 23.  
34 
 
which was inherently reflective of the presence or absence of the character traits of the rugged 
individual, e.g. perseverance, adaptability, etc.  
This fusion of the economic and personal ideals of rugged individualism was further 
entrenched by the various testing and accountability regimes that emerged in the wake of the 
Reagan Revolution, such as the Bush era “No Child Left Behind” and Barack Obama’s “Race to 
the Top”. On the one hand, as many recent commentators have argued, the neoliberal 
imperatives of economic production necessitate strict governmental oversight and 
“accountability” regarding what is taught and how it is taught.79 At the same time, many of the 
traditional values of rugged individualism have become directly infused into the educational 
rhetoric of would-be reformers. Indeed, one can see the contemporary echoes of this vision of the 
ideal individualist in much recent work on what makes for a successful student, with John 
Wayne-esque buzzwords like “resilience,” “adaptability,” “initiative,” “vision,” and so on 
coming to describe the ideal student. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is the recent 
controversy surrounding the concept of “grit” as an educational value.80 After the publication of 
Angela Duckworth's study on grit as a factor in student academic success and the widespread 
adoption of the concept in education circles, a backlash emerged which critiqued Duckworth's 
usage of the idea as problematically individualist and reductionist. Ariana Gonzalez Stokas is 
representative of this critique when she argues that “to tell the impoverished child in particular 
that he or she needs more grit in order to succeed seems at best misguided and at worst classism 
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and a return to a culture of poverty ideology that equates pauperism with an unfavorable human 
trait that could be bred out of society.”81 The Reaganite narrative that the inherent qualities of 
individuals should determine their economic and social success is predicated precisely on the 
type of bootstrapping narratives of perseverance that also underwrite educational approaches that 
center character traits such as “grit.”  
The next chapter will extend the historical account of the development of individualism, 
with a particular focus on the ways that it came to be so deeply associated with various rightist 
ideals, both economic and social, and distinguish individualism’s radically leftist origins from its 
ultimately radically rightist, and perverted, terminus.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ANARCHISM: CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Within anarchism as an umbrella ideology, individualist anarchism has a particularly 
interesting history, and there is significant controversy surrounding many of the key individualist 
anarchist thinkers and their place in the tradition. Indeed, there are some within anarchism who 
consider individualist views to be fundamentally incompatible with anarchism in the same way 
that liberal democrats view individualism as incompatible with genuine democracy. For 
example, one of the most well-known public anarchists in modern history, Colin Ward, while 
clearly delineating the distinctions between genuinely autonomist individualist anarchism and the 
appropriation of the language of individualism by free-market advocates, nonetheless dismisses 
as “incomprehensible” and “distasteful” the individualist tradition that grew out of the work of 
Max Stirner, one of the major thinkers of individualist anarchism.82 Murray Bookchin, a 
progenitor of libertarian municipalism and advocate of communalist anarchism, famously 
divided anarchism into two camps, namely social anarchism and lifestyle anarchism (or 
lifestylism), with lifestyle anarchism representing essentially the modern iteration of 
individualism.83 Bookchin argued that the recent developments in individualistic lifestylism “are 
steadily eroding the socialistic character of the libertarian [anarchist] tradition.”84 In this chapter, 
I want to review some of the historical developments within anarchism that have affected the 
perception of individualism within anarchism specifically, and contextualize individualist 
anarchism in the anarchist context by comparing it with a selection of other anarchist schools of 
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thought. This discussion will provide the basis for the vision of individualism discussed and 
endorsed in chapter three. 
The Origins of a Rift: Marx, the Young Hegelians, and Stirner 
In his discussion of individualist anarchism, Bookchin seems to endorse a classically 
Marxist critique of individualism, voiced most forcefully during the 1930s by anarcho-
syndicalists and anarcho-communists, namely the idea that individualist anarchism amounts to 
little more than “petty-bourgeois exotica” and “middle-class indulgence.”85 By raising this 
Marxist critique of individualism (which I will address more directly in Chapter Four), Bookchin 
is pointing to what is perhaps the critical moment of rupture between social anarchism and 
individualist anarchism (and, perhaps, the broader Left and individualism in general), namely 
Marx’s encounter with Stirner. Here I want to survey the genesis and development of Marx’s  
 Marx’s various clashes with his anarchist contemporaries are well known and have been 
documented in great detail. Studies of Marx’s relationship to anarchism often rightly focus on 
the importance of his nearly decade-long engagement with Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, a 
battle that took place in the arena of the then-newly-formed International Workingman’s 
Association (IWA) or the First International.86 One of the core disagreements between Bakunin 
and Marx had to do with competing interpretations of the events leading up to and following the 
Paris Commune's two-month existence in 1871. Bakunin saw the Commune as an opportunity 
for sustained decentralized organization between peasants and workers in opposition to all forms 
of State power, whereas Marx believed that the lesson of the Commune was that the workers 
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needed a true political party to help them to seize power from the State, and he saw the role of 
the International as becoming that party. This was reflective of a more basic doctrinal difference 
between the two, namely their visions of post-revolutionary social organization. While both 
Marx and Bakunin attacked capitalism, the scope and focus of their approaches differed 
critically. Marx relegated his revolutionary ardor to the bourgeoisie property-owning classes, 
where Bakunin wanted to expand the revolution to overthrow not only these mechanics of 
capitalism but also the state form itself. Bakunin, rather than envisioning a form of centralized 
state ownership of the means of production, advocated for a “voluntarily federated set of groups” 
as the basis of post-revolutionary social organization.87 Bakunin, somewhat prophetically, argued 
that Marx's views would only ever result in a changing of the authoritarian guard, and that a 
dictatorship of the proletariat was no less objectionable than one of the bourgeoisie. Alvin 
Gouldner refers to this feud, which ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the First International 
in 1872 and the exiling of Bakunin’s contingent of IWA members to the United States, as “the 
culminating conflict of [Marx’s] political life.88 
 While this emphasis on the climactic clash between Marx and Bakunin is in many ways 
justifiable, there has been comparatively little examination of the arguably equally important 
inaugural conflict between Marx and anarchism, which occurred in the form of Marx’s extended 
attack on Max Stirner’s The Ego and its Own. Among Marx scholars, the importance of The 
German Ideology for Marx’s later work is well established, and many of the themes that find 
their ultimate expressions in Capital are first elucidated in The German Ideology. However, what 
is often overlooked about that work and its impact on Marx’s later thinking (and the 
                                                          
87 Alvin W. Gouldner, “Marx's Last Battle: Bakunin and the First International,” Theory and Society 11, no. 6 
(1982): 853-884, 859.  
88 Gouldner, “Marx’s Last Battle,” 853.  
39 
 
development of the relationship between Anarchism and other Leftisms more generally) is the 
inclusion of a very lengthy section, indeed the largest in the work, addressing the thought of Max 
Stirner. There are a number of interesting historical factors that contributed to the general lack of 
sustained analysis of this section of The German Ideology, and the attendant de-emphasizing of 
the impact of Stirner’s thought on Marx. For example, the earliest and most widely-read English 
translation of that work (the Roy Pascal translation) omitted the section of Stirner, entitled “Saint 
Max,” entirely.89 Indeed, this translation was the only English version available until nearly 
1970,90 and by the time full translations began to emerge it was generally thought that the 
omitted sections from the Pascal translation were either small or of minor theoretical interest. 
From a purely editorial standpoint, the omission of “Saint Max” from the text of The German 
Ideology is a strange choice. The section, which lays out Marx’s interpretation of Stirner’s 
philosophy and methodically attacks nearly every aspect of his work, comprises nearly three-
fifths of the entire text, is nearly ten thousand words longer than the entirely of Stirner’s own 
book, and is over five times longer than Marx’s discussion of his own position.91 The facts seem 
to clearly illustrate the importance that Marx himself placed on Stirner’s work, and specifically 
the need he felt personally to respond to it in such a lengthy and detailed manner. 
The Post-Hegelian Milieu 
 There is something of a larger context to this discussion that is worth reviewing as well, 
and which sheds some light on Marx’s preoccupation with Stirner during this period of his life. 
Throughout the early-to-mid-1840’s, Marx was intent on settling his longstanding philosophical 
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score with Hegelianism, and specifically the intellectual movement known as “Young 
Hegelianism.” The Young Hegelians, sometimes referred to as “Left Hegelians” (as opposed to 
their “Old” and “Right” counterparts, who embraced the idea that the dialectic of history had 
essentially come to an endpoint with Hegel’s death) was a loose association of German 
intellectuals who began to examine and engage with Hegel’s legacy after his death in 1831. 
Among their ranks were the brothers Bruno and Edgar Bauer, the theologian David Strauss, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, and Max Stirner. The intellectual and political culture of 
Germany in the aftermath of Hegel’s death was profoundly divided on the direction in which 
Hegel’s work was to be taken, and how the political landscape was to be interpreted through the 
lens of Hegel’s work, and the Young Hegelians represented the left-liberal point of view on those 
questions. More specifically, the nature and role of the Prussian state and the question of religion 
became key objects of contestation and, in the case of the Young Hegelians, critique, for those 
who would vie for Hegel’s mantle during these years. These topics dominated the post-Hegelian 
intellectual space to such a degree that Karl Rosenkranz, one of the few Hegelian thinkers of the 
time who attempted to maintain a relatively orthodox or centrist position, reflected that where 
Hegelianism has previously served as a pillar of both the Prussian state and the Church, it was 
now “considered to be heretical in religion and revolutionary in politics.”92 The dramatic degree 
to which Rosenkranz saw this shift in the perception of Hegelianism was in large part due to the 
success of the Young Hegelian project. As it turns out, the most radical developments in Young 
Hegelianist leftism were yet to come, and emerged largely in the mid-1840s as Bauer, 
Feuerbach, and Stirner began publishing more of their work.  
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 What Rosenkranz was referring to in 1940 were the early writings of the Young 
Hegelians, most notably David Strauss’ 1935 The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined, which 
represented the opening salvo of Left Hegelianism against established religious commitments 
and theological accepted wisdom. Strauss’ Life, a nearly eight-hundred-page tract, set out to 
historically examine the life of Jesus Christ, ultimately arguing, contra church teachings, that the 
belief in the incarnation of God in Christ was “the product of collective myth, the truth of which 
lies not in the unity of one man with God but in the divinity of humanity itself.”93 Strauss 
couched his project in rationalistic terms, claiming to reject the presupposition of any 
supernatural facets of the Christ narrative in order “to cling more tenaciously”94 to the historical 
truth of the Biblical accounts. The publication of Strauss’ investigation caused an uproar, and 
signaled the arrival of the Young Hegelians as a distinct political and philosophical movement. 
Importantly, though Strauss’ book was most explicitly religious, in the context of Prussia at the 
time, which severely restricted political speech but was comparatively lax when it came to 
religious discourse, it served as an important proxy for a political critique of the Prussian 
monarchical system. As Walter Jaeschke puts the point, “Much of the extensive literature 
devoted to the Hegelian left and right has failed to notice and has consistently disregarded the 
fact that it was this [Strauss’ Life] which transformed a debate on the philosophy of religion into 
a political debate.”95  
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Indeed, the majority of work produced by the Young Hegelians during this period took 
the form of religious criticism, but resonated most deeply and in the longer term in the political 
arena. A notable example is Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity (1841), in which Feuerbach 
advocates for a naturalistic and anthropological view of the origins and fundamental nature of 
religious conviction. Specifically, Feuerbach suggests that religious belief is the product of a 
confluence of two forms of what he calls “projection,” both of which grow out of immutable and 
basic human psychological needs. The first mode of projection arises out of man’s recognition of 
his own finitude, and the extension of that finitude to man as a species more generally.96 The 
second, and derivative form of projection, is the creation of a personal God in the image of the 
human person, a projection that, according to Feuerbach, “is in fact a product of the human 
person’s egoistic refusal to recognize his own limits in nature.”97 For Feuerbach, then, the 
emergence of Christianity was a historical, naturalistic process that could be objectively studied 
anthropologically. Feuerbach’s curative to this was a humanistic return to the individual as the 
measure of human value, rather than some immutable and ultimately illusory concept like the 
Christian God. Indeed, Feuerbach considered titling The Essence of Christianity, Know Thyself 
instead, thus driving home his humanistic desire to dispel “the illusions that alienated man from 
his own nature.”98 For Feuerbach, the task of post-Hegelian philosophy was to return man to 
himself because, as he puts the point, “It is the species which infuses love into me. A loving 
heart is the heart of the species throbbing in the individual.”99  
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It was this anthropological critique of Christianity coupled with Feuerbach’s humanistic 
return to the value of the individual in society that made his work politically important. In an 
echo of Hegel’s early work and indeed as a notable precursor to Marx, Feuerbach saw Christian 
belief as a product of its own particular material and historical conditions. He tied the genesis of 
the Christian need to “project his quest for personal worth into an afterlife beyond the social and 
political world that had ceased to be the sustaining medium of the self”100 to the decline of the 
Greek polis and Roman Republic. With the collapse of these archetypical forms of socio-political 
relationships, the human need of self-actualization drove humanity to posit a Universal redeemer 
who could satisfy that need. However, in doing so, Feuerbach argued that humanity profoundly 
and ultimately alienated itself from itself, and “sacrificed man to God, his own creation.”101 The 
reduction of human identity and value to a single, isolated individual (Christ, or the personhood 
of God), Feuerbach argued for a return to the communal orientation of the polis, and insisted on 
a social ontology that prioritized the social nature of humanity.102 While Feuerbach generally 
resisted explicit political engagement (he gradually ceased to contribute to Arnold Ruge’s journal 
Hallische Jahrbucher as the publication became increasingly politically radical),103 it is critical 
to recognize the degree to which philosophical and religious writings were deployed by the 
Prussian state to ideological support its foundations among the public and intellectual classes 
against what they saw as the potentially subversive advance of certain philosophical positions 
(atheism, republicanism, etc.). As Todd Gooch has argued, Feuerbach’s critiques of religion 
were often “directed against…representatives of what Feuerbach refers to as the positive 
philosophy, who were enlisted by Friedrich Wilhelm IV after he assumed the throne in 1840 to 
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combat the influence of Hegelian ‘rationalism’ in the Prussian universities.104 This participation 
in the sub rosa political conflict between the Prussian monarchy and the Young Hegelians, 
coupled with his lasting influence on Marx (as in his initial articulation of a concept of 
alienation), Feuerbach’s political impact was substantial.  
A similar case to that of Feuerbach was the work of Bruno Bauer. Bauer, though he 
originally rejected Strauss’ interpretation and held to the orthodox view of the historicity of the 
Christ narrative, published in quick succession Critique of the Evangelical History of John 
(1840) and Critique of the Evangelical History of the Synoptics (1841-1842), in which he argued 
that Strauss had not gone far enough in his criticism of religious doctrine. Specifically, where 
Strauss accounted for the mythological nature of Christian texts by appealing to a certain 
unsophisticated sincerity on the part of their authors, Bauer argued that the gospels he analyzed 
were created by “writers who had deliberately set out to achieve a desired effect.”105 This 
historically materialistic interpretation of the Gospels led Bauer to critique what he saw as the 
Church’s monopolistic, sectarian claim to universality by fusing the particular (in Christ) with 
the universal, rather than allowing for a pluralistic understanding of abstract universality in its 
myriad instantiations. This deeply Hegelian critique of the Church was tied directly to Bauer’s 
then-radical republicanism, in the sense that he saw the Church and the Monarchy as enacting 
precisely the same type of “hubristic particularism”106 that tamped down the radical possibilities 
embodied in a pluralistic celebration of what Bauer called “Self-Consciousness,” and it is 
Bauer’s understanding of this concept that provides the direct bridge between his religious 
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critiques and his critiques of the Prussian state (and State power more generally). Though Bauer 
did not identify as an anarchist, in the early 1940s he articulated a number of important critiques 
of the state and its structural oppression of self-consciousness, both individual and collective. In 
classical Hegelian fashion, Bauer saw his revolutionary program, as “rooted in the historical 
process of self-consciousness. What the present demands is opposition to alienation and 
heteronomy in all their forms,” and one key form in which those things are instantiated is the 
State.107 Though the intricacies of Bauer’s political theory are not directly relevant to the 
discussion here, what is important to note is that, as in the work of Feuerbach, the seemingly 
apological character of the Young Hegelian critiques of religion are also importantly political, 
once the Prussian context is understood.  
It was at this critical and fecund moment in German intellectual history, that Karl Marx 
arrived in Berlin and quickly fell in with the Young Hegelians. It was, importantly, Bruno Bauer, 
who was largely responsible for Marx’s being brought into the fold of the Young Hegelian social 
circle, and the two would even work on an edition of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion together.108 
Bauer’s influence on Marx was profound, and the two became very close, with many 
contemporaries viewing Marx as Bauer’s protégé.109 It is telling, in this regard, that Marx 
concluded his dissertation on Epicurus by arguing that the Hellenistic-era Greek thinkers 
represented an early instantiation not of the dialectical progress of Spirit, as orthodox 
Hegelianism would have it, but rather as participants in the dialectic of self-consciousness, as 
Bauer himself had argued.110 Soon after the completion of Marx’s dissertation, Marx accepted an 
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invitation from Bauer to visit him in Bonn, where Bauer had been transferred from Berlin to 
teach theology. The pair proceeded to spend the summer “shocking the local bourgeoisie – 
getting drunk, laughing in church…and penning an anonymous spoof The Last Trumpet of 
Judgment Against Hegel the Atheist and the Anti-Christ.”111 The publication of this shorter work, 
once the identity of the authors was discerned by a local Hegelian newspaper, ultimately led to 
the dismissal of Bauer from his university post and the departure of Marx to Cologne, where his 
break with Young Hegelianism would begin. After this time period, Marx’s thinking would 
quickly shift to a full rejection of Young Hegelian ideals, both philosophical and political. As he 
began his journalistic career at the German radical newspaper Rheinische Zeitung and began to 
become more interested in economic theory, he simultaneously began publishing a series of 
works attacking the Young Hegelians with whom he had previously been so close. These works 
included The Holy Family (1844), Theses on Feuerbach (1845), and The German Ideology 
(written around 1845). I have rehearsed briefly the philosophical context of Young Hegelianism 
as well as Marx’s interaction with the movement not merely for historical purposes, but because 
I argue that Marx’s break with Young Hegelianism, and Max Stirner most importantly, 
represents the origin of the more general rift between individualism and more communally 
oriented leftist ideologies in general, be they anarchist, communist, socialist, or whatever. That 
is, the intra-leftist disagreements between communalist democratic thinking and individualism 
always echo the rift between Marx and Stirner. It is to Stirner’s views themselves to which I turn 
in the next section, setting as they do the stage for nearly all subsequent developments and 
mutations in individualist anarchism, as well as the relationship between individualism and the 
Left more generally.  
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Stirner’s Egoism and the Culmination of Young Hegelianism 
 Max Stirner, though closely associated with the Young Hegelian circle, more often 
served as a foil to the work produced by the likes of Bauer, Feuerbach, and the like. Indeed, the 
little historical evidence we have about Stirner’s personal life and reladtionships suggest that he 
purposely remained on the margins of his social circle. William Brazill evokes Stirner’s presence 
at the meetings of the Young Hegelians of Berlin as “aloof and calm…willing to talk about 
philosophical matters, but never [speaking] about himself.”112 Friedrich Engels, who sketched 
the only extant depictions of Stirner, also mentions Stirner in a mock-epic poem, characterizing 
him as combining “restraint in his manners and extremity in his views, quietly reflective in 
appearance but provoking others with his ideas.”113 In terms of those provocative ideas, Stirner 
broadly held the Young Hegelian line on questions of religion and the Prussian monarchy, but 
broke with his contemporaries by pushing their lines of critique even further, arguing that the 
Young Hegelians had failed to see their project through fully. After having published a series of 
shorter articles and pieces of journalism in the early 1840s, Stirner published The Ego and Its 
Own (Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum). The book, which was a broad-based critique not only of 
the traditional targets of Young Hegelianism, but also the Young Hegelians themselves, 
specifically Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, received wildly divergent receptions. Among 
the general public, it was largely ignored entirely. Indeed, the manuscript was approved 
surprisingly easily by the Prussian censors, given its radical content and explicit critiques of the 
state, and was dubbed “too absurd to be dangerous.”114 At the same time, the book has also been 
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referred to as “the most revolutionary book ever written,”115 and this characterization is indeed 
more apt when the book is placed in the context of Left politics and the relationship between 
anarchism, Marxism, and the Young Hegelian milieu of the time. The book provoked direct 
responses from Moses Hess (who defended socialism against Stirner’s anarchism), Ludwig 
Feuerbach, and an anonymous follower of Bruno Bauer, who went by the name “Szeliga.”116 
 Stirner, the only Young Hegelian to explicitly declare himself an anarchist, sets up as his 
goal in The Ego and its Own, first to critique what he sees as the unfinished Young Hegelian 
project of ideological demystification, and second, to provide an individualist account of human 
development, both on the level of individual persons as well as as the grounds for a new social 
order. The book is divided into two major sections entitled “Man” and “I.” The first section can 
be characterized as genealogical, “not only in the mundane sense of tracing a linear progression 
through modes of experience, but also in the Foucauldian sense of trying to unsettle by 
demonstrating that modernity fails to escape from the very thing that it claims to have 
outgrown.”117 Specifically, Stirner argues that in their zeal to transcend the old types of religious 
belief and monarchical state power, his contemporaries had only succeeded in replacing those 
forms with equally homogenizing and oppressive constructs that changed the type of oppression, 
but not its nature. Whether one’s identity is determined by religious strictures, monarchical 
nationalism, or abstract ideals of humanism and secular citizenship, the key point is that one’s 
identity is being determined at all, and therefore stifled. For Stirner, the individual corporality of 
human experience is irreducible, and attempts to subsume individuals under any umbrella 
whatever are all fundamentally flawed and represent attacks on subjectivity. He accurately 
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glosses the general Young Hegelian humanist consensus in this way, “Be not a Jew, not a 
Christian, but be a human being…Assert your humanity against every restrictive specification; 
make yourself, by means of it, a human being, and free from those limits; make yourself a ‘free 
man,’ that is recognize humanity as your all determining essence.”118 Stirner unambiguously 
endorses freeing humanity from the shackles of outmoded religious visions of souls and essences 
(Stirner’s pet term for these incorporeal ideals is “spooks”), but argues that this critique is 
incomplete. What else is “human being” but yet another restrictive identity specification, much 
like “Jew,” “Christian,” “Prussian,” or whatever else? He writes, “I say: You are indeed more 
than a Jew, more than a Christian, etc., but you are also more than a human being. Those are all 
ideals, but you are corporeal.”119 Stirner is not here advocating some primitive form of 
posthumanism, by which we transcend our humanity through technological or other forms of 
augmentation,120 (though as I will argue in Chapter Three, individualism is fundamentally 
compatible with these sorts of identity play), but rather is calling for a reevaluation of the 
identity categories of Enlightenment humanism, and illustrating their discursive limitations. 
Stirner’s genealogy of homogenizing, spectral power over identity and subjectivity suggests that 
where “political liberalism” attacked the power of individual feudal masters, it merely replaced 
that master with the master of state power; where “social liberalism” aims to abolish inequality 
in property, it does so only by appealing to the abstract category of “ghostly society,” which 
again only serve to subsume the individual; and where “humanistic liberalism” attempts to free 
people from the controlling power of religion, it does so only by replacing religious conviction 
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with abstract ideals of “Man.”121 Stirner summarizes his view of liberal humanism this way, “In 
short, I have no calling, and follow none, not even that to be a man.”122 Importantly, Stirner 
directly attacked socialist communism as participating in this religious return to abstract ideals of 
humanity and community membership. Stirner accurately points out that the socialist 
preoccupation with alienation is important not because of the process of alienation (on which 
Stirner largely agrees with Marx), but because of the question of what one becomes alienated 
from. The socialist view of alienation, on Stirner’s view is that “if a factory worker must tire 
himself to death twelve hours and more, he is cut off from becoming man,”123 where “man” is 
used as a proxy for a prescriptive vision of humane excellence or value. The communist still 
neglects the individuality of discrete human persons in favor of their preferred religious ideals of 
“laborer,” “fellow worker,” and the like. This discourse is still unacceptably essentialist on 
Stirner’s view, and is itself merely a form of religious orthodoxy. He writes, “As the communists 
first declare free activity to be man’s essence, they, like all work-day dispositions, need a 
Sunday; like all material endeavours, they need a God.”124 It was this form of critique that so 
predictably incensed Marx, and pushed him to directly and lengthily attack Stirner. Though it is 
generally agreed upon that Marx’s dealings with the anarchists, Stirner in particular, were 
interpretively ungenerous, reliant on personal attacks, and revealing of “the authoritarian 
tendency of his own social and political thought, but also the authoritarian nature of his own 
personality,”125 Marx did recognize that Stirner’s extremism did indeed represent the culmination 
of the Young Hegelian project of critique, and took seriously his diagnosis of concepts such as 
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“man,” and historical actors such as “the worker” as merely vestigial and covert religious 
abstractions.126  
The truly radical project of individualism, for Stirner, is to subvert all categories of 
homogenizing identification and expose the relations of power and control that exist in even the 
purportedly liberal rejections of things like religion and monarchical authority. In this sense, Saul 
Newman argues that Stirner represents an important precursor to more recent critiques of power 
and calls for a “politics of difference” pursued by poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault and 
Derrida.127 Stirner’s exposure of a political imaginary, in mid-19th century Germany, that was 
still indelibly polluted with “essentialist categories that are derived from Enlightenment 
humanism,”128 Stirner was inarguably ahead of his time. His positive views for a society 
compatible with individualist values will be discussed along with those of other individualists in 
Chapter Three, but the key point here is to illustrate Stirner’s inauguration of anarchist 
individualism and his break with Marx, which I argue represents the larger break between leftist 
thinking and individualism in general, particularly once individualist ideas are exported to the 
United States and undergo certain proto-libertarian mutations.  
American Anarcho-Individualism 
 As discussed in Chapter One, a certain breed of rugged individualism is deeply embedded 
in the American cultural and political consciousness. I want in this section to discuss how the 
arrival of Max Stirner’s egoist anarchism on American shores influenced the libertarian left of 
the age, as well as examine how these developments set the stage for the ultimate appropriation 
of individualism by the current neoliberal forces of right libertarianism and conservatism.  
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 While there were certainly important precursors to individualist anarchism in American 
philosophical history, the majority of the nineteenth century in American radicalism was marked 
much more dramatically by a tendency toward communal utopianism, which was both not 
generally anarchist in its orientation and much more willing to treat individuals as explicitly 
subordinate to communal identities. During this period, figures like Robert Owen, George Rapp, 
and various religious sects, drawing their inspiration often from the work of utopian social 
planner Charles Fourier, set out to establish perfectly harmonious communal societies apart from 
the control of state authority.129 It was this utopian socialist milieu that produced arguably the 
first American anarchist,130 Josiah Warren, as well as primed the American left to receive the 
impending English translation of The Ego and its Own on terms very different than those of the 
European context.  
 Warren, of whose life relatively little is known, first appears in the history of American 
radicalism as a follower of the utopian Robert Owen, and one of the founding settlers of an 
Owenite utopian socialist community, New Harmony, in Indiana in 1925. The colony at New 
Harmony fell apart two years later in 1927, but unlike many of the disillusioned would-be 
utopians, Warren’s conviction of the possibility of autonomous government apart from State 
authority only strengthened. For Warren, the failure of New Harmony was that it had entirely 
failed to respect individuality and, crucially, concepts of private property and personal 
responsibility.131 Warren argued that attempts to subjugate individual will and personality to a 
                                                          
129 For American utopianism in general, see John W. Friesen & Virginia Lyons Friesen, The Palgrave Companion to 
North American Utopias (New York: Palgrave, 2004), Christopher Jennings, Paradise Now: The Story of American 
Utopianism (New York: Random House, 2016), and America’s Communal Utopias, ed. Donald E. Pitzer (Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994).  
130 Philosopher Crispin Sartwell, who has produced the only major collection of Warren’s writings and remains one 
of the few scholars actively researching Warren, suggests as a more accurate characterization “the first American to 
publish his views whose anarchism was not primarily religious.” The Practical Anarchist: Writings of Josiah 
Warren, ed. Crispin Sartwell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 2.  
131 Eunice Minette Schuster, Native American Anarchism, 96-97.  
53 
 
sense of collectivity was ultimately what doomed New Harmony, and was the fatal flaw in all 
forms of communalist organization, be they utopian, communist, or merely state-socialist. He 
wrote in his “Narrative of Practical Experiments,” “It [the utopian movement] had been defeated 
by our attempt to govern each other, to regulate each other’s movements for the common benefit, 
no two having the same view from one week to another. Infinite diversity instead of unity is 
inevitable…”132 Though Warren was by no means opposed to the concept of common benefit, 
and held that rigorous respect for individuality would on the whole lead to the benefit of all, one 
can already see here the seeds of the right-libertarian wholesale rejection of community and 
valorization of private property.  
Another key aspect of Warren’s philosophy that serves as a precursor to explicit right-
libertarianism, and contributed to the misinterpretation of Stirner among American anarchists, 
was his emphasis on economic exchange. The year that New Harmony failed also represented a 
banner year for the American labor movement, with laborers from a number of disciplines 
forming the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations and successfully striking for a ten-hour 
work day, as well the founding of the radical trade newspaper The Mechanic’s Free Press.133 
Warren, who saw Robert Owen’s proposed solutions to the problems of labor as paternalistic and 
wrongly capitulating to the demands of capital at the level of ownership, saw this as an 
opportunity for him to put forth his theory of voluntary association and economic production as a 
solution that genuinely respected the individual and his rights. One of the cornerstones of 
Warren’s economic theory, which he referred in a work by the same name as “equitable 
commerce,” was the concept of the “Time Store.”134 Effectively, the Time Stores, of which a 
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number were actually established in Cincinnati and elsewhere, were meant to be places where 
goods could be exchanged directly for labor, represented by labor notes. Rather than a currency 
in the sense that the term is usually understood, Warren argued that “a stable, rational circulating 
medium must be nothing but a representation of a certain amount of goods or labor, a sheer 
placeholder for things of intrinsic value.”135 In Warren’s system, if I want to purchase x number 
of bushels of wheat, I need to pay the wheat farmer with labor directly equivalent to the labor 
utilized in the production of the wheat. This system, Warren argued, both solved some of the 
intrinsic problems with money (inflation, speculation, artificial limitation on supply, etc.) and 
provided opportunities to those traditionally left behind by usual monetary systems (the 
homeless, poor, etc.) since they would immediately gain wealth in the form of their direct labor 
under this system. While there are examples of Warren’s system finding success, as in his later 
utopian experiment on Long Island, Modern Times, it should be obvious given more recent 
mutations in the discourse of responsibility and personal initiative (as in Reagan and Thatcher), 
that Warren’s vision of fair economic exchange was ripe for exploitation and appropriation by 
conservative and right libertarian forces.136  
Warren’s emphasis on private property and exchange, along with his interpretation of 
self-ownership in an economic sense centered around one’s right to economically dispose of 
one’s own labor, rather than in a metaphysical sense centered around the imperative of self-
creation (as in Stirner, Emerson, and Thoreau), runs through the American individualists. Take, 
for example, William Batchelder Greene, another American anarchist individualist whose views 
were, like Warren’s, significantly shaped by a negative experience with an experimental socialist 
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utopia, this time at George Ripley’s137 Brook Farm in eastern Massachusetts. Greene is by far 
most well-known not as an anarchist per se, but rather as an economic critic, specifically of the 
concept of interest. James J. Martin, one of the most important historians of American 
individualist anarchism refers to Greene as “a product of the currency radicalism that 
accompanied and followed the business and financial panic of 1837.”138 Greene’s most well-
known works, Mutual Banking (1850) and Equality (1849), echoed Warren’s critiques of 
centralized state and private power in the form of banks and other organization, arguing that the 
various forms of speculation, interest, and the like that had plagued the banking system in the 
United States be eliminated from financial transaction. Greene, though developing a less 
thoroughgoing individualist metaphysic than Warren, still couched many of his economic 
critiques in the language of individualism. He writes, for example, in Equality, that centralized 
banking, with interest and the like, puts banks in a prime position “to enable the few to bring the 
many under tribute…On the side of the bank there is a small army, well equipped, well officered, 
and well disciplined.”139 Greene saw the banks as essentially paramilitary organizations that 
tamped down individual freedom, productivity, and generally damaged social relations. At the 
same time, his solutions to the issues he saw with banking and the excesses of centralized capital 
were articulated in precisely the same language as what we would today think of as right-
libertarianism, namely “increasing personal freedom” and “increasing competition and choice.”  
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Greene’s economic individualism was importantly formative in the thought of the most 
influential of the American individualists, Benjamin Tucker. It would be through Tucker, and his 
series of anarchist periodicals The Radical Review and Liberty, that European individualism of 
the type advocated by Stirner first made its way to the United States. Tucker, who referred to his 
politics not as anarchism, but as “unterrified Jeffersonianism,”140 was in some senses the 
philosophical heir of a wide swathe of American leftisms, less an original thinker than a 
synthesizer and, in some ways, a popularizer.141 The wide and popular distribution of Liberty 
(active from 1881-1908), which counted among its contributors and subscribers the likes of 
George Bernard Shaw and Walt Whitman,142 provided the perfect avenue for the distribution of 
anarchist thought and writing, and was taken full advantage of by Tucker and his 
contemporaries. The purpose of the periodical was entirely and explicitly to advocate anarchist 
ideals, particularly in the tradition of Josiah Warren. The influence of Warren’s economistic 
individualism on Tucker’s early thought is apparent in the initial advertisement for Liberty, 
which read in part that the chief enemy of the publication was 
the State – The State that corrupts children, the State that trammels law; the State that 
stifles thought; the State that monopolizes land, the State that limits credit; the State that 
restricts exchange; the State that gives idle capital the power of increase, and through 
interest, rent, profit, and taxes, robs industrious labor of its products.143 
 
Given Tucker’s philosophical proclivities and the global reach of his influential publication, it 
was inevitable that Tucker would eventually become acquainted with Stirner’s work and its 
European advocates, most notably John Henry Mackay, a prominent advocate of Stirnerite 
individualism and eventual biographer of Stirner. While the historical timeline is somewhat 
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muddled regarding who introduced who to Stirner’s work, and though Stirner had been known in 
certain American anarchist circles prior to Tucker’s first meeting with Mackay in the Summer of 
1889, what is clear is that Tucker and Mackay immediately felt a philosophical kinship and 
began working together very quickly.144 Mackay was himself a fascinating figure, and a poet and 
anarchist thinker of some merit in his own right. He was a prominent homosexual in European 
radical circles and penned a number of highly polemical and controversial defenses of free love, 
up to and including pederasty.145 After the meeting between Tucker and Mackay, Mackay began 
publishing regularly in Liberty from an explicitly Stirnerite perspective, and Tucker began 
working, along with fellow Anarchist Steven T. Byington, on preparing the first English 
translation of The Ego and its Own, which would eventually appear in 1907. Tucker’s 
interpretation of Stirner’s individualism was directly in line with and colored by his already 
established commitments to the Americanized individualism of Warren, Greene, and the like, 
and so he saw in the work of the German a philosophical tool to advance his own vision of 
individualism, which again was much more economistic and reductive than Stirner ever 
intended. Indeed, controversies surrounding Tucker’s interpretation of Stirner arose almost 
immediately, with Dora Marsden, a suffragette and individualist who published a Stirnerite 
journal The Egoist in the early 1900s, pointing out that Tucker was reading into Stirner and other 
European individualists economic themes and commitments that were simply not there, or at 
least were being wildly exaggerated and misinterpreted.146 At this point, however the die of 
American individualist anarchism had largely been cast, and the term was fastened strongly to 
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ideas of economic freedom, choice, competition, and reductive dichotomies of selfishness and 
altruism, and government and private industry.  
 In 1908, Tucker’s anarchist book shop, and the publishing office of Liberty, burned to the 
ground, forcing Tucker to flee to France. Many saw the fall of Liberty, the dissolution of the 
individualist group that had formed around the figure of Tucker, and the simultaneous rise of 
Anarcho-communism as the preferred radical leftist position (exemplified in Emma Goldman’s 
Mother Earth), as the end of individualist sentiment in America, and it is indeed where James J. 
Martin ends his authoritative study of that subject.147 However, when Tucker died in France in 
1939, though his work would not be as influential on the development of the Left as Stirner’s was 
in his time, his economistic rhetoric of individualist self-interest was already shaping the views of 
a very different group of political thinkers that would come to define right-libertarianism in the 
years to come. In the next section I will survey some of these thinkers and their thought, as well 
as complete my genealogical account of the development and eventual subversion of individualism 
in the American context, culminating in its appropriation for explicitly conservative capitalist 
ends.148 
The Conservative Appropriation of Individualism 
 Much has recently been written about the prominent (re)emergence of individualist 
economic and social discourses on the American right. Perhaps the figure who has prompted the 
most interest in the ideological foundations of these views is that of Paul Ryan, Republican 
                                                          
147 Martin, Men Against the State, 276.  
148 It is worth reiterating that I in no way mean to directly equate the views of the early American individualist 
anarchists discussed in this section with contemporary conservatism and right-libertarianism. Indeed, many of the 
views of these thinkers were genuinely radical, both in their time and today (many were early adopters of 
abolitionism, free love, equality for men and women in marriage, and gay rights). The point here is to show how 
Stirner’s individualism, beginning with his feud with Marx, was appropriated and mutated through its various 
historical contexts to the point that individualism as a term has become automatically associated with neoliberal 
capitalism and unfettered self-interest.  
59 
 
congressman from Wisconsin and current Speaker of the House. Ryan has been very public about 
his philosophical affection for the work of Russian novelist Ayn Rand, who is credited by many 
with popularizing rightist libertarian individualism among the American populace during the 
middle of the 20th century. Ryan credits reading Rand in high school with sparking his interest in 
politics and economic policy, and claims to direct all of his congressional interns to read her most 
well-known work Atlas Shrugged (1957).149 Donald Trump has spoken highly of Rand’s The 
Fountainhead (1943), stating that “it relates to business (and) beauty (and) life and inner emotions. 
The book relates to…everything,” and claims to personally identify with the novel’s egoist 
protagonist Howard Roark.150 Trump’s nominee for labor secretary Andrew Pudzer (who was 
forced to withdraw from consideration after documents detailing alleged spousal abuse surfaced), 
has stated that he instructed all six of his children to read The Fountainhead.151 Clearly, Rand has 
had a large influence on the ideology of the contemporary right, particularly on economic issues. 
Jennifer Burns, who has painstakingly documented Rand’s work and rise in conservative circles 
in her Goddess of the Market (2009), assesses Rand’s legacy in this way, “She does, however, 
remain a veritable institution within the American right…For over half a century Rand has been 
the ultimate gateway drug to life on the right.”152 It is worth mentioning here that, despite her 
undeniable political staying power, Rand has exerted precisely zero influence in academic 
philosophical circles, even among those who identify as conservative or libertarian. Robert Nozick, 
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who authored the standard account of academic right-libertarian philosophy Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia (1974) is one of the few academic philosophers to even address Rand by name, and he 
more-or-less dismisses her philosophy as a potential moral foundation for capitalism out of 
hand.153 This fact is perhaps indicative of yet another splintering of individualism once it entered 
the consciousness of the right, but since Rand and those in her orbit much more readily took up 
the mantle and language of individualism explicitly, it is their work that will be the focus of this 
section.  
 Rand seems to have viewed her philosophy and work as historically sui generis, 
conditioned neither by the material conditions of her life or his theoretical forebears. Speaking 
through the character of Howard Roark, she writes in a not-so-thinly-veiled reference to her own 
work, “I inherit nothing. I stand at the end of no tradition. I may, perhaps, stand at the beginning 
of one.”154 In reality, of course, Rand was undeniably in theoretical conversation with the 
American individualists and their European counterparts (particularly Nietzsche, in Rand’s case), 
and she developed much of her thinking in the same way that many of the American individualists 
did, namely as a response to a deeply negative formative experience with communal existence, as 
she witnessed her father’s self-made wealth forcefully reappropriated by the Red Guard during the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1918, and was forced to relocate multiple times as a child due to 
communist-induced instability in Europe.155 Rand’s philosophy extolled the polar opposite of 
communal values, as well, in her eyes the repressive and irrational Christian morality, namely what 
she famously referred to as “the virtue of selfishness,” and correspondingly preached the inherent 
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destructiveness of altruism.156 For Rand, any proper ethic that would claim to be able to guide 
human conduct must above all else be rational. Her proposed system, which she called 
“objectivism,” purported to be the first ever rational answer to “the question of why man needs a 
code of values.”157 Rand’s answer to this question is, essentially, the pursuit of survival and self-
interest by individuals. Rand interpreted the Nietzschean conception of the ubermensch to refer to 
the individualized forms of genius and creativity that are constantly tamped down by the strictures 
of society and political power.158 While this interpretation of Nietzsche, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, is crude and reductive, as well as likely a product of Rand’s own bitterness at her 
early professional and social failures, it lent her work a particular appeal amongst disaffected youth 
and individuals who felt that their own greatness had been overlooked or even suppressed by some 
or other aspect of society. For Rand, the solution was, essentially, capitalism. The freedom of the 
market was the most “rational” way of releasing the shackles that had previously fettered the great 
geniuses of society and provide a rational basis for organizing society, namely along the lines of 
intellectual, physical, and economic prowess.  
 Rand’s work emerged alongside both a series of Red Scares in the United States, which 
contributed to a generalized skepticism regarding communism and communally-based political 
systems in general, as well as the emergence of a chorus of new economists who defended Rand’s 
vision of the free market on economic, rather the moral grounds favored by Rand. Specifically, the 
rise of so-called Austrian economics and its outpost at the University of Chicago in the United 
States purported to empirically prop up Randian assumptions regarding individuals, capitalism, 
and the good. This era in economic theory represents the rise of what we know today as 
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“neoliberalism,” a term that has undergone a number of mutations and alterations, sometimes 
going by the aliases of “late capitalism,” “liquid capitalism,”159 and others. Neoliberalism is itself, 
as the name implies, a type of mutation, namely of economic liberalism, or what is sometimes 
called “classical liberalism” to emphasize the distinction. The basic principles of neoliberalism 
were elaborated following the 1938 Walter Lippman Colloquium in Paris, which was called 
explicitly to form a new liberalism as interest in classical liberal economic thinking waned. The 
foundational commitments ultimately produced by the participants at the colloquium are “the 
priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and 
impartial state.”160 Two of the most important neoliberal economic theorists who were to emerge 
in the postwar period were attendees at the original Colloquium, namely Friedrich Hayek and 
Ludwig von Mises. Hayek and von Mises, along with Chicago economist Milton Friedman would 
go on to found the Mont Pelerin Society, an organization dedicated to developing and, critically, 
disseminating the ideas of neoliberal economics. The neoliberals took on board nearly all of the 
most foundational commitments of classical liberalism, namely a vision of economics as an 
objective science akin to the hard sciences of physics and chemistry, a fundamentalist Lockean 
view of property rights,161 and a strong preference for negative over positive freedom. That is, the 
neoliberal theorists, in advocating for a government detached from people’s economic lives in 
every way other than military protection, argued that the primary mode of freedom to be accorded 
individuals is that of freedom from outside interference. Individuals ought to be free from 
interference or restriction by government power up until the point that they threaten to infringe on 
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the rights of another, third party. Naturally, this implies the freedom to dispose of one’s labor and 
capital in whatever way one likes.162 While this view of freedom goes back as far as John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty,163 it was particularly centered in the economic theories advocated by the 
classical liberals and their neoliberal progeny. 
 It was the publication of Hayek’s 1944 The Road to Serfdom that signaled the fusion in the 
American political imaginary of the moralistic Nietzschean individualism of Rand with the 
dispassionate economic individualism of the Austrian school of economics. Both Rand and Hayek 
pointed to the deteriorating situation in Europe as evidence of the failures of collectivism and 
directly mobilized individualist language, tied in their work directly to capitalism, as a 
counterpoint to the evils of socialism. Though neither thinker would directly identify American 
anarcho-individualism as an influence on their thought, the connections were made by their 
followers both in the public and in the academy. Followers of Rand on the student Right, for 
example, fashioned a new logo for the nascent Objectivist movement that imposed a shining, gold 
dollar sign (one of the avatars of John Galt, the hero of Atlas Shrugged) over the traditional 
anarchist black flag.164 Murray Rothbard, a radical devotee of von Mises and the first to use the 
term “anarcho-capitalism” to describe his economic views, deeply admired the work of Benjamin 
Tucker and his lesser known contemporary Lysander Spooner. Rothbard opened his analysis of 
what he called “The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine,” that “nothing is more needed today than a revival 
and development of the largely forgotten legacy that they left to political philosophy.”165 Rothbard 
advocated, like Tucker and Warren, the complete elimination of the state so as to maximize 
                                                          
162 See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in his Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 166-217.  
163 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003).  
164 Burns, The Goddess of the Market, 253.  
165 Murray N. Rothbard, “The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist’s View,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 
20, no. 1 (2006): 5-15, 5.  
64 
 
personal liberty in the economic realm, and agreed with Rand that this would open up the space 
for human creativity to unfold unhindered. 
Rothbard’s anarcho-capitalist individualism is the philosophical terminus at the extreme 
right of the individualist anarchism of Max Stirner, a view with which, as Chapter Three will 
demonstrate, it is fundamentally incompatible. When “individualism” is attacked by those on the 
left who advocate the range of views from state socialism to communistic anarchism, it is generally 
the views described in the last section of this chapter that they have in mind, and these views are 
indeed anathema to many traditionally leftist commitments, such as democratic community, a 
sense of the common good, and basic human empathy. Having traced the mutation of Stirner’s 
original articulation of individualist anarchism, and particularly his negative critique of the state 
and the project of enlightenment humanism, up to the current era of neoliberal capitalism, the next 
chapter will, drawing on not only Stirner but a suite of other early individualist thinkers, construct 
a view of individualism that not only runs counter to the neoliberal individualisms just discussed, 
but also serves as a powerful ally to other leftisms.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEFT-ANARCHO-INDIVIDUALISM: A POSITIVE VISION 
 
 Having reviewed the historical development of individualist thinking within anarchism, 
and diagnosing what I see as the perversion of the core of individualism by neoliberal capitalist 
rationality, this chapter will, drawing on the work of some of the individualist thinkers surveyed 
in Chapter 2, lay out a positive, synthetic understanding of individualism as both an ontological 
and socio-political worldview that I believe ought to be attractive to leftists of many types, 
particularly in the struggle to resist neoliberal late capitalism. I have previously spoken in terms 
of “individualism” or “anarcho-individualism” in general terms, focusing more on the historical 
development of the tradition. In this chapter I will articulate a view of what I will call “left-
anarcho-individualism” and distinguish that view from the “right-anarcho-individualism” 
described in the conclusion of the previous chapter.166 While both views are “individualist” in a 
basic sense, it is the political and ethical dimensions of each view that render them importantly 
distinct. Chapter 4 will lay out what I see as some of the most powerful objections to the left-
anarcho-individualist view presented here and answer them.  
Individualism as an Ontological Commitment: The Primacy of Subjectivity and Identity 
 At the foundation of individualism lies a suite of ontological claims about the nature of 
the individual, the nature of freedom, and, by extension, the nature of society. Eunice Minette 
Schuster, in her study of the American anarchist tradition, succinctly sums the individualist view 
(which she controversially attributes to all anarchists) this way, “The Individual for the anarchist 
is the only social reality. Society has no existence, per se, as distinct from the individuals who 
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compose it.”167 Put more expansively in the words of American anarchist Benjamin Tucker, 
“Man sums up in his being all the universe contains.”168 This particular social ontology, which 
centers the individual as of primary importance in philosophical and political theorizing, runs 
throughout all of the individualist thinkers, including those who would mobilize their thought for 
conservative capitalist ends, an overlap which has led many to dismiss individualism out of hand 
as a useful tool for leftist resistance, a mistake that I will address in Chapter 4.  
 The particular approaches taken by the various individualist thinkers differ in some minor 
ways, but the general thrust of their ontological approaches to individualism are, in the main, 
very similar. In general, individualists are interested in the unavoidably subjective, first-person 
nature of human experience of being a specific, discrete person in the world. In this sense, the 
foundational ontological concern of individualism can be said to be existentialist in some 
regards, and many commentators have made explicit the connections between the left-anarcho-
individualism of Stirner, Emerson, and others with the existentialist tradition represented by 
Nietzsche, Sartre, and others. Herbert Read, for example, makes this connection perhaps most 
explicitly, noting that  
Existentialism is eliminating all systems of idealism, all theories of life or being that 
subordinate man to an idea, to an abstraction of some sort. It is also eliminating all 
systems of materialism that subordinate man to the operation of physical and economic 
laws. It is saying that man is the reality - not even man in the abstract, but the human 
person, you and I; and that everything else – freedom, love, reason, God – is a 
contingency depending on the will of the individual.169 
 
The point Read is making here is simply that, for the existentialists and individualists alike, the 
individual both is ontologically primary (rather than abstract concepts of society and so on) and 
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ought never to be treated as subsumable under any other abstract heading. The individualist 
begins with the subjective lived-experience of the individual, and lets those experiences serve as 
the basis of all further theorizing and action. Max Stirner ably elucidates the starting point of 
individualist philosophy in the opening to The Ego and its Own, writing “From the moment 
when he catches sight of the light of the world a man seeks to find out himself and get hold of 
himself out of its confusion, in which he, with everything else, is tossed about in motley 
mixture.”170 Emerson poetically echoes Stirner’s vision of the “motley mixture” of our subjective 
experience in the opening of his aptly titled “Experience,”  
Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and 
believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, 
which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward 
and out of sight…All things swim and glitter.171 
 
Both Stirner and Emerson here are describing what they take to be the fundamental nature of 
human existence and experience, namely the fact that we are always engaged in a never-ending 
process of attempting to make sense of the world and of ourselves as beings in that world. It is 
the first task of the individual, on the individualist view, to reckon with the simple but strange 
fact that we exist at all. Agnese Maria Fortuna argues that both Emerson and his 
Transcendentalist contemporary Henry David Thoreau saw the search for authenticity and the 
expression thereof as an unavoidable ontological fact of human existence. She writes that for the 
Transcendentalists, “Individuals are basically conceived as expressing selves…Therefore, to 
express self is not evidently a matter of self-satisfaction or complacency…nor is it a simple 
question of finding a good use for personal talents. The worth of expression rests on its 
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unavoidability.”172 It is this unavoidability of confrontation with the self and the need for self-
creation that forms the most fundamental ontological commitment of the individualist.  
In this sense, the early individualists seem to be prefiguring some aspects of the work of 
Martin Heidegger, who, in his Being and Time, would famously call for a philosophical return to 
the question of Being as such that he felt had been lost in Western philosophy. Specifically, the 
individualist attitude toward experience seems to be of a piece with Heidegger’s concept of 
“thrownness” (Geworfenheit).173 The essential aspects of thrownness have to do with the 
unchosen and yet unavoidable fact of simply being somebody in the world, with concerns, 
responsibilities, relationships, and the full suite of human limitations and capacities. As Taylor 
Carman puts it, “I am constantly thrown into taking on responsibility for my being…my 
responsibility for my own being is thrust upon me; it accrues to me just in virtue of my being-in-
the-world.”174 Katherine Withy glosses the concept of thrownness in terms more directly in line 
with Stirner and Emerson, claiming that “Pure thrownness is the fact that there is and has to be 
sense-making, rather than not…Explicitly formulated, the reflective question…is, ‘What is it to 
be a sense-maker (rather than not)?’”175 While it would be wrong to label Heidegger as an 
individualist in the same way that one might use that term apropos Emerson or Stirner, there is 
no doubt that Heidegger’s understanding of the fundamental nature of the human subject is 
deeply in line with the understanding of the individual shared by the individualist thinkers.  
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 In this sense, there is an important distinction to be made in the individualist 
understanding of the nature of the individual herself. By centering the individual ontologically, 
the individualist does not simply mean that all humans are atomically isolated, Leibnizian 
monads that do not interact or comingle in meaningful ways. Rather, the claim of the 
individualist is that the question of what is it like to be a person, of the inside-out view of the 
world that we invariably have as humans, and of how we create ourselves and our identities out 
of the experiences that we have from that subjective first-person point of view must be central in 
our thinking about the world. What this means in practice is that individualists reject both the 
claim that social forms and identities are intelligible apart from individuals as well as the claim 
that individuals are always invariably subject to the influences of these social forms. Social 
identities and forms are viewed by the individualist as generally stifling, oppressive, and to be 
subverted by individual expressions of uniqueness and the quest for self-creation. The 
individualist rejects hierarchically imposed forms of homogenization as unacceptable forms of 
oppression, and calls for a rethinking of social forms so as to allow more space for the free 
development and self-creation of all people.  
 There is an important parallel here to draw between this positive understanding of the 
individualist claim regarding social forms and a critical insight provided by critical feminist and 
race scholarship, namely the rejection of essentializing narratives regarding groups of people as a 
way of undermining and subverting the power relations that those narratives reinforce and 
instantiate. Anti-essentialism, as theorized by critical race, feminist, queer, and other theorists of 
identity construction and formation, holds that overly general claims and narratives about 
oppressed populations are often deployed by social power structures in order to uphold and 
justify the systems of oppression that are in place in a given historical context. In feminist 
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thinking, for example, there is a long tradition, going back even to Simone de Beauvoir’s proto-
constructionist claim that “One is not born, but rather becomes woman,”176 of critiquing 
essentialist narratives that “deploy accounts of women’s hormones, anatomy, and physiology 
(especially in terms of menstruation and reproduction) to justify the political and social 
domination of women by men.”177 In recent years, the critique of essentialism has been 
importantly expanded by women of color and women who otherwise do not fit the standard 
historical feminist mold of white and middle-class. For these critics, the traditional feminist 
subject has been problematically generalized along racial, economic, ability, and other lines that 
obscures and flattens the unique and deeply diverse experiences of women cross-contextually.178 
These developments have in large part been spurred on by the encounter between feminist theory 
and the various postmodern decenterings of the subject in relation to social power relations 
exposed by the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and others.179 Some have argued that 
the critiques of essentialism have been overapplied or otherwise taken too far beyond their 
usefulness,180 but the general spirit of the anti-essentialist critique, i.e. that it problematically 
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178 For helpful general surveys of these debates and the development of feminist thinking on essentialism, see 
Cressida Heyes, Line Drawings: Defining Women Through Feminist Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2000), and Alison Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy,” Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 1, no. 2 (2004): 135-153.  
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individualist tenet that identities and the mobilization of them are at the discretion of individuals. That is, if an 
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rights recognition (or for another goal), the individual is free to do that, or not. Of course, the individualist position 
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erases critical differences between individuals’ experiences in a way that reinscribes oppressive 
power relations, is one that is still of profound importance in the struggle for liberation among 
oppressed groups.  
 A relatively extreme representative example of this anti-essentialist insight in racial 
theory is the work of Paul Gilroy, who has called for a fundamental break with “the dangerous 
and destructive patterns that were established when the rational absurdity of ‘race’ was elevated 
into an essential concept and endowed with a unique power to both determine history and 
explain its selective unfolding.”181 Gilroy argues for a radically humanist, and admittedly 
utopian, vision of social relationships that does not employ racial concepts, either for solidarity 
and communal organization or, more importantly perhaps, oppression and persecution. Despite 
the “hard-won, oppositional identities” that racial categories can and do support among 
marginalized peoples, Gilroy argues that these categories are always ultimately the concepts of  
“rulers, owners, and persecutors,” and for that reason must be rejected by those on which they 
are foisted.182 In this sense, Gilroy’s critique of the use of racialized thinking both by those who 
use it as a basis of oppression as well as those who would take it up for their own uses is 
fundamentally individualist in orientation, and the classic individualists would emphatically 
support Gilroy’s call for eliminating race as a social category that is imposed from the top down 
and, importantly, all-too-often utilized for purposes of oppression.  
                                                          
would be that society should never be organized such that these types of group mobilizations are necessary, but in 
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 Perhaps the clearest example of the individualist approach to social categories and 
relations is the advent and development of transgender studies and the various other approaches 
to “queering” gendered identities as a theoretical and political force in intellectual life. The 
subversion and disruption of historical and contemporary gender norms of appearance, dress, 
behavior, and the like represented by the transgender community, what Stephen Whittle has 
referred to as the effects of “gender outlaws,”183 is precisely the type of identity-work called for 
by Emerson, Stirner, Vaneigem, and others in the individualist tradition. The emphasis on the 
fluidity, irreducibility, and play184 in the approach to gender identity advocated by many 
transgender and queer theorists is something that the individualist tradition calls for to be applied 
across the board to all possible types of identity. As Judith Butler suggests, the idea that gender 
identities are fundamentally spectral, and socially imposed in order to maintain certain types of 
power relations can “open up possibilities for reassignment that excite [their] sense of agency, 
play, and possibility.”185  
This language of possibility, freedom, and play with respect to the creation and, often, 
changing of one’s own identity runs throughout the classical individualists, and is applied to all 
types of problematically homogenizing imposed identities. The individualist equally rejects 
imposed gender identities, imposed racial identities, and imposed cultural identities. The critical 
point for the individualist understanding of identity is that the individual is the one who is in 
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control of who they are, and who they want to be. This is not a one-time choice made with any 
sort of deterministic outcome, but is rather an ongoing and slippery process. In much the same 
way that critical race theorists have argued that culture is fluid, malleable, and fundamentally not 
static in any meaningful way, individualists argue that the self and identity should be thought of 
as open to change, play, and fluidity. In a similar way to how thinkers like Butler speak about 
and understand gender and the queering thereof, the individualist can be understood as 
suggesting that we explore how we might be able to queer all identity formations and socially 
imposed roles.186  
Many of the individualists couch their understanding of identity explicitly in this type of 
language of experimentation. Emerson, for example, speaks approvingly in “Self-Reliance” of 
the feeling of whimsy that his experiments in identity can provide, and in an anticipation of 
modern-day concepts like gender non-conformity, argues that self-reliance, rather than the 
rugged individualist caricature often suggested by his less charitable interpreters, is the aversion 
to conformity, which in his eyes is “the virtue in most request” by society in general.187 Stanley 
Cavell interprets Emerson’s admonishment to self-creation and experimentation as an injunction 
not to follow some set standard of excellence or a predetermined identity, but rather to follow 
one’s own whim and internal compass. He writes, “To say, ‘follow me and you will be saved,’ 
you must be sure you are of God. But to say, ‘follow in yourself what I have followed in mine 
and you will be saved,’ you merely have to be sure you are following yourself.”188 What is 
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critical about this injunction of Emerson’s is that what is to be followed in each individual may 
be, and indeed is likely to be, radically different, but each individual identity, though they may 
change over time and even moment to moment, grants to each individual the same feeling of 
subjective belonging to oneself and authenticity that cannot be attained simply by participating in 
large-scale social identities or labels. This common subjective sense of self-belonging is what 
Emerson will eventually argue serves as the basis of friendship and social relations. 
A related approach to self-creation and freedom from social identity formations is taken 
by Friedrich Nietzsche, a thinker who, along with Stirner, is often cited as a philosophical 
precursor to existentialism. One of the important aspects of the perpetual and rigorous critique of 
all homogenizing and reductive social forms, for the individualist, is the conviction that the 
individual has a right (and indeed a duty, as Emerson suggests) to take control of shaping herself 
according to her own vision of herself and of the good life. This aspect of individualism is 
clearly articulated in the work of Nietzsche, which attempts to bridge the divide between a 
conviction that individuals are inherently called to mold themselves in the ways they see fit and 
the knowledge that the conditions of human existence are often largely not of our own choosing. 
Ariela Tubert refers to this strain of Nietzsche's work as “freedom as self-creation,” and argues 
that, for Nietzsche, “freedom is acting in accordance with one's own values, which he often 
refers to as self-mastery and self-creation.”189 Indeed, this is reflected in a number of passages 
from Nietzsche's work, as when he remarks in Beyond Good and Evil, that “In man creature and 
creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in 
man there is also creator, formgiver, hammer, hardness, spectator, divinity, and seventh day...”190 
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Similarly, in characterizing his vision of the truly free individual, he argues that “the 'free' human 
being, the possessor of a long, unbreakable will, has in this possession his standard of value as 
well...the proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of 
this rare freedom, this power over oneself and fate, has sunk into his lowest depths and has 
become instinct.”191 Importantly, this freedom to self-create in Nietzsche's work is not simply an 
option which is available to humans but is rather, in a way which aligns Nietzsche closely with 
the thinking of Emerson, a moral imperative that we as humans cannot avoid.  
Taking on board the ontological commitments of individualism outlined above, namely 
the immediacy of our subjective experience of our own individuality as thrown into a morass 
from which we must differentiate ourselves, Nietzsche moves toward the normative position that 
humans ought to engage with this freedom to self-creation which is offered them by their 
ontological lot in life. One who fully and creatively participates in the process of constant self-
overcoming and re-making is what Nietzsche famously refers to as the Ubermensch. This term is 
one which needs a significant amount of explication to avoid some of the historically 
problematic associations which have grown up around Nietzsche's use of it and its subsequent 
interpretations and the uses to which it has politically been put, particularly in connection to the 
rise of Nazism in WWII Germany. Generally speaking, the term Ubermensch has been construed 
as what Bernd Magnus refers to as an “ideal type,”192 which represents a prescriptive set of traits, 
qualities, and values which must be aspired to by each individual person in society; a sort of 
heroic individual which is set apart from the mediocrity of the crowd and who serves as model 
for their own behavior and self-shaping activity. An important aspect of this interpretation of the 
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Ubermensch has to do with the idea that he embodies a new moral code which is somehow 
higher or more transcendent than the current moral standards, something which is often seen to 
play directly into the fascistic tendencies which are often drawn out of Nietzsche's work.193 
Going back as far as the introduction written for Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Nietzsche's sister 
(herself the fount of many of the most pernicious and egregious misinterpretations of her 
brother's work, including the imagined ties to Nazism), we see this interpretation at work. She 
writes,  
The phrase 'the rearing of the Ubermensch' has very often been misunderstood. By 
 the word 'rearing,' in this case, is meant the act of modifying by means of new and 
 higher values – values which, as laws and guides of conduct and opinion, are now 
 to rule over mankind...a new table of valuations must be placed over mankind – 
 namely, that of the strong, mighty, and magnificent man, overflowing with life and  
elevated to his zenith – the Ubermensch, who is now put before us with overpowering 
passion as the aim of our life, hope, and will...This type must not be regarded as a 
fanciful figure...it is meant to be a possibility which mean of the present could realize 
with all their spiritual and physical energies, provided they adopted the new values.194 
 
This interpretation of the Ubermensch figure is not one which was simply advocated by 
Nietzsche's sister, well known for bastardizing for her own political ends her brother's work. 
Much more recently, a similar view is advocated by J.P. Stern, who makes the ties to fascism 
quite explicit, writing of the Ubermensch, 
We for our part are bound to look askance at this questionable doctrine. We can hardly 
forget that the solemn avowal of this reduplicated self – the pathos of personal 
authenticity – was the chief tenet of fascism and National Socialism. No man came closer 
to the full realization of self-created 'values' than A. Hitler.195 
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While it would be disingenuous to deny that there are moments in Nietzsche's writing 
that are tempting to cite in support of these types of interpretations, particularly when taken out 
of context, it is equally important to recognize the countervailing tendencies in Nietzsche as well 
as the fact that he himself explicitly rejected this interpretation of the concept of the Ubermensch 
in Ecce Homo, writing that  
 
The word 'Ubermensch,' as a designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed 
to 'modern' men, to 'good' men, to Christians and other nihilists...has been understood 
almost everywhere with perfect innocence in the sense of those very values whose 
opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent – that is, as an  'idealistic' type of a higher 
kind of man, half 'saint,' half 'genius.'196  
 
Given that there are good reasons to be suspicious of the “ideal type” interpretation of 
Nietzsche's Ubermensch here, we ought to ask after a better, more consistent interpretation. 
Bernd Magnus has proposed what he refers to as the “attitudinal” or “diagnostic” interpretation 
of the Ubermensch, which emphasizes not any specific set of qualities or values which the 
Ubermensch is supposed to embody or model, but rather certain attitudes or approaches which 
are characteristic of the Ubermensch.197 For Magnus, we ought to reject the interpretation of 
Nietzsche's Ubermensch which holds him up as any kind of human ideal of perfection or “an 
algorithm telling us how, what, and when to choose”198 in favor of an understanding of the 
Ubermensch as a diagnostic concept which serves as “an underdetermined embodiment...of a 
certain attitude toward life and the world.”199 This less prescriptive understanding of the 
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Ubermensch as a general guideline for how one is to approach life, namely taking on the burden 
of self-creation and, indeed, self-perfection, seriously. 
Ultimately, the key difference, then, between the social ontologies of left-individualism a 
la Stirner, Nietzsche, and Emerson, and the right-individualism discussed in Chapter Two has to 
do with their orientation toward the self. The major focus of the anarcho-capitalist individualism 
of Rothbard, Rand, and the like is fundamentally objective in its orientation. The individual is 
conceptualized and treated as above all else rational, and as playing a role in the objective 
science of free-market economics. Insofar as subjectivity in right-individualism is considered at 
all, it is in the attempt to capture and quantify the economic preferences and desires of 
individuals. By contrast, left-individualism centers subjectivity from the beginning, orienting its 
entire view of the social space around the experiences of the individuals who exist in and create 
both that space and themselves in it. Emerson’s understanding of self-reliance as self-creation 
would be entirely foreign to Hayek, for example, who understands individuals only as nodes of 
economic exchange.  
 Having detailed the ontological commitments of the individualism I advocate here, as 
well as describing the ways in which that individualism sees the relation of individuals to their 
identity formations, I want to address directly the understanding of society and political 
commitments of individualism. I argue that an anarchist political theory is the most consistent 
with the individualism I have been discussing, and that it is the distinct set of political beliefs, 
strategies, and ideals that set apart left-anarcho-individualism from other forms individualist 
thought, such as anarcho-capitalism. In the next section, I discuss how left-anarcho-
individualism sees society, social forms, and why these socio-political commitments necessitate 
a rejection of both state and corporate authority. I will then conclude the chapter with a 
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somewhat briefer discussion of various potentialities for left-anarcho-individualist society, and 
illustrate why, despite how it may appear, such a term is in no way a contradiction or 
oxymoronic.  
Individualism as a Political Commitment: State, Economy, and Culture as Homogenizing Forces 
 In her 1993 book The Return of the Political, Chantal Mouffe provides a set of 
considerations and questions that can be seen as inaugurating the turn from ontological 
individualism to political, and ultimately, anarchist individualism. She writes,  
 
How can we grasp the multiplicity of relations of subordination that affect an individual 
if we envisage social agents as homogeneous and united entities? What characterizes the 
struggle of the new social movements is precisely the multiplicity of subject positions 
which constitute a single agent and the possibility that this multiplicity can become the 
site of an antagonism and thereby politicized.200 
 
While Mouffe’s broader goal in that book is, roughly, to attempt to rescue liberal democracy 
from itself, a project that the individualist, for reasons that will become clear, sees as 
fundamentally flawed, the animating concerns she lays out here are in many ways the same as 
those animating the left-anarcho-individualist political project. It is, I argue, the socio-political 
project of left-anarcho-individualism that sets it apart more than its ontological commitments. 
After all, one might readily accept that individuals are ontologically primary while still holding 
that social roles, mores, and cooperative goals still supersede the individual once they are 
established. This is arguably the view held by the classical social contract theorists.  
 For left-anarcho-individualism, the political and social corollary to the ontological 
emphasis on individual subjectivity is a global critique of all imposed political and social 
identifications, which individualists see as serving only to homogenize, reduce, and flatten 
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subjective experience unjustifiably and to both individual and collective detriment. I argue that 
this takes two major forms in individualist thinking: first, a critique of capitalism, and second a 
critique of state power and socio-cultural categories. Importantly, these imposed identifications 
also always reinforce pre-existing power relations and mechanisms of both state and social 
control. Recall from Chapter Two Max Stirner’s extension of the Young Hegelian critique of 
religious identification to the concept of “Man” itself. For the left-anarcho-individualists, where 
the identifications of “Christian,” “Jew,” “Muslim,” and so on (even more pernicious, is adding 
the modifier “good” to any of those) represented a type of reductive control of individual 
identities and a way of maintaining the power of the various churches, so do concepts like 
“Man,” “Consumer,” “Citizen,” and the like serve the same structural purpose. Some such 
identifications directly undergird state power, others the power of capital, and still others social 
relations of control. Political ideologies of all stripes, be they fascist, liberal, nationalist, or 
whatever all mobilize homogenizing identities to ensure conformity and control. Thus, where the 
left-anarcho-individualist would concur with the anarcho-capitalist in their commitment to 
dismantling governmental power, the rationales could not be more different, as the left-anarcho-
individualist calls also for the dismantling of the power of capital.  
 The thinker who has theorized the socio-political import of left-anarcho-individualism 
perhaps most thoroughly is Raoul Vaneigem, associate of the Situationist International. 
Vaneigem is often represented as the more poetic, chaotic foil to the more well-known Guy 
Debord, whose The Society of the Spectacle, represents the most influential and lasting 
contribution of the SI.201 It was, however, arguably the publication of Vaneigem’s The 
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Revolution of Everyday Life202 in 1967 that more directly inspired and fed the revolutionary ardor 
that exploded in the student protests of May 1968 in France.203 Vaneigem’s book would be 
quoted at rallies, used in graffiti, and carried in the back pockets of protestors throughout that 
event and others afterwards. Though Vaneigem’s work is often reductively juxtaposed with 
Debord’s on a spectrum of anarchism to Marxism, subjectivity to objectivity,204 Vaneigem had 
an important and well-developed theory of socio-political control and homogenization via 
identifications and social roles. Vaneigem diagnosed the various forms of oppression, violence, 
malaise, and depression experienced in their various modalities in modern life as stemming from 
forced, rote participation in ideological social identities. Vaneigem stands firmly on the primacy 
of the subjective in the project of political and economic liberation. He writes,  
The concept of class struggle constituted the first marshalling of responses to the shocks 
and injuries which people experience as individuals; it was born in the whirlpool of 
suffering which the reduction of human relationships to the mechanisms of exploitation 
created everywhere in industrial societies. It issued from a will to transform the world 
and change life...Anyone who talks about revolution and class struggle without referring 
explicitly to everyday life – without grasping what is subversive about love and positive 
in the refusal of constraints – has a corpse in his mouth.205  
 
For Vaneigem, and I would argue the individualists more generally, both the fundamental evils 
of capitalist oppression and the primary means of ultimately subverting that oppression206 are 
inescapably subjective, and begin with our inner experiences of our social world and roles in it. 
In this connection. Vaneigem makes a distinction between “identity,” which is the authentic and 
self-fulfilled expression of our genuine interiority, and “identification,” which represents the 
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uncritical ways we play our various social roles at the behest of power.207 In the context of our 
roles as consumers under capitalism, for example, he writes “At first glance the main thing 
would seem to be the choice of the ‘consumable image.’ The housewife-who-uses-Fairy-Snow is 
different…to the housewife-who-uses-Tide.”208 Here Vaneigem is rehearsing the common but 
important critique of capitalism that it provides merely surface-level, meaningless choices as a 
way of providing an illusion of identity and individuality when in reality all individuals are 
precisely the same in the eyes of capital, i.e. they are consumers; what is consumed is of nearly 
no importance whatsoever to the fundamental structure of the system.209 These types of 
meaningless loyalties to a label (e.g. Tide or Fairy Snow) are what Vaneigem calls 
“identifications.” In keeping with the individualist centering of subjectivity, Vaneigem argues 
that capitalist oppression functions most insidiously in its effects on subjective experience, 
homogenizing totally both individual identities as well as every moment of our daily existences. 
He writes “The bourgeoisie for its part does not dominate. It exploits. It does not subject people 
so much as wear them out.”210 Though the term “neoliberalism” had not entered the popular 
lexicon at the time, Vaneigem importantly anticipated David Harvey’s characterization of that 
particular mutation of capitalism as “the financialization of everything,”211 in that he was able to 
diagnose the ways in which neoliberal capitalism had begun to seep into every aspect of human 
existence, robbing them of those aspects that made them distinctly human to begin with. He 
traces the gradual phasing out of joy, love, friendship, and so on under the imperatives of 
neoliberal production and rationality, concluding that these forms of human relation and 
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expression only temporarily “found refuge in…oases doomed to disappear as the dictatorship of 
quantified exchange (market value) colonized everyday life and turned that too into a market.”212 
The individualists hold that the evil of the marketization is not solely, nor even primarily, the 
material conditions it imposes on people, but that it is fundamentally anti-human, reducing 
human beings to mere objects of exchange and homogenizing them under umbrella identities 
(worker, producer, owner, slave, etc.). The relationships, activities, and interactions that make 
human life something worth celebrating are undercut when they are subjected to the dictates of 
the market. Vaneigem writes,  
Systematically quantified (first by money and then by what might be called ‘sociometric 
units of power’), exchange corrupts all human relationships, feelings, and thoughts. 
Wherever exchange rules, only things remain in a world of human objects frozen in place 
in the organigrams of the cybernetic powers-that-be: a world of reification.213 
 
This critique of capitalist rationality, though it extends to the suffering that that economic form 
inflicts materially on a daily basis, argues that the fundamental evil committed by capitalism, that 
which enables all the other harm it causes, is its view of the human person, namely as an object 
reducible to brand identifications and relations of exchange. The individualist holds, rather, that 
“The individual is irreducible: subject to change but not to exchange.”214 However, this 
irreducibility applies beyond the realm of neoliberal economic reductionism into the political and 
social realms as well. 
Much like Stirner extended the Young Hegelian critique of religion to the very categories 
employed by the Young Hegelians themselves, Vaneigem mobilizes the common leftist critique 
of capitalism to critique the left itself as participating in the same type of ultimately meaningless, 
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homogenizing identification. He writes, referring back to the false distinction between the Tide 
user and the Fairy Snow user,  
The Labour voter differs from the Conservative voter, and the Communist from the 
Christian Democrat, in much the same way. But such differences are increasingly hard to 
discern…Eventually identification with anything at all, like the need to consume anything 
at all, becomes more important than brand loyalty to a particular type of car, idol, or 
politician. The essential thing, surely, is to alienate people from their desires and pen 
them in the spectacle, the policed zone. Good or bad, honest or criminal, left-wing or 
right-wing – what does the mould matter, so long as we are engulfed by it?215 
 
This extension of the critique of capital to the political and social realm is of critical importance 
to the left-anarcho-individualist project, as it suggests that not only are the choices that we are 
presented by capital meaningless, but similarly the choices we are presented by political parties, 
economic doctrines, cultural group identifications, and so on are also fundamentally 
meaningless, predicated as they are on the existence of larger-scale relations of power and 
control. Identification as a Communist, Christian, Latino, and so on are all the socio-political 
equivalents of brand identities, and falsely homogenize the irreducible nature of subjectivity in 
precisely the same way that the pseudo-choices of capitalism do. For the individualist, so long as 
our identities are simply chosen, or assumed unconsciously, out of a pre-established array of 
acceptable options presented to us by power, power wins. It is only the radical rejection of these 
homogenizing identifications and subversion of their expectations that genuine revolutionary 
progress can be made. The ontological irreducibility of subjective experience then serves as a 
grounding for the rejection of those socio-political forces that would attempt that reduction.  
 Emerson is again illustrative of this rejection of socially dictated identifications when he 
calls for the continual rejection of conformity and his famous “hobgoblin of little minds, adored 
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by little statesmen and philosophers and divines,” namely consistency.216 For Emerson, 
authenticity (Vaneigem’s “identity”) requires aversion to conformity, which “loves not realities 
and creators, but names and customs.”217 He goes on to name various social identifications that 
impinge on uniqueness and authenticity, including familial roles and conceptions of right and 
wrong, writing “Good and bad are but names very readily transferrable to that or this; the only 
right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it.”218 Stirner makes similar 
claims regarding the stifling nature of imposed social values, explicitly arguing that control over 
the levers of social morality grants incredible power to the State and the upper classes. In 
reference to this social power, he writes,  
What was so longed for and striven for through thousands of years – namely, to find that 
absolute lord beside whom no other lords and lordlings any longer exist to clip his power 
– the bourgeoisie has brought to pass. It has revealed the Lord who alone confers 
‘rightful titles,’ and without whose warrant nothing is justified.219  
 
Stirner, after making the political ground of his objections to talk of right and wrong, argues that 
we must reject these concepts in their traditional, externally imposed, forms. In an almost 
verbatim echo of Emerson’s essay, published only three years prior to The Ego and its Own, 
Stirner writes “I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right outside me. If it is 
right for me, it is right.”220 Stirner goes on to extend this critique to the concept of political 
rights, which he sees as also fundamentally dependent on an external authority, and therefore to 
be rejected, executing again the maneuver of taking an accepted position on the left and 
extending its own logic, to a less intuitive but relevantly similar example. He begins with the 
rejection of certain objectionable sorts of birthrights, particularly for the communists and 
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socialists who are his primary interlocutors, namely “the right to receive an entailed estate, to 
inherit a throne, to enjoy a princely or noble education.”221 Similarly, the disadvantage foisted on 
the poor and oppressed underclasses by the genetic lottery must also be rejected. The rejection, 
or at least social and economic counterbalancing, of these sorts of unearned benefits and harms 
under the guise of the language of rights is in many ways the foundation of liberal democratic 
thinking,222 and Stirner agrees here with the advocates of liberal humanist democracy that these 
sorts of inequalities are fundamentally unacceptable. However, the proposed liberal democratic 
solution, i.e. to “affirm that every one is by birth equal to another – namely, a man” must also be 
rejected.223 The issue with rights is not that they are unjustly distributed, but that their existence 
necessitates an outside authority to grant, enforce, and even create them. Attempting to solve the 
issues of human interaction by subsuming all individuals under the abstract heading “man” and 
submitting them to the authority of an external power that grants them certain rights and 
withholds others is to entirely retain the pre-enlightenment religious structure of authority, only 
substituting in for God things like State power and social expectation. For the left-anarcho-
individualists, the political and social dimensions of the assertion of the self and the rejection of 
homogenizing categories of identification extends past religious and nationalistic fervor to all 
imposed forms, racial, gendered, and even the concepts of right and wrong themselves.  
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Individualism and Relativism 
It is critical here to preemptively address an obvious objection that might be levelled 
against left-anarcho-individualism, namely that of moral relativism. This interpretation of the 
individualists is tempting due to their explicit rejection of imposed moral categories and the 
locating of moral authority at the level of the individual, as opposed to social norms or religious 
doctrine. Peter Marshall, for example, seems to suggest this view when he claims that Stirner’s 
ethic can be summed up as the “completely subjective” view that “right is merely might.” 224 
Admittedly, Stirner’s polemical writing style does little to assuage these worries about nihilistic 
moral relativism. However, I argue that neither Stirner nor Emerson, nor the other left-anarcho-
individualist thinkers are advocating any sort of simplistic ethical relativism of this type, but are 
rather calling for individuals to reject imposed categories, moral categories included. That is, the 
individualists do not reject the concept of morality or the concept of empathic engagement with 
fellow human beings tout court, but rather argue that our morality must grow out of our own 
experiences and interactions, rather than be dictated from an outside source. While Marshall is 
indeed correct that individualism holds that “there are not eternal moral truths and no values to 
be discovered in nature,”225 he is wrong that this view implies a wholesale rejection of ethical 
thinking.226 There are of course many moral theories that reject eternal and immutable moral 
truths apart from human existence but that do not collapse into relativism, and individualism is, I 
argue, to be counted among these.  
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Emerson, for example, advocates a pragmatist view of morality, that is neither imposed 
from outside nor fixed immutably, but rather shifts with experience and self-understanding. He 
writes, “Yesterday I was asked what I mean by Morals. I reply that I cannot define & care not to 
define. It is man’s business to observe & the definition of Moral Nature must be the slow result 
of years, of lives, of states perhaps of being.”227 Indeed, it was Emerson’s rejection of imposed 
external categories, both moral and other, that ultimately led him to reject traditional Christian 
derivations of morality from God.228 Emerson was quite circumspect regarding the danger of 
what David M. Robinson has called the possibility of a “subjectivism run amok.”229 He warned, 
for example, in “Experience” that as humans we have a certain tendency to “permit all things to 
ourselves, and that which we call sin in others, is experiment for us.”230 Emerson’s point here is 
neither an endorsement of ethical relativism nor a call to hold ourselves to an objective moral 
standard, but rather to acknowledge that ethical engagement requires deep self-reflection. This 
also entails a disciplined refusal to simply dismiss other’s actions as simply wrong or ours as 
simply right, but rather to attempt to subvert these categories altogether through experimentation 
and reflection. For Emerson, though morality is in some sense unknowable, the best we can do is 
to attempt to reach a place of self-trust and comfort in our moral action, such that morality 
becomes a type of epiphenomenon of self-knowledge and expression, coupled with rejection of 
imposed standards and categories. As David Robinson puts the point, “Emerson overcame moral 
paralysis with a…recognition that subjectivity generates ‘self-trust,’ which is valuable finally in 
insulating us from the imperatives of others,” and argues further that “the acts of the self-trusting 
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individual will cohere with the larger good more closely than those of the imitative or unoriginal 
individual.”231 Put slightly differently, so-called “’immoralism’ often appears to amount to no 
more than mere transgression…; but the essential principles of the immoralist are ever found in 
strength and inwardness, which strong assertion from within contrasts most strikingly with weak 
submission to that which is without.”232 Individual experience and self-reflection are, Emerson 
would argue, better guides to behavior than imposed external standards. This is not a rejection of 
morality, but a call to take our own moral lives seriously.  
Stirner argues along similar lines, holding that what is objectionable about moral 
strictures is not their content, but their form, imposed as they are by an outside source and 
uncritically accepted by individuals without regard to the ways in which those moral rules 
resonate or fail to with the experiences of that individual. This is not a rejection of the concept of 
ethical behavior or morality as such, but only of a certain attitude toward moral concepts, namely 
that they are outside the subjective experiences of individuals and must be obeyed regardless of 
context. For Stirner, this is to treat morality in the same way that we treat any other religious 
concept, namely as beyond questioning, and it is the positive project of individualism to 
empower the individual to question that which is foisted on her as given. When morality is 
treated as a sacred end beyond questioning, it becomes anathema to the individualist. It is in the 
constant reassessment and evaluation (what Nietzsche would call “transvaluation”) of our moral 
categories in light of our experience that constitutes individualist morality. For Stirner, like 
Emerson, the content of our moral lives is fundamentally comparative and experiential. As John 
Carroll suggests,  
“The quality of an experience – its noumenal intensity, its sensual abundance, or however 
it is described – can be assessed only in the same manner in which the individual 
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subjectively makes value judgments about phenomena external to him. The 
actor/observer can compare it with other experiences only by making judgments as 
imprecise (‘unscientific’), and as open to subsequent revaluation, as moral rankings of 
good and evil.”233 
 
Moral evaluation and behavior are, on individualism, unscientific in the sense that they can never 
be objectively specified by appeal to outside, objective authority, but are always undergoing 
continued examination and questioning by those that engage in them. On individualism, one can 
never say when considering some potential course of action or evaluating the actions of others “it 
is objectively and for-all-time wrong in light of a third-person standard handed down from an 
infallible authority,” but one can say “in light of what I have myself experienced and what I have 
observed in the experiences of others up until this point, this action is wrong.” To this, one must 
always add the proviso that subsequent experiences and interactions with others can always 
induce a re-evaluation of the judgment rendered previously, and that all such judgments are to be 
constantly subject to scrutiny and one must “remain toward [them] frostily cold, unbelieving.”234 
That is, one must remain constantly skeptical even of one’s own ethical evaluations, 
understanding that they are always open and never final. The individualist holds that 
autonomous, self-actualized individuals are better equipped to perform this constant movement 
of evaluation and re-evaluation than are those who are still subject to the dictates of this or that 
imposed moral system. 
 This raises a related worry about individualist ethics, namely the idea that the 
individualist is in some sense cheating in their use of evaluative language at all. After all, is not 
individualism itself a value set, both ontological and political, like any other? If so, how can the 
individualist justify their assertion of the superiority of individualism over, say, religious 
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subservience? I think there are two things to be said here. First, while individualism is 
undeniably a value set, complete with evaluative claims about the types of life that we as humans 
ought to aspire to, namely a free life of self-actualization, individualism is better thought of as a 
meta-evaluative claim, compatible with many forms of life. In his book-length reply to the 
various critiques that emerged after the publication of The Ego and its Own, Stirner addresses 
those who accused him of nihilism and the rejection of any and all human relationships 
whatever. Writing in the third person, assuming the identity of an anonymous interpreter of 
Stirner, he writes,  
Egoism, as Stirner uses it, is not opposed to love nor to thought; it is no enemy of the 
sweet life of love, nor of devotion and sacrifice; it is no enemy of intimate warmth, but it 
is also no enemy of critique, nor of socialism, nor, in short, of any actual interest. It 
doesn’t exclude any interest. It is directed against only disinterestedness and the 
uninteresting; not against love, but against sacred love, not against thought, but against 
sacred thought, not against socialists, but against sacred socialists, etc.235 
 
Here Stirner makes clear that the egoist does not oppose any and all forms of identity, 
relationship, and belief, but only opposes the essentializing reification of those things as anything 
other than contingent human creations, and hence impervious to human change, mutation, and 
intervention. For Stirner, there is no contradiction between individualism and socialism, self-
sacrifice, and even deeply altruistic devotion to others, so long as the latter are not imposed from 
without by either state or social authorities, are taken on willingly by free individuals, and are 
always open to re-evaluation. As David Leopold argues, “Stirner’s rejection of morality is 
grounded not, as is often suggested, in a rejection of values as such, but in the affirmation of 
what might be called non-moral goods, that is, he allows a realm of actions and desires which, 
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although not moral…are still to be evaluated positively.”236 That is, while Stirner reject moral 
claims in the sense of traditional objectivist moral realism, he further holds that moral claims do 
not exhaust the evaluative space, and that certain forms of life can be superior or inferior to 
others on grounds unrelated to their moral content or lack thereof. Leopold suggests Stirner’s 
discussion of the famed, and famously immoral, Roman Emperor Nero as an example of what 
Stirner sees as a non-moral evaluative claim justified on the basis of his individualism. While 
Stirner and traditional moralists would agree in negatively assessing Nero’s behavior, they would 
do so for critically different reasons. Where the moralist would hold that Nero had violated some 
or other moral rule, Stirner argues that Nero’s behavior is to be negatively assessed because his 
“obsessive predilections violated his self-mastery.”237 This is not a moral claim in any traditional 
sense, since moral claims fundamentally deal with relations between individuals, but is rather an 
evaluative assessment of Nero’s relationship with himself. Nero is to be viewed negatively 
because his behavior and beliefs were alien to himself, dictated by various obsessions and the 
belief that he possessed some divine, sacred quality. There are, in the Foucauldian sense, “styles 
of life” that are preferable for non-moral reasons, i.e. they are preferable for reasons other than 
whether or not they conform to an objective list of duties to others. The individualists hold that 
those who partake in the constant evaluation and questioning of their own relationships with 
themselves, actualizing their subjectivity and living truthfully with it are not prone to this type of 
self-alienated behavior, and this ideal of self-relation serves as the basis for the individualist 
ethic.  
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Individualism and Social Construction 
Another potential problem that is important to address here is the idea that individualists 
must deny the influence of social forms and power structures on individuals. That is, it is 
possible to read the individualists as rejecting the concept of the social construction of identity 
and relations of power.238 The idea here is that individualists, in emphasizing the primacy both 
ontologically and politically of subjectivity and individual identity formation, must 
correspondingly de-emphasize the role of unchosen social forces beyond our control in the 
shaping of our identities and beliefs. I think that this type of objection, formulated in this way, 
fundamentally misunderstands the position of individualism. The individualist does not minimize 
the influence of external forces on our day to day lives, since it is precisely the strength and 
depth of that influence to which the individualist objects. The claim of the individualist is 
precisely that these forces exert much too strong a force on the shaping of our identities and our 
lives in the world, and that we should rather assert ourselves against their oppressive control.  
One might restate the objection to say not that the individualists downplay the power of 
social construction, but rather even in their acknowledgement still underestimate it in their 
assumption that we ever could transcend or subvert socially imposed identities and categories. 
The forces that bear down on our self-understandings, identities as members of groups, and 
understandings of our place in the world are simply too strong and pervasive to be overcome by 
any amount of introspection or willful rejection. This critique could be offered as a parallel 
version of a related critique levelled by Michel Foucault against the dominant understanding of 
Kantian freedom. For Foucault, the transcendental rationality and objectivity at the core of 
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Kant’s conception of freedom, which does seem to imply the ability of individuals to transcend 
contingent sociopolitical factors, ignores the fact that all humans are always already implicated 
in relations of power, whether aware of those relations or not. Essentially, Kant had confused the 
ontological conditions of freedom with the actual historical conditions that restrict and hem-in 
autonomous action.239 Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is Foucault’s analysis of 
discipline and internalized moral strictures found in modern society. The advent of a type of 
Panopticism that subjects all individuals to constant surveillance finds its ultimate expression in 
the unconscious internalizing of that surveillance. The individualist ideal of a free or autonomous 
individual is belied by the fact of our own internalizing of various moral categories, self-
surveillance practices, social categories and power relations, and so on. Foucault writes “The 
man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection 
much more profound than himself.”240 The advocate of this line of objection might, in 
performing a Foucauldian genealogical move, argue that the individualist is inadvertently 
mobilizing enlightenment visions of the transcendentally free individual that have been since 
undermined by increased understandings of social forces and power relations.  I find this line of 
objection to be both more plausible and addressing more directly the claim of individualism, 
however, I do think that this critique also operates on a significant misinterpretation of the 
individualist view of the self, as well as of freedom. 
The individualist need not deny the overriding power of social constructs on our self-
understanding, and can readily admit that no individual can ever achieve full freedom in the 
Kantian sense of ridding oneself of all outside conditioning. Stirner, for his part, explicitly rejects 
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the concept of “freedom” as yet another pseudo-religious deflection of genuine selfhood. He 
writes,  
‘Freedom’ awakens your rage against everything that is not you; ‘egoism’ [Stirner’s term 
for individualism] calls you to joy over yourselves, to self-enjoyment; ‘freedom’ is and 
remains a longing, a romantic plaint, a Christian hope for unearthliness and futurity; 
‘ownness’ is a reality, which of itself removes just so much unfreedom as by barring your 
own way hinders you…Freedom teaches only: Get yourselves rid, relieve yourselves of 
everything burdensome; it does not teach you who you yourselves are.241 
 
Stirner’s conception of individualism here rejects the merely negative understanding of freedom, 
endorsed by the anarcho-capitalist right-individualists, as the removal of barriers. The left-
anarcho-individualist views this type of freedom as problematic because it must be conferred, 
guaranteed, and administered by a higher authority. In this negative sense, I am free to the degree 
that I am guaranteed (by some third force) a lack of intervention in my life. Again, the question 
of individualism is considered in an objective, external way. Individualism as I am understanding 
it here again returns to subjectivity as the site of freedom, and calls for an ongoing positive 
project of self-creation, understanding, and experimentation.  
Interestingly, Foucault himself was deeply engaged in questions of freedom, and I would 
argue that he ultimately arrived at strikingly similar conclusions to those of the left-anarcho-
individualists.242 For Foucault, re-situating the problematic of freedom within rather than 
abstracted from relations of power and social control (a la Kant) opens up new paths for 
discussions of freedom.243 Foucault saw freedom under the strictures of modernity as essentially 
a process of self-formation. He writes in his late essay “What is Enlightenment?,” itself an 
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attempt to rethink the Kantian legacy of critique, “This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his 
own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.”244 Referring to the 
“indispensable example” of Baudelaire’s vision of the figure of the dandy, Foucault takes up a 
certain attitude of self-aestheticism, suggesting that the modern individual is “not the man who 
goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth,” as these would participate in the 
abstracted Kantian metaphysic of freedom and essences, but rather the individual who “makes of 
his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art.”245 Foucault 
increasingly, particularly in his later years, turned to ideas of self-work, aestheticization, and 
style as fundamental to freedom and also as important instances of political resistance. It is worth 
quoting Paul Veyne at some length in this connection: 
The idea of style of existence played a major role in Foucault’s conversations and 
doubtless in his inner life during the final months of his life that only he knew to be in 
danger. Style does not mean distinction here; the word is to be taken in the sense of the 
Greeks, for whom an artist was first of all an artisan and a work of art was first of all a 
work. Greek ethics is quite dead and Foucault judged it as undesirable as it would be 
impossible to resuscitate this ethics; but he considered one of its elements, namely the 
idea of work of self on self, to be capable of acquiring a contemporary meaning, in the 
manner of one of those pagan temple columns that are occasionally reutilised in more 
recent structures. We can guess at what might emerge from this diagnosis: the self, taking 
itself as a work to be accomplished, could sustain an ethics that is no longer supported by 
either tradition or reason; as an artist of itself, the self would enjoy that autonomy that 
Enlightenment can no longer do without.246 
 
This conception of self-work and the artistic, expressive nature of subjectivity in the face of 
oppressive and homogenizing categories and power relations articulated by Foucault is directly 
in line with the calls of Emerson, Stirner, Nietzsche, and Vaneigem to assert as ontologically and 
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politically meaningful our own subjectivity247, and to define that subjectivity for ourselves. 
Freedom and selfhood are not simply acts of bursting free of the myriad chains placed upon us 
by (post)modernity, but are rather the constant negotiations, refusals, and interrogations we 
articulate within those structures. In this sense, the left-anarcho-individualist both sides with the 
Foucauldian critique of abstracted Kantian concepts of “Man” and “Freedom” as themselves 
homogenizing categories as well as endorses the view of freedom as an ongoing individualized 
movement of self-creation. The more direct question of how these interactions might eventually 
change or undermine the structures to which we are subject, and the degree to which 
individualism can serve as a basis for political resistance, is addressed in Chapter Four.  
Individualist Society? 
 I want to conclude this chapter with a somewhat brief discussion of how individualists 
have conceived of how societies might be organized along individualist principles. Given the 
individualist rejection of formalized State power and imposed socio-cultural forms, it is 
reasonable to ask what is proposed in their place. This discussion will serve in some ways to set 
the stage for the concluding discussion in Chapter Five regarding how individualism might 
manifest itself in the organization of schools and in pedagogical principles. This discussion is 
brief largely out of necessity. That is, for reasons that ought to be clear from the account given in 
this chapter of the commitments of left-anarcho-individualism, individualists have generally 
refrained from engaging in robust and detailed prescriptions for how society ought to be 
organized. This would be, of course, to simply impose another system of external strictures on 
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the free expression and self-work of unique individuals, something that runs fundamentally 
against individualism. That said, there are some common themes that arise in the writing of the 
individualists regarding what a possible individualist society might look like.  
 Max Stirner makes and important distinction that helps indicate a first pass at what forms 
individualist society might take, namely the distinction between “society,” on the one hand, and 
“coalition” or “union” (he uses the terms more-or-less interchangeably) on the other, and refers 
to his vision of individualist society as a “union of egoists.”248 The key distinction between the 
two has to do with their orientation toward those individuals that make them up. Society, in 
Stirner’s usage of the term, is fundamentally indifferent to the individual, swallowing her into its 
generalizing, homogenizing sense of membership. Accordingly, Stirner views society as fixed 
and static, rehearsing the same formal relationships of work, labor, love, and so on via the pre-
established roles that operate within its structures. He lays out the various distinctions in this 
way, 
You bring into a union your whole power, your competence, and make yourself count; in 
a society you are employed, with your working power; in the former you live egoistically, 
in the latter humanly, that is, religiously, as a ‘member in the body of this Lord’; to a 
society you owe what you have, and are in duty bound to it, are – possessed by ‘social 
duties’; a union you utilize, and give it up undutifully and unfaithfully when you see no 
way to utilize it further. If a society is more than you, then it is more to you than yourself; 
a union is only your instrument…the union exists for you and through you, the society 
conversely lays claim to you for itself and exists even without you; in short, the society is 
sacred, the union your own; the society consumes you, you consume the union.249 
   
This paragraph makes an important connection between Stirner’s vision of social relationships 
and the cultivation of the self, namely the fact that in both cases impermanence, change, and 
mutability are fundamental. The sort of constant self-work and experimentation called for by the 
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left-anarcho-individualists expresses itself socially as well, with all social relations being sorts of 
ad hoc experiments or associations directed at a particular goal or problem, to be dissolved or 
altered once that goal is reached. The freedom to enter into and remove oneself from social 
relationships is key to the left-anarcho-individualist conception of society. Stirner writes that a 
coalition or a union “is an incessant self-uniting”250 and insofar as relationships calcify and 
become fixed, as they do in societies that impose pre-established roles on their members, those 
relationships cease to be unions. In the same way that my individual identity cannot be subsumed 
under social roles and disciplinary mores, neither can my relationships with others be reduced to 
interactions between those roles. The key point here is that relationships and identities are ideally 
to be entered into and assumed by choice and self-expression. If one’s internal self-
understanding demands assertion as a Latino or a Father or a Woman, or if the material facts of 
one’s existence make such an assertion of identity useful, as in the case of mobilizing larger 
groups of individuals for some political or social purpose,251 the individualist is in complete 
support, so long as the proviso is included that those identity and relational forms are not 
imposed from without and are malleable, open to exit and reentry, and not viewed as some sort 
of metaphysical essence expressing the totality of one’s unique self.  A society predicated on 
left-anarcho-individualist principles would retain many of the relationships and identities 
familiar from our current order, but would radically change the signification of those 
relationships and identities, from essentialist divine edicts of society or the state to subjective 
expressions of interiority. Importantly, as in the case of individualist ethics, there is no 
contradiction between the individualist focus on individual autonomy and self-actualization and 
the existence of social structures and relationships, which again the individualist recognizes as an 
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inevitable and even desirable aspect of human existence. As Daniel Guerin argues with respect to 
Stirner’s view of social institutions, “The individual needs help and friends…He joins with his 
fellow man in order to increase his strength and fulfill himself more completely through their 
combined strength than either could in isolation.”252 In his critique of the homogenizing 
ideological tendencies of political parties, Stirner even goes so far as to directly allow for the 
possibility of an individual joining such a party or identifying with their cause, but with certain 
conditions. He writes, “So then an egoist could never embrace a party or take up with a party? 
Oh, yes, only he cannot let himself be embraced and taken up by the party. For him the party 
remains all the time nothing but a gathering: he is one of the party, he takes part.”253 Again, 
individualism does not foreclose the possibility of social structures, organizations, and 
relationships, but only suggests that these structures and relationships must be predicated on 
voluntary association between free individuals, where “free” is understood in the Foucauldian 
sense discussed earlier. Much like the self, social institutions and relationships must always be 
subject to re-evaluation, repudiation, and restructuring. This does not mean that they cannot exist 
or are inherently oppressive, only that they become so when they hinder the freedom of self-
creation through imposed identifications or behavioral strictures.  
 Vaneigem, for his part, is predictably more poetic in his envisioning of a world that 
respects subjectivity, and suggests that part of what makes that possibility so exciting is precisely 
how radically open it is to our own influence. That is, it is impossible to say what the 
unshackling of human subjectivity and creativity would ultimately produce, but that unshackling 
is itself desirable. He writes, “Everyone wants their own subjectivity to triumph; the unification 
of human beings ought therefore to be built on this common desire. Nobody can strengthen their 
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subjectivity without the help of others, without the help of a group that concentrates subjectivity, 
that faithfully expresses the subjectivity of its members.”254 Again, Vaneigem rejects the 
subsuming of individual identity and subjectivity into social roles, but rather calls for social 
organizations that respect and create space for the unique expression of that subjectivity. The 
left-anarcho-individualist desires a world where people are not forced to identify as a given 
racial, gender, or other socio-cultural category out of either the demands of their social group or 
out of economic or political necessity, and remains optimistic about the possibilities for the 
freedom granted in such a world. 
 Perhaps the best microcosm of this understanding of social relationships advocated by 
Stirner and Vaneigem, and the one perhaps best suited as a model for individualist education, is 
Emerson’s understanding of friendship. Friendship was one of Emerson’s preoccupations 
throughout his career, and he dedicated significant thought to the matter of reconciling both his 
own understanding of individualism and his own tendency toward introspective isolation with 
the importance of sociality and relationships in all human endeavors. In many ways Emerson 
echoes Stirner’s distinction between society and union, only substituting the even smaller-scale 
notion of friendship into the latter position. He certainly rejects society in terms similar to 
Stirner, writing in “Self-Reliance” that “Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the 
manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company in which the members 
agree for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture 
of the eater.”255 In contrast to the homogenizing surrender of individuality to the dictates of 
society, genuine friendship recognizes the unique beauty and identity of the other, a recognition 
that inspires within us a greater understanding of our own subjectivity. This relationship is 
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mutual, continual, and constantly changing and evolving. He writes in “Friendship,” “In good 
company, the individuals merge their egotism into a social soul exactly coextensive with the 
several consciousnesses there present.”256 True friendship represented, for Emerson, the desire 
for “a just and even fellowship, or none.”257 As David Robinson has argued at length, Emerson’s 
understanding of friendship importantly centers the choice of the individuals united in friendship 
to enter and continually affirm that friendship for its duration, whatever that may be.258 
Friendship is both a recognition of value and individuality in another, but also a means of my 
own self-expression and discovery. It is this sort of interaction that would be encouraged in a 
society founded on principles of individualism, and precisely that which is denied under the 
oppressive homogenization of the State, capital, and social roles.   
It is worth briefly noting, to conclude, that the individualist vision of society as a 
mutually beneficial series of temporary, organic, and spontaneously arising relationships was, 
perhaps ironically, has been given an important layer of empirical legitimacy through the work 
of mutualist anarchist Peter Kropotkin, particularly in his collection of scientific essays Mutual 
Aid: A Factor of Evolution, published in 1902.259 Kropotkin, an amateur scientist and naturalist, 
spent a number of years during the 1860s as an officer of the Russian military exploring Siberia 
and cataloging his observations of the wildlife and their behaviors. His observations led him to 
conclude that rather than the classical Darwinian picture of competition for scarce resources and 
natural selection as the fundamental driving forces of evolution and social harmony within a 
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species, cooperative behavior for mutual benefit played a much larger role than had been 
previously believed. He wrote “I failed to find…that bitter struggle for the means of 
existence…which was considered by most Darwinists…as the dominant characteristic of the 
struggle for life,” but rather “saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extend which 
made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the 
preservation of each species, and its further evolution.”260 Kropotkin argued, and his views have 
been generally upheld in the scientific community up to the present day,261 that rather than 
surviving through competitive or adaptive advantage, species tended to persist and flourish more 
to the degree that they exhibited cooperative behavior based on mutual benefit. The concept of 
mutual benefit is critical here, as Kropotkin aimed not only to dismantle the myth of pure 
Darwinian competition in the vein of Hobbes’ “war of all against all,” but also the romantic 
visions of thinkers like Rousseau, “who saw in nature but love, peace, and harmony.”262 Rather, 
individuals were motivated to cooperative behavior not out of any large-scale sense of species 
survival or altruism, but out of a form of self-interest, and that this form of motivation created as 
an epiphenomenon evolutionary success. Though Kropotkin is not considered an individualist, 
his view of human society based around these same mutualist principles is remarkably similar to 
the view of left-anarcho-individualism, which sees social organizations as arising out of a mutual 
sense of need or desire between individuals and dissolving once that need has been met, rather 
than remaining and calcifying into the oppressive organs of state power. 
 Having laid out the positive vision of individualism that I wish to defend (i.e. as 
fundamentally anticapitalist, anti-statist, and against homogenizing and reductive domination of 
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all types) and distinguishing it from the traditions of “rugged individualism” and rightist 
anarcho-capitalism, the next chapter addresses in more detail two of what I see as the most 
powerful objections against the view of individualism presented here. Specifically, I will argue 
that individualism can serve as a base of political resistance as well for the compatibility of 
individualism and a genuine democratic impulse. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TWO OBJECTIONS TO INDIVIDUALISM 
 
 
The Objection of Inefficacy: Individualism and Resistance 
Having discussed in Chapter Three the compatibility of individualism and group identity, 
I will now respond to a related objection, namely that individualism is incapable of providing a 
solid basis of resistance to organized oppression and violence. Discussions of resistance in 
education are commonplace, particularly in our era of neoliberal incursions, takeovers, and 
augmentations within the public school system. It is natural that under the pressure of the 
constantly changing and ever more onerous suite of burdensome and deprofessionalizing policies 
and demands placed on teachers and students alike that these groups would seek out ways of 
resisting and pushing back against the forces of neoliberalism. In this section I will address two 
major points. First, I will discuss the predominant ways in which resistance is conceptualized in 
contemporary educational thought and practice, as well as examine some of the theoretical and 
ideological underpinnings of those conceptualizations. Second, drawing from the work of some 
of the most politically active individualists, argue that anarchist individualism offers a valuable 
tool for those on the Left who seek to resist neoliberalism in education. Counter to the prevailing 
discourse that paints individualized resistance as at worst counterproductive and disorganized, 
and at best merely emotionally cathartic for those who undertake it, I will suggest that 
individualist resistance both has a rich theoretical tradition as well as a history of legitimate 
success. From desertion to poaching to work sabotage, individualism has much to offer us as 
educators and students in our struggle against neoliberal capture. 
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Teacher and Student Resistance: The Contemporary Consensus 
 It is interesting to begin this discussion of educational resistance by noting that teacher 
and student resistance in the way that I mean to discuss it here is rarely named in the literature as 
such. Rather, resistance is most commonly discussed as an obstacle to be overcome by 
administrators dealing with recalcitrant, stubborn teachers who simply refuse to adapt to the 
changing needs of their workplace environment, or students who are in need of the ubiquitous 
“behavior modification.” Resistance, in this understanding of the term, is a flaw in an educator or 
a student, something to be overcome, worked through, and managed by administrators and 
outside reformers. Typical of this type of approach to teacher resistance are quotes such as this 
one from Joo-Ho Park & Dong Wook Jeong, who argue that “Eliminating or reducing teachers’ 
negative attitude toward change is a common and persistent challenge to interveners, in 
particular, outside the school.” 263Jim Knight concludes his article, simply entitled “What Can 
We Do About Teacher Resistance?” by arguing for having a small group of educators and 
administrators “do the thinking for teachers” because “Schools need programs implemented 
consistently across a district, and it’s not especially efficient for many teachers to be deeply 
involved in curriculum revision.”264 Often administrators are cautioned about how to approach 
teachers with policies or ideas for change because of the emotional responses such “innovations” 
might trigger in the change-resistant teaching force, and teachers’ dissatisfaction with reforms 
are often dismissed in psychological terms that reduce their agency and expertise to simple 
attachment to older ways of doing things, force of habit, or even simple laziness.265 One group of 
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researchers has even claimed to have found a “solution for the treatment of teacher resistance” 
based on a “combination of five theoretical approaches to preventing, diagnosing, and 
remediating misbehavior.”266 The infantilizing language of “misbehavior” here is, I argue, not 
accidental, as it appeals to dominant deprofessionalizing narratives of teachers as in need of 
direction from the outside and childishly resistant to change. It also fuses the literature on teacher 
resistance with the literature on student resistance, which often participates in precisely the same 
psychologizing discourses of misbehavior and behavior modification.267 
 While a number of criticisms can and have been made of these ways of talking about 
teachers and students (e.g. that this discourse removes autonomy, reduces legitimate critique to 
psychology, etc.), my purpose in referencing it here is slightly different. The point I want to 
emphasize about how resistance is talked about in education today is that the word itself has been 
robbed of whatever radical or political implications it might have had by discourses of 
management and psychologism. If “resistance” is reduced to a minor managerial inconvenience, 
then those who would use the term more expansively must find alternative ways of expressing 
themselves, and this itself is already a significant victory for the neoliberal project, and is 
something worth acknowledging.  
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 By and large, the language that has been picked up by teachers and students who would 
politicize their resistance is the language of “activism.” Discussions of both student activism on 
college campuses and at the K-12 level, and work on teacher activism have long been important 
aspects of education as an academic discipline, and interest in these topics has only escalated in 
the era of Donald Trump. The discourse of activism, both student and teacher, takes a number of 
different forms. Mark R. Warren and Karen L. Mapp, for example, conceptualize resistance to 
neoliberal school as a form of community organizing, which they see as a catalytic force not just 
for resistance but also for creative and grassroots generation of new, democratic forms of 
community education.268 Warren and Mapp specifically situate their understanding of 
community organizing within the larger historical context of civil rights struggles of minoritized 
and oppressed communities, who have long mobilized along community lines to achieve 
political and social ends. They argue, for example, that “the struggle for quality education and 
the struggle for liberation have been fundamentally interconnected in the African American 
community,” and go on to emphasize the importance of shared histories and identities in the 
process of building communities and bases of resistance in sociopolitical struggle.269  Russell H. 
Carlock Jr. argues that community organizing around education has been instrumental in the 
Latinx struggle for social justice as well, pointing out that “As early as the nineteenth century, 
social reformers in the United States combined organizing with adult education to impact social 
change, especially in immigrant communities.”270 There is perhaps no better illustration of the 
power of community organizing to alter educational conditions than the East Lost Angeles 
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“blowouts” of March 1968, which saw thousands of Latinx students walk out of their high and 
middle schools in protest of the way they had been treated by their school districts.271 The 
students led by teacher Sal Castro, parental groups, college students, and many other community 
members, whose schools had been systematically ignored and defunded, demanded equality in 
facilities, funding, supplies, as well as a more inclusive curriculum and diverse schools staff that 
more completely reflected Chicano culture.272  
 These community-based forms of resistance and protest often draw on the work of Paulo 
Freire, who centered the need for communal identity formation and consciousness in his 
educational philosophy and pedagogical practice. For Freire, critical education occurred only 
through dialogue with others in one’s own context to address the specific material conditions of 
that context, a commitment which grew out of the well-documented influence of Marx on 
Freire’s educational thought and practice.273 In classic Marxian fashion, Freire often refers to the 
fact of humanity being “something constructed socially and historically and not there simply a 
priori.”274 Freire’s own interest in education and community-oriented pedagogy began during his 
time spent educating illiterate and economically disadvantaged rural adults in his native Brazil, 
where he would eventually, after being exiled for his views, serve as Secretary of Education and 
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come to profoundly influence the development of national education.275 Freire’s radically 
communal and situated pedagogy has had wide appeal among Marxist and Leftist educators 
throughout the world, particularly with his emphasis on the building of shared identities to 
address shared struggles and oppressions (a sine qua non of community organizing, as elucidated 
by Warren and Mapp), and Freirean experiments have taken place in locations as disparate as 
South Africa,276 Scotland,277 Grenada, Jamaica, and Australia.278  
 A second major current in the contemporary discussions of educational resistance takes 
as its main source of inspiration not the community-building critical pedagogy of Freire,279 but 
rather the radical group organizing and action of the historical labor movement and working 
class. This strain of thinking, which tends to focus more on teacher activism than student, or at 
least views them as inseparably linked, sees teachers primarily as workers in a capitalist system 
that exploits their labor and advocates for teacher organizing along the lines of the traditional 
labor unions. The decline of labor unions and the continued attacks on their sources of influence 
and indeed their very existence, as in the various moves to implement so-called “right to work” 
(RTW) policies across the United States,280 has been a growing source of concern on the left 
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broadly, and has produced passionate calls for the revitalization of labor unions and radical 
working-class politics in general. One of the most well-known and respected diagnostician of the 
neoliberal paradigm, David Harvey, has argued the construction of “strong collective institutions 
(such as trade unions)” is one of the most threatening possibilities to neoliberal rationality, 
committed as it is to free market ideologies and the fracturing of collective identities of all kinds 
in the name of the type of rugged individualism discussed in Chapter 1.281  
The labor view of resistance is also fundamentally Marxist in orientation, though with 
important caveats and modifications. Though Marx clearly advocated for organized worker 
resistance to capital and somewhat infamously held that worker uprisings would inevitably end 
capitalism and usher in the dictatorship of the proletariat, there are tensions between the 
orthodox Marxist view and the traditional modes of trade unionism. For example, where trade 
unions tend to advocate for things like higher wages, Marxism ostensibly calls for the 
elimination of the wage system altogether.282 That being said, it is undeniable that there is a deep 
affinity between the Marxist vision of worker resistance and the activity of the historical trade 
unions. Advocates of this view often look to figures such as Bill Haywood, one of the founders 
of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and prominent figure in early radical labor 
organizing in the United States, organizing a number of textile strikes in the early 1900s for 
inspiration.283 Haywood had deeply revolutionary views about class relations and capitalism, 
claiming in the very first line of the preamble to the IWW constitution that “The working class 
and the employing class have nothing in common” and going on to directly evoke Marx, writing 
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that “between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as 
a class, take possession of the means of production, abolish the wage system, and live in 
harmony with the Earth.”284  
 Within education, many have argued that teachers today under neoliberalism find 
themselves in much the same position that industrial workers found themselves in when 
Haywood founded the IWW, and so should respond with similarly radical forms of organization. 
Mary Compton and Lois Weiner open their collection detailing the global neoliberal assault on 
education and teacher unions in this way, “Teachers are in a war being fought over the future of 
education, and though at times it might seem as though we are losing the war without firing a 
shot, we have a potentially powerful weapon in our hands – our solidarity and organization into 
powerful teachers unions.”285 Bob Peterson argues for a “social justice unionism” that fuses 
together the classical trade union perspectives and advocacy for better wages and conditions with 
the insights of community organizing and the realization that, in a direct echo of Haywood, 
“teachers’ long-term interests are closer to those of poor people and working people whose 
children are in our public schools, than to the corporate leaders and politicians who run our 
society.”286 The overriding idea of the labor vision of educational resistance is that educators 
must bind together as a unified force in order to articulate and ultimately achieve their political 
and social ends.  
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 What I want to point out at this point regarding these two dominant strains of thinking 
about educational resistance is that they are both fundamentally rooted in the centrality of 
community and group identity of some kind. In the case of community organizing, that identity 
is likely to be some form of shared marginalization or oppression, often along racial or cultural 
lines, and in the case of labor organizing, the identity in question is that of a worker under 
neoliberal capitalism, and particularly an educational worker. This focus on community and 
shared identity should not be surprising, given the Marxist roots of both types of thinking 
documented above. In the next section, I want to argue that communally-oriented thinking about 
resistance, whatever historical successes it may have had and whatever theoretical considerations 
weigh in its favor, ought not to exhaust the resources we have as educators for resisting 
neoliberal global capitalism, nor for pursuing our own vision of the good in education and 
without.  
The Critique of Individualized Resistance 
 The discourse of political resistance, particularly on the left, has been so dominated by 
the community-oriented modes discussed in the previous section that it has becomes nearly 
commonsensical to believe that resistance at the individual level is at best ineffectual and at 
worst corrosive to larger-scale leftist goals. The debate between organized, communal resistance 
and decentralized individualist resistance has been particularly fierce among anarchists and other 
revolutionary ideologies, specifically socialism and communism. A representative instance of 
this debate has been ongoing roughly since the advent of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) 
movement in 2011, and centers around the tactics employed by a subset of protesters at that and 
related events referred to as the “Black Bloc.” Strictly speaking, the Black Bloc is not a discrete 
group or identity, but is rather a tactic used within protests and movements, or, as Francis 
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Dupuis-Deri refers to it, a collective action that forms a contingent within an already existing 
protest or rally.287 These Blocs are not homogenous or uniform in either size or composition, but 
emerge organically in specific circumstances, and multiple Blocs can be active within a single 
event. The Bloc is easily identifiable by the uniformly black colors its members don, often 
covering their faces with bandanas and glasses, as well as their controversial tactics which can 
include vandalism, burning or otherwise destroying property (a particularly well-known example 
here is the breaking of windows at large corporate businesses, e.g. Starbucks, McDonalds, or 
certain banks), and anti-capitalist and anarchist signage and imagery.288 The Black Blocs first 
made their appearance on the American political scene during the massive demonstrations 
against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999.289 They returned in full 
force during OWS and immediately generated very public and heated debates surrounding their 
tactics and ideology.  
While the description of the Black Blocs I have given here may suggest that the tactic is a 
fundamentally communal one, predicated as it is on the anonymous dissolution of individuality 
within a group for a shared tactical purpose, the critiques leveled against the Black Bloc 
protesters of OWS argue precisely the opposite, namely that Black Bloc tactics were childish 
expressions of individual frustrations or predilections that fundamentally cut against the more 
collectively organized factions within the movement. The most forceful proponent of this line of 
thinking at the time was Chris Hedges, a journalist who identifies closely with radical worker 
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movements (he often cites Haywood, along with the founder of the Catholic Workers movement 
and anarchist Dorothy Day) and advocates powerfully for unionization and anti-war organizing. 
In early 2012, Hedges, who participated in OWS and often spoke to the initial group that formed 
at Zuccotti Park in New York City, published a piece entitled “The Cancer in Occupy” that 
fiercely critiqued the Black Bloc contingents in OWS.290 The thrust of Hedges’ case against 
Black Bloc protestors was that they mistakenly eschewed traditional leftist organization in favor 
of wanton violence, criminal activity, and even “a deeply disturbing hypermasculinity.”291 
Hedges argued that the fundamental motivations of Black Bloc-ers292 were individualistic, and 
that their tactics were, rather than any form of serious critique or protest against capitalism or 
corporate power, but expression of “the lust that lurks within us to destroy, not only things but 
human beings,” even going so far as to equate the motivations of Black Bloc-ers to “the same 
sickness that fuels the swarms of police who pepper-spray and beat peaceful protestors.”293 The 
selfish, individualistic, “progressive adolescentization” of the anarchist movement, in Hedges’ 
eyes, fundamentally undercut the organized leftists movements, primarily by “open[ing] the way 
for hundreds or thousands of peaceful marchers to be discredited by a handful of hooligans.”294  
 The debate surrounding Black Bloc tactics has, with the advent of Donald Trump, begun 
again with full force, this time surrounding the group known as “Antifa,” which has become a 
household term after the violent protest clashes in Charlottesville, Virginia and Berkeley, 
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California during the Summer of 2017. Antifa, which is a shortening of Anti-Fascist, is a 
complex of loose group associations that has a long history dating back to the rise of fascism 
under Benito Mussolini in Italy during the 1920s.295 Like the Black Bloc, Antifa is as much of a 
tactic as it is a discrete grouping or organization. While the specific details of Antifa as a 
movement are not directly relevant to my discussion, the response to their emergence in 
American politics in recent months is a further example of the type of thinking represented by 
Hedges with respect to supposedly individualized resistance on the American far left. Many of 
the same types of dismissals and insults that had been levelled against the Black Bloc are now 
being deployed against Antifa, with similar effect. Even mainstream figures have participated in 
this type of critique, as when Trevor Noah, the host of the massively popular The Daily Show, 
referred to Antifa as “vegan ISIS.”296 Noah went on to more directly echo the sentiments of 
Hedges and the like, claiming with respect to the common Antifa tactic of breaking windows of 
major corporations, most famously Starbucks, 
Seriously, though, breaking a window was a ‘symbolic act’? You might think it’s some 
deep statement, but most people see that and think, ‘Great, now I’ve got to walk a whole 
block up to the next Starbucks.’ Like, who is that supposed to convince? What are you 
trying to do? It definitely doesn’t convince the Starbucks guy, the person who’s gonna be 
in the store cleaning up the glass, like, ‘Yeah, they made a good point about fascism. I 
understand what they mean. I understand it.’297 
 
Whether they are aware of it or not, these critics of what they see as individualized, expressive 
forms of resistance are echoing a well-known intra-anarchist critique articulated most forcefully 
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by Murray Bookchin in his Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable 
Chasm.298 What Bookchin refers to as “lifestyle anarchism” or simply “lifestylism,” is what he 
sees as the depoliticized, individualistic, and even metaphysical forms of anarchism represented 
by Max Stirner and, moreso for Bookchin, Hakim Bey and John Zerzan. It is worth quoting 
Bookchin at some length here, as he singles out many of the figures discussed in this dissertation 
and references many of the concepts I have been concerned to rehabilitate. He writes,  
With its aversion for institutions, mass-based organizations, its largely subcultural 
orientation, its moral decadence, its celebration of transience, and its rejection of 
programs, this kind of narcissistic anarchism is socially innocuous, often merely a safety 
valve for discontent toward the prevailing social order. With the Bey [Bookchin’s 
disparaging nickname for Hakim Bey, much as Marx had referred to Stirner as “Saint 
Max”], lifestyle anarchism takes flight from all meaningful social activism and a 
steadfast commitment to lasting and creative projects by dissolving itself into kicks, 
postmodernist nihilism, and a dizzying Nietzschean sense of elitist superiority. The price 
that anarchism will pay if it permits this swill to displace the libertarian ideals of an 
earlier period could be enormous. The Bey’s egocentric anarchism, with its 
postmodernist withdrawal into individualistic “autonomy,”…threatens to render the very 
word anarchism politically and socially harmless – a mere fad for the titillation of the 
petty bourgeois of all ages.299 
  
Here I believe that Bookchin distills not only the intra-anarchist critique of individualized 
resistance, but also touches on many of the worries expressed by other leftists in general, as well 
as advocates of the reductionist objection against individualism, i.e. that it problematically 
rejects group identities as bases of resistance and sites of communal bonding. In the next section 
I argue that this is a mistaken view of individualized resistance. I show that individualized 
resistance is both effective, as well as compatible with the sorts of empowering, curative effects 
that can come from a strong sense of communal identity, particularly in the face of trauma.  
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The Case for Individualized Resistance: The Politics of Refusal and Withdrawal 
 The case I want to make here for individualized resistance is both negative and positive. 
The negative case has to do with a general social tendency to overstate the effectiveness of 
resistance in the form of mass movements, and the positive case has to do with a correlative 
tendency to downplay the successes of individualized resistance, often for reasons, I argue, that 
are inscribed directly into the way individualized resistance functions. I will also offer a qualified 
defense of the expressive, emotive value of individualized resistance. I conclude the section by 
discussing the potential for individualized resistance within the current context of neoliberal 
education.  
 James C. Scott, a political anthropologist with an anarchist bent, has long written about 
grassroots peasant and popular resistance to government power and oppressive social orders. His 
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, for example, 
examines a large region of Asia300 that he argues is a world “in which the state has not come to 
close, as it now has, to sweeping all before it.”301 Scott details the various strategies and tactics 
used by the peoples of this area, often existing in small tribal or familial groups, for avoiding 
state power and outside intervention. For example, Scott describes a number of examples of the 
ways in which people on the margins of society evaded conscription into the armies of the 
Burmese-Manipur Wars, which took place from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. These 
tactics included everything from simply fleeing into more remote areas outside of the marching 
paths of the armies to, in an interesting form of identity play, altering official kinship records, 
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since conscription was almost always done by family or household. For Scott, the evidence of 
the effectiveness of these small-scale, individualized forms of resistance is provided by the 
increasing desperation of the conscription efforts, which expanded over time from one out of 
every hundred households, to one out of every fifty, to one of ten, and so on.302 Much of the 
success of these resistance efforts, Scott holds, came from the malleability of the identities of the 
populations involved, from their willingness to alter and blur kinship lines to their ability to alter 
cultural norms based on their location, he argues that  
they [the peoples of Zomia] have multiple histories they can deploy singly or in 
combination depending on the circumstances. They can…create long, elaborate 
genealogies or…have minimally short genealogies and migration histories. If they appear 
to be without a definite history, it is because they have learned to travel light, not 
knowing what their next destination might be…They have just as much history as they 
require.303 
 
What is important about Scott’s insight here are not the details of the Southeast Asian context, 
but the fact that this example provides what Scott sees as a general template for successful small-
scale, individualized resistance to oppression. For Scott, the example set by the unincorporated, 
stateless regions of Southeast Asia is illustrative of the more general point that “More regimes 
have been brought, piecemeal, to their knees by what was once called ‘Irish democracy,’ the 
silent, dogged resistance, withdrawal, and truculence of millions of ordinary people, than by 
revolutionary vanguards or rioting mobs.”304 Scott suggests two other important examples of this 
principle in action, arguing that both the outcomes of the Civil War and the ultimate defeat of 
Napoleon “can almost certainly be attributed to a vast aggregation of acts of desertion and 
insubordination.”305 
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 Indeed, much work has been done on the role of small-scale, individualized resistance in 
both the abolitionist movement and the Civil Rights movement. Robin D.G. Kelly frames his 
critical study of the history of black working-class resistance in precisely the same terms that 
Scott uses to describe anti-statist strategies in Southeast Asia.306 Kelly writes that his goal is to 
“dig a little deeper, beneath ‘below,’ to those workers whose record of resistance and survival is 
far more elusive. I’m referring here to evasive, day-to-day strategies: from footdragging to 
sabotage, theft at the workplace to absenteeism, cursing to graffiti.”307 Kelly’s various examples 
of individualized forms of resistance and, importantly expression, such as the subversive uses of 
urban Black musical spaces that operated as venues for oppressed Black workers subject to 
brutal hours and treatment to “take back their bodies”308 all suggest a fusion between the political 
value of small-scale, individualized resistance strategies and the subjective, expressive, eruptive 
nature of these types of acts. It is illustrative to look, for example, at the ways in which 
autonomous, undirected groups of resisters were treated both contemporaneously and historically 
during the Civil Rights movement. Kelley points out that the vast majority of marchers that took 
part in the critically important May 1963 Civil Rights demonstrations in Birmingham, organized 
by Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), were actually not 
native to the city, nor were they those who bore the brunt of oppression in Birmingham’s worst 
slums. However, as Kelly puts it “The slum dwellers…did show up to Ingram Park to participate 
on their own terms in the May demonstrations.”309 This group of protestors, who were outside 
the organizational authority of the SCLC, famous for its advocacy of nonviolent resistance, 
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responded to the infamous water guns and dogs of the Birmingham police with violence and 
force, engaging directly with police via throwing bottles, rocks, and hand to hand combat. These 
protestors returned the next day, lining the route of the planned march armed with pistols and 
knives, ultimately causing the SCLS to call the demonstration off altogether.310 One can clearly 
see the echoes and spirit of Black Bloc and Antifa tactics in the behaviors of the Birmingham 
slum dwellers, refusing to be subsumed under an organizational head and engaging in direct 
insurrectionary action against oppressive authoritarian power. It is telling, both as a metric of the 
attitudes toward this type of resistance and the invisibility of individualized resistance in the 
historical record that, as Kelly points out, historians and contemporary activists have generally 
dismissed this aspect of the May Birmingham protests as the fringe activity of “onlookers” or 
“bystanders.”311 
 Kelly is not the only scholar of Black history to point out the power of individualized, 
guerilla resistance. Both Akinyele Omowale Umoja and Charles E. Cobb, Jr. have written 
powerful counterhistorical narratives regarding the role of insurrectionary violence in the Civil 
Rights movement.312 Umoja, who focuses his work on Mississippi during the Civil Rights era 
and before, notes that “The armed resistance of the post-Reconstruction period does not 
generally manifest as intentionally organized collective action, but rather as emergency self-
defense, often in the form of individual acts, in response to the threat of White violence.”313 
Though Cobb’s analysis tends to emphasize the efforts to organize resistance among armed 
militia groups in the South, he concurs with Kelly that one of the most critical and 
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underappreciated aspects of the Civil Rights movement was the individual, dogged resistance of 
“small farmers, sharecroppers, day laborers, craftsmen,…and church leaders.”314 
The overarching idea, shared by Scott, Kelly, Stirner, and others is that while large-scale 
mobilizations like protests, marches, strikes, and so on are, for obvious reasons, more historically 
visible than individual forms of resistance such as desertion, tax evasion, poaching, squatting, 
and the like, the accumulated effect of these seemingly innocuous individual acts is ultimately 
more damaging to established orders of power and oppression than the mass movements that are 
much more often credited with generating social and historical change. Indeed, a common theme 
running through all of the individualist thinkers and advocates of guerilla resistance is the idea 
that part of the strength of individualized forms of resistance lies precisely in their refusal to 
participate in established and accepted channels of contestation. As Scott puts the point apropos 
the rampant wildcat strikes, looting, rent boycotts, slow work, and so on that marked depression 
era economic life, “they represented no coherent policy agenda. Instead it was genuinely 
unstructured, chaotic, and full of menace to the established order. For this very reason, there was 
no one to bargain with, no one to credibly offer peace in return for policy changes. The menace 
was directly proportional to their lack of institutionalization…there were no coherent demands, 
no one to talk to.” Neoliberal capitalism thrives at bargaining with and ultimately defusing 
established, organized, institutions of resistance, even purportedly radical ones. Individualized 
resistance, on the other hand, is much more threatening, precisely because it is sub rosa, with no 
manifestoes, platforms, or lists of demands. The practitioner of individualized resistance says to 
neoliberal capital “I will not negotiate with you because you have nothing to offer me.”315 There 
                                                          
314 Cobb, “This Nonviolent Stuff’ll,” 15.  
315 This way of putting things raises the interesting and complex question of intentionality regarding individualized 
resistance. That is to say, to what degree do those who participate individualized resistance need to have some sense 
of the larger scale political context of their actions or of the philosophical underpinnings of their resistance? Both 
123 
 
is, then, a political value to being disorganized, to refusing to be subsumed under established 
organization norms of engagement, and that political value is the difficulty such disorganized 
resistance presents for systems of power predicated on negotiating with those who would resist 
them, and on offering piecemeal versions of reform.  
Slavoj Zizek makes precisely this point with respect to a more recent instance of eruptive, 
individualized resistance, namely OWS. One of the most common critiques of OWS, which 
emerged organically and captured national attention when they effectively turned parks and 
public places around the country into temporary autonomous zones, was that they articulated no 
clear policy agenda, had no demands, and were generally uninterested in communicating with 
outside media or reporters.316 For Zizek, this recalcitrance and unwillingness to couch their 
resistance in familiar terms and fields of play was precisely one of the strengths of the 
movement. Referring to Bill Clinton’s suggestion that the protestors of OWS focus on getting 
then President Obama’s jobs plan passed, Zizek writes that “they [Clinton and others like him] 
will try to make the protests into a harmless moralistic gesture…What one should resist at this 
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stage is precisely such a quick translation of the energy of the protest into a set of ‘concrete’ 
pragmatic demands” and goes on to praise the eruptive, expressive force of the OWS episode, 
arguing that “The reason the protestors went out is that they had enough of the world where to 
recycle your Coke cans, to give a couple of dollars for charity, or to buy Starbucks cappuccino 
where 1% goes for the third world troubles is enough to make them feel good.”317 For Zizek, it is 
precisely the undirected rage, frustration, and disgust that made OWS such a potentially fertile 
moment in history. The moment one capitulates, even conceptually and linguistically, to the 
terms of hegemonic power structures, one has already given up significant ground.  
Zizek’s conceptualization of the impetuses for OWS in specifically quotidian, expressive 
terms (the infantilizing false morality of Western capital, the malaise of daily life under 
neoliberalism, and so on) leads me to address another objection commonly levelled against 
individualist resistance, namely that it is more about emotional expression than legitimate 
political change. Having demonstrated the political potential of individualized resistance, I want 
to conclude this section by briefly arguing for the value of subjective expression in resistance. 
The bifurcation between political organization and individualized resistance is, I suggest, a false 
dichotomy, and wrongly assumes that political change can never occur out of eruptive, 
expressive actions that themselves grow out of various forms of dissatisfaction with the current 
order of things. This, in essence, is the objection favored by critics of individualist resistance like 
Bookchin and Hedges, who see this type of action as merely “lifestylist” and emotive, and hence 
inherently unpolitical.  
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Few would deny, at this stage in political history, the power of subjective, personal 
experiences of daily life to spur political action and change. When Betty Freidan diagnosed the 
quiet oppression of the female sexual underclass of the 1950s as “the problem that has no 
name,”318 the Second-wave feminist movement organically coined the phrase “the personal is 
political.” Or when James Baldwin wrote of his friends “in twos and threes and fours, in a 
hallway, sharing a jug of wine or a bottle of whiskey, talking, cursing, fighting, sometimes 
weeping: lost, and unable to say what it was that oppressed them, except that they knew it was 
‘the man,’”319 they are all asserting the value of individual experiences of oppression, depression, 
frustration, and anger as of fundamental importance for political resistance and movements. 
What is often assumed, however, and what the individualist rejects, is the idea that the only 
acceptable outlets for these types of frustrations are organized political parties, protests, 
organizations, and language. That is, the subjective experiences of oppression and violence under 
neoliberal capitalism and state authority are taken as legitimate and are understood to influence 
political engagement, but the outlets for those feelings must be regulated, approved, and 
generally accepted in the wider socio-political landscape (e.g. unions, parties, community 
groups, etc.). For the left-anarcho-individualist, the eruptive power of these subjective 
experiences is inherently political, regardless of their modes of expression.  
One of the most articulate and passionate defenders of the political power of subjective, 
individual experience and eruptive expression is Raoul Vaneigem, an anarchist affiliate of the 
loose politico-artistic group the Situationist International (SI).320 According to Peter Marshall, 
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the Situationist critique of capitalism and oppressive state authority suggested that “the way 
out…was not to wait for a distant revolution but to reinvent everyday life here and now. To 
transform the perception of the world and to change the structure of society is the same thing.”321 
The Situationists, and Vaneigem in particular, saw the subjective experience of oppression, and 
the invisible forms of microresistance that organically erupt in our daily experience as 
fundamental to any revolutionary politics, not simply as a basis for larger scale organized 
resistance, but in themselves. Vaneigem summarized his position, and, I argue, the position of 
the left-anarcho-individualists in general, this way, 
The unstated agenda of every insurrectionary movement is the transformation of the 
world, and the reinvention of life…Revolution is made every day despite, and indeed in 
opposition to the specialists of revolution. This revolution is nameless, like everything 
that springs from lived experience. Its explosive integrity is forged continuously in the 
everyday clandestinity of acts and dreams.322 
 
This is of course not to say that individualized expressions of refusal are the sole means of 
revolutionary political change, but only that their political value is their own and that they must 
not be seen as entirely subordinate to or precursors of larger-scale forms of resistance. The SI 
explicitly supported many of the forms of individualized resistance discussed above (e.g. 
vandalism, wildcat strikes, work sabotage, etc.) and saw these types of refusal as signs of 
creativity and always already political acts of expression.323 Vaneigem, in an echo of Baldwin’s 
description of his despondent and frustrated friends, vividly describes a scene where the eruptive, 
inarticulable force of refusal expresses itself in a deeply quotidian manner, but with critical 
political implications.  
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He writes,  
The malaise assails me as the crowd around me grows. The concessions I have made to 
stupidity, under the pressure of circumstances, rush to meet me, surging around me in 
hallucinatory waves of faceless heads…Carried along by a crowd which only he can see, 
a man suddenly screams out in an attempt to break the spell, to call himself back to 
himself, to get back inside his own skin. All the tacit compliance, all the fixed smiles, 
lifeless words, cowardice and humiliation strewn along his path suddenly coalesce and 
possess him, driving him out of his desires and his dreams and exploding the illusion of 
‘being together.’324 
 
Here the individualist commitment to the primacy of subjective experience is on full display. The 
individual lived experience of oppression, boredom, and generalized feelings of dissatisfaction is 
the impetus for the desire to construct new forms of living and interacting. For Vaneigem, 
structured political revolution and the development of new social forms are inseparable from 
subjective oppression. Vaneigem argues that subjectivity and rigorous systematic critique must 
work in tandem, writing that the various structures and ideologies of violence and control 
“withstand neither analysis nor the anxiety that assails me.”325 That is, subjective, individualized 
experiences and their outward expression are as valid in terms of political resistance and 
diagnosis as any form of more structured, organized engagement.  
The expression of these subjective states of humiliation and despair serve as important 
shared spaces of connection and construction as well. Importantly for left-anarcho-individualists, 
the alienation from the self and subjective oppression are not only key forms of resistance, but 
also form the basis from which new forms of social relations can be constructed. Individualism 
ultimately holds that inverting alienation and actualizing individuals is also the truest form of 
democratic society. It is to this question, and the anti-democratic objection that I turn in the next 
section.  
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The Anti-Democratic Objection: Individualism versus Democracy?   
 It is difficult to overstate the influence of liberal democratic thinking on contemporary 
educational philosophy, and specifically the thinking of John Dewey. Dewey scholar Mordechai 
Gordon has gone so far as to compare the scope and depth of Dewey's impact on education to 
those of Marx and Freud on sociology and psychology respectively.326 Perhaps the most 
important of Dewey’s many theoretical legacies has been the sense among philosophers of 
education that the fundamental project of schooling is a social, democratic, and communicative 
one; that, as Dewey said, “…learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or 
occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social situations. For 
under such conditions, the school itself becomes a form of social life, a miniature 
community.”327 Schooling, for Dewey, is to develop in children “the means to be fully and 
adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices in 
life.”328 While Dewey recognized the significant challenge of how to balance the concerns and 
needs of individuals, on the one hand, and the large democratic community, on the other (indeed, 
he once referred to this problem as “the ultimate problem of all education,”)329 it is undeniable 
that Dewey viewed the community building, democratic aspects of the educational project to be 
of primary importance. This legacy has had two major implications for the purposes of this 
dissertation. First, there is the enduring sense that Dewey was fundamentally correct about the 
nature and goals of education in modern society, i.e. that it ought to promote liberal democracy, 
broadly understood. There is a certain affinity between the current state of political thinking in 
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educational philosophy and the thesis of Francis Fukuyama’s controversial 1992 book The End 
of History and the Last Man, in which he famously suggests that “What we may be witnessing is 
not just the end of the Cold war, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”330 With 
certain provisos, e.g. that we incorporate into our democratic political theorizing the insights of 
identitarian movements and thinking, many educational theorists seem to think that we have 
more or less hit on the best possible vision of schooling, and that we must simply tweak our 
approaches to bring that vision into practice in reality or add this or that theoretical addendum as 
necessary.331  
 A corollary to the “end of history” mentality regarding liberal democratic education, and 
the second major implication of Dewey’s legacy, has been that contemporary educational 
thinking has developed a list of foes and anathematic concepts against which the ideal of 
democratic schooling must be defended. Generally speaking, the discourse of resistance and 
incursion revolves around capitalism, markets, privatization, and the ubiquitous “neoliberalism.” 
The particular features of this historical epoch and its guiding philosophy, both of which are 
potential referents of these terms, are certainly in dispute, but there is widespread agreement on 
some of the fundamentals. For example, there is a general consensus that the basic tenets of 
neoliberalism tend to guide global and national economic policies, perhaps particularly so in the 
United States. The basic principles of neoliberalism were elaborated following the 1938 Walter 
Lippman Colloquium in Paris, which was called explicitly to form a new liberalism as interest in 
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classical liberal economic thinking waned. The foundational commitments ultimately produced 
by the participants at the colloquium are “the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, 
the system of competition, and a strong and impartial state.”332 Although neoliberalism as a term 
has become a generalized shorthand form of criticism toward both classical and properly 
neoliberal economic policies, we ought, as implied by the conditions of neoliberalism's initial 
articulation, to note the important differences that exist between these principles and the pure 
free-market philosophies of, say, F.A. Hayek or Ludwig von Mises, who initially did object to 
the commitment to strong state intervention in economic matters on the part of neoliberals. 
Another important aspect of neoliberalism is the shift from manufacture and labor as the main 
founts of profit and productivity to an emphasis on financial markets and speculation for those 
purposes. David Harvey puts the point pithily, claiming that “Neoliberalization has meant, in 
short, the financialization of everything.”333 I take this pervasive influence of globalized financial 
capital to be one of the defining features of the current political problematic, and it is the one 
against which the majority of current politico-educational critique is leveled.334 Crucially for this 
dissertation, it is generally assumed that a handmaiden to the destructive logics of efficiency, 
market ideology, and neoliberalism more generally is individualism, and the two are casually 
paired together with such notably frequency that one could be forgiven for thinking that 
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neoliberalism and individualism just are one and the same, or at the very least parasitic on one 
another. Critical pedagogue Henry Giroux groups individualism with “the ethic of consumption, 
“empire-building,” “the dictates of the market” and “patriotic jingoism,” and goes on to contrasts 
it directly with “civic responsibility.”335 In another piece, he ties individualism to “excessive 
commercialism” and “selfishness” which “undermine and displace the values necessary to define 
ourselves as active and critical citizens rather than as consumers.”336 Peter McLaren, another 
critical pedagogue, groups individualism together with what he calls “myths of the nuclear 
family” and “imperialism.”337 One of the most widely-cited theorists of neoliberalism, David 
Harvey, sees individualism as fundamentally tied to “the anarchy of the market, of competition” 
and “a breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy and 
nihilism.”338 Many other writers prefer to appropriate C.B. Macpherson’s famous term 
“possessive individualism”339 to more directly tie individualism to consumerism and capitalism. 
This despite the fact, it must be noted, that Macpherson himself explicitly denied the association 
between individualism and capitalism, writing that his entire philosophical project has in part 
revolved around “rescuing that valuable part of the liberal tradition which is submerged when 
liberalism is identified with capitalist market relations.”340 Wendy Brown, another important 
recent critic of neoliberalism, historically links the ideology of possessive individualism to “the 
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growth of capitalism and its overtaking of public life.”341 Pauline Lipman similarly deploys the 
term when she suggests that “Antidemocratic policies take root in a culture of possessive 
individualism and White supremacy that makes them seem natural and inevitable…”342 Clearly, 
there is a sense in much of the educational literature that individualism is fundamentally 
complicit with neoliberal capitalism and its attendant corruptions of democracy, community, and 
even human meaning, as in Harvey’s charge of nihilism. In short, the anti-democratic objection 
to individualism holds that individualism is fundamentally incompatible with democratic social 
organization, treating individuals as atomistic, disconnected, and in some cases fundamentally 
driven only by their own selfish desires. The next section argues that individualism is actually 
entirely consistent with democratic organization, and may even be a more truly radical form of 
democracy than traditional understandings of the term. I argue that the target of the critiques of 
individualism surveyed above is the type of rightist-individualism discussed in the conclusion of 
Chapter Two, and that the left-anarcho-individualism I advocate would wholeheartedly endorse 
the critiques of that rightist form of individualism as racist, atomistic, and oppressive. That is, to 
argue that individualism is incompatible with democracy is to fail to make the critical distinction 
between rightist-anarcho-capitalist individualism and left-anarcho-individualism. I will also 
argue that this distinction is one of which Dewey himself was keenly aware, and that his vision 
of democratic life is of a piece with that of the left-anarcho-individualist view. 
Individualist Democracy 
 It is worth acknowledging at the outset of responding to the antidemocratic objection that 
it is manifestly true that forms of rugged, capitalist individualism that are the intended target of 
the antidemocratic objection are not in any way democratic, predicated as they are on ideologies 
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of domination, pseudo-Darwinian competition, and isolation. The argument of this section is that 
the anarchist individualism advocated in this dissertation is united with traditional advocates of 
democracy in both opposing these tendencies as well as in calling for a freer, more just social 
world, though apart from state control. In nearly all of the major individualist thinkers, 
particularly those of the anarchist tradition, one finds political considerations to be of critical 
importance. While the political principles on which individualism is based, and some of the 
potential implications of those principles for social organization have already been articulated in 
Chapter Three, what I want to focus on here are the ways in which those principles align with the 
explicit commitments of democratic social organization. Given the broadly educational context 
of this discussion, I find it helpful to appeal to Dewey in terms of thinking about the nature of 
democracy and the values that underpin it. Dewey is rightly considered one of the most 
important theorists of democracy in the history of thinking about the concept, and any discussion 
of democracy must inevitably move through his work in some way. Here I will outline Dewey’s 
understanding of democracy, and go on to illustrate its fundamental compatibility with anarchist 
individualism.  
 The first critical point to note about how Dewey understands democracy is that, for him, 
democracy is not only, nor even primarily, a form of governmental organization. Rather, 
democracy is a way of life, an ethic, and, critically, a subjective experience. In his early 
articulation of democracy “The Ethics of Democracy,” Dewey argues that democracy as 
government or social organization is at best derivative of the subjective, inner sense of 
democracy as a moral commitment. He writes that democracy “is not to be put into a man from 
without. It must begin in the man himself, however much the good and the wise of society 
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contribute. Personal responsibility, individual initiation, these are the notes of democracy.”343 
Indeed, in 1927’s The Public and Its Problems, Dewey derides those who would restrict 
democracy to political organization at the expense of the subjective component, arguing that 
mere political democracy is weak, mechanistic, and narrow, stealthily relying on implied 
premises of rugged individualist liberalism.344 This centering of the individual in Dewey’s 
conception of democratic life is by no means marginal or limited to his early work, but rather is 
shot through the entire philosophical framework he establishes for democracy. In “A Resume of 
Four Lectures on Common Sense, Science and Philosophy,” from 1932, Dewey again describes 
the fundamental aspect of the democratic sensibility in individual terms, describing the 
democratic society as one in which “every individual has a degree of power to govern himself 
and be free in the ordinary concerns of life.”345 Critically for Dewey, democracy is constantly 
evolving, always creative, and always in the process of becoming. That is, there is no fixed 
endpoint at which we reach perfect democracy. Rather, as he puts the point in “The Challenge of 
Democracy to Education,” democracy “as a form of life cannot stand still.”346 Indeed, James 
Albrecht glosses Dewey’s experimentalist democracy as primarily a means of attempting to 
usher in a new vision of individualism, one that should immediately be familiar from discussion 
of individualism in Chapter Three. Albrecht writes that Dewey envisioned an individualism “that 
rejects classic liberalism’s negative conception of liberty and its rigid laissez-faire opposition to 
public regulation, in favor of a broad commitment to creating the positive conditions of 
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individual liberty and equality by whatever means…are best suited to each particular 
situation.”347 The ultimate goal of democratic organization, and the inner experience of the 
democratic spirit, is to unlock individual subjectivity, rather than achieve some objective form of 
freedom (as in the right-individualist tradition). Dewey, critically, extended this goal of 
individual cultivation into the realm of education as well, a connection that will be drawn more 
explicitly in Chapter Five. 
 Perhaps the most important statement of Dewey’s understanding of individualism, and a 
text that in many ways can serve as a bridge between Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists 
on the question of democratic individualism, is Individualism Old and New (1930). Dewey 
argues that the gradual advance of capitalist social capture and its infiltration into all aspects of 
modern life has fundamentally undercut the ability of individuals to achieve subjective 
fulfillment or band together for social progress. In an argument that parallels the rhetoric of 
Vaneigem, Dewey isolates as particularly oppressive “the unrest, impatience, irritation and hurry 
that are so marked in American life” and suggests that the ubiquity of these pathological 
subjective phenomena can only signal “an acute maladjustment between individuals and the 
social conditions under which they live,”348 namely a global capitalism that centers private 
pecuniary accumulation as the ultimate goal of human existence. Dewey argues that the “old” 
view of individualism is, as I argued in Chapter Two, fundamentally complicit with this view, 
situating the individual as merely an agent of capital. On the “old” view of individualism, “The 
individual is told that by indulging in the enjoyment of free purchasing he performs his economic 
duty, transferring his surplus income into the corporate store where it can be most effectively 
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used.”349 This is the view of right-individualism and anarcho-capitalism, holding as they do to 
the model of homo economicus as the ideal of individual activity. Dewey also echoes the 
discussion of Herbert Hoover from Chapter One, arguing that Hoover positioned himself, and by 
extension the Republican party at large, not as political entities, but rather as engineers of order 
and prosperity, taking a supposedly more objective view of economic relations.350 This is of 
course a sine qua non of neoliberal capitalist rationality of the Randian and Hayekian variety. As 
should be clear, the left-anarcho-individualist agrees with Dewey’s critique of this form of 
individualism.  
 These developments in capitalism and the entrenchment of the “old” vision of 
individualism that supports those developments has resulted, Dewey argues, in the subversion of 
the individual, who is divided within himself between the alienating and homogenizing forces of 
capitalist production and his genuine desire for self-realization and expression. Dewey argues 
that the individual needs to be reconstructed in an organic way that responds to the currently 
existing problematic and set of social relationships. In a similar argument to that made by 
Stirner, Dewey argues that traditionally imposed mores and social roles must be re-evaluated in 
light of new social conditions and forms of living, writing “Traditional ideas are more than 
irrelevant. They are an encumbrance; they are the chief obstacle to the formation of a new 
individuality integrated within itself and with a liberated function in the society wherein it 
exists.”351 The new individual must be free to develop in conversation with both her genuine self 
and those around her. For Dewey, this spark of individuality and the desire to escape oppressive 
social forms (and indeed create new ones) is, as Vaneigem also argues, “inexpugnable” and 
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asserts itself everywhere that it is tamped down, even in small ways.352 The mode of individualist 
democracy begins within the individual and the recapturing of the individual spirit of 
experimentation and engagement with one’s surroundings.  
This individualist orientation in terms of the spirit of democracy is shared by all the great 
individualists, as is the sense that democratic forms can never become static or rigid, falling back 
into the homogenizing subsuming of the individual under the heading of “Society” as understood 
by Emerson and Stirner in Chapter Three. The left-anarcho-individualists, if anything, see 
themselves as calling for a more rigorously thorough democratic reimagining of society, so as to 
maximize the value and variation of human experiences and freedoms. This view is in keeping 
with the individualist tendency to extend the logic of a traditional leftist position to its logical 
conclusions. If democracy is decoupled from its associations with this or that particular way of 
organizing political representation, and is viewed as an attitude toward the world and other 
individuals in it, it becomes clear that Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists share much the 
same understanding of the concept. Stirner’s call for a reconfiguration of human relationships 
from society to union and Emerson’s extension of the ideal of friendship into the realm of the 
social are both of a piece with Dewey’s definition of democracy as “a name for a life of free and 
enriching communion.”353 The emphasis here on freedom and enrichment is key, as it represents 
a critical point of agreement between Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists, namely on the 
issue that true democracy, while acknowledging the unavoidable entanglements into which we 
are thrown as human being, must not unilaterally impose on us unchosen relations of force, or 
put us in positions that sap our individuality and unique identities. For Dewey, these free and 
enriching communities (or “publics” in his preferred terminology) emerge and develop in 
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response to specific, localized conditions and problems that confront the members of that public 
in their daily lives. There is no predetermined model or theoretical ideal to which the emergence 
of a public must adhere, and indeed, “to form itself, the public has to break existing political 
forms.”354 This understanding of the emergence of publics as contingent and dependent on 
shifting, localized contexts, is certainly consistent with how Stirner understands the formation of 
unions, namely for mutual benefit and in response to a desire or need. These types of ad hoc 
social forms that do not exist long enough to become hardened by social roles or other strictures 
are hallmarks of the left-anarcho-individualist understanding of democracy and democratic 
decision making.  
Dewey is similarly clear, and in agreement with the left-anarcho-individualists, that one 
of the main forces that has come to oppress and stifle subjectivity, and hence democracy, is the 
advent of neoliberal capitalism and the attendant flattening of human relations under the 
demands of production, work, and capital accumulation. Dewey clearly recognized that “the 
problem of democracy is no longer chiefly governmental and political. It is industrial and 
financial – economic.”355 For Dewey, industrial capitalism and the various indignities and 
humiliations it produced, along with its demand for competition among all of those under its 
control, had snuffed out the spirit of democracy. Mere political democracy in the form of 
elections and the like is neither able to spark or nourish the democratic impulse, and Dewey calls 
for a radical reshaping of our social order so that democracy can be reborn anew. He goes so far 
as to explicitly call for the people’s ownership and control of “the land, banks, the producing and 
distributing agencies of the nation.”356 Certainly Vaneigem would agree with Dewey regarding 
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the false promises and antidemocratic foundation of capitalist production, a when he describes 
the reality of day to day life under capitalism as “working to survive, surviving by consuming 
and for the sake of consuming: the hellish cycle is complete. According to the logic of the-
economy-rules, survival is both necessary and sufficient.”357 Modes of modern capitalist 
production, for both Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualist, are fundamentally antidemocratic 
and corrosive to the ultimate goals of self-actualization and development of agency.  
 Both in their understanding of the fundamental goals of democracy (i.e. the cultivation of 
individuality), their conception of how democratic social organization is to be approached, as 
well as their critiques of capitalism as antithetical to democratic life, the left-anarcho-
individualists and Dewey agree. Broadening the conception of democracy from mere formal 
political organization to include certain types of attitudes and subjective dispositions shows 
clearly that left-anarcho-individualism is not only compatible with, but an ally of, democracy.358 
In the final chapter, I will approach educational issues specifically, applying the positive left-
anarcho-individualist view espoused in Chapter Three to specifically educational concerns, 
namely concerns of school organization, pedagogy, curriculum, and the relationship of schools to 
society.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LEFT-ANARCHO-INDIVIDUALIST EDUCATION 
 
 In this chapter I synthesize the critiques of state power and social homogenization offered 
by individualism with the positive picture of that view offered in Chapter Three specifically with 
respect to educational questions. I will argue first that left-anarcho-individualism provides a 
strong and important critique of the current neoliberal problematic in education, defined as it is 
by increasing calls for standardization, measurement, accountability, and the like. Second, I 
discuss some possible futures suggested by the left-anarcho-individualist program for reshaping 
and rebuilding education for individual liberation and expression. I also address the potential 
objection that left-anarcho-individualist education in practice simply collapses into a type of 
existentialism, an educational approach that has a long theoretical and practical history of its 
own.  
Education as a Fundamental Anarchist Interest 
Education has long been a central preoccupation of anarchist thinking in general, apart 
from the individualist tradition. Despite anarchism’s notorious inability to generate meaningful 
theoretical consensus among those who actually identity as anarchists,359 one of the few nearly 
universal points of agreement among anarchists of various stripes is the conviction that education 
and schools are of foundational importance in any long-term project of social change or 
revolution. Leonard Krimerman and Lewis Parry go so far as to claim of anarchism that “Indeed, 
no other movement whatever has assigned to educational principles, concepts, experiments, and 
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practices a more significant place in its writings and activities.”360 The reasons for this are both 
negative and positive. That is, anarchists recognize both the importance of wresting the powerful 
tool of ideological reproduction and indoctrination represented by the educational system from 
State control, as well as seeing education as a critical positive project for building a new society.  
With respect to the negative aspect of the anarchist interest in education, anarchists are 
largely in agreement with the analysis of schools as social institutions provided by Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser in his influential essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” which diagnosed the ways in which State and Capital power reproduce the 
conditions of their persistence, specifically with respect to production.361 For Althusser, the key 
function of social formations of all types is to “reproduce the conditions of its production at the 
same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce.”362 That is, social forms must 
participate in maintaining the material bases of their existence, such that they can continue with 
their productive imperatives. Crucially, this “endless chain” of social reproduction necessitates 
not just the reproduction of the means of production (e.g. raw materials, factories, etc.), but also 
of what Althusser calls “productive forces,” by which he simply means labor power itself.363 
Althusser argues that the most influential and important institution in the process of reproducing 
labor power is the ideological State apparatus (ISA) of the educational system.364 Althusser 
performs a genealogical exposure not unlike those undertaken by Stirner and Foucault to 
demonstrate how the educational ISA has come to perform the same reproductive functions and 
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occupy the same structural position as the previously dominant ISA, namely the Church. He 
argues that “the ideological State apparatus which has been installed in the dominant position in 
mature-capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle 
against the old dominant ideological State apparatus [the Church], is the educational ideological 
apparatus.”365 The school is where children are initiated into the structural relations of State 
power and capital and prepared for their various downstream positions in productions. Critically, 
Althusser does not necessarily see school as a site of explicit propagandizing or indoctrination in 
any direct sense, but rather isolates how the most supposedly innocuous and basic aspects of the 
curriculum serve the larger purposes of ideological control. Inquiring into what precisely it is 
that students learn in school, he writes in a paragraph that is unmistakably applicable to our 
current neoliberal context,  
at any rate they learn to read, to write and to add – i.e. a number of techniques and a 
number of other things as well, including elements of ‘scientific’ or ‘literary culture,’ 
which are directly useful in the different jobs in production (one instruction for manual 
workers, another for technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for higher 
management, etc.). Thus, they learn ‘know-how.’ 
 
 He goes on to argue that beyond these technical forms of preparation for economic production, 
children also learn  
the ‘rules’ of good behavior, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the 
division of labour, according to the job he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and 
professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical 
division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination.366  
 
The school, then, is one of the primary means of assigning social roles, instilling the rules of the 
game of production, and the site of subjection to the established order. While this 
characterization of the ideological apparatus of the school is particularly attractive to 
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individualists for reasons I will discuss, it is also generally consistent with the anarchist position 
on schools as they currently exist in the neoliberal social order, and helps to explain the high 
degree of interest in schools and education on the part of anarchists.   
 While anarchists generally agree on the centrality of a robust critique of the educational 
system and acknowledge its importance in any revolutionary project, the positive visions of what 
education ought to look like, and what its purposes would be, in post-revolutionary society are, 
perhaps predictably, strikingly different. Judith Suissa makes clear the fundamental tension 
between total freedom and a positive political program that invariably arises in any discussion of 
anarchist education in her authoritative treatment of the topic, writing  
On the one hand, given the anarchist aversion to blueprints and the demand for constant 
experimentation in the endeavour to improve society, it may seem quite reasonable to 
argue that doing away with schools and formal education altogether would be a crucial 
step toward the creation of an anarchist society…Yet on the other hand, the earlier 
discussion of the substantive core of anarchism suggests that any educational practice 
consistent with these values cannot coherently adopt a libertarian position, in the sense of 
a laissez-faire attitude to children’s upbringing.367  
 
Suissa goes on to argue that the former horn of this dilemma, while in some senses consistent 
with anarchist commitment, is more properly referred to as “libertarian,” given its 
uncompromising emphasis on the freedom of the child and unwillingness to impose strictures on 
their behavior and development. On the other hand, it is the centrality of anarchist political 
principles in the educational process that marks certain forms of education as distinctly anarchist, 
rather than simply libertarian, and the imparting of these principles can indeed necessitate certain 
forms of imposition and authority that would be rejected by strict educational libertarians. This 
distinction is of profound importance for thinking about anarchist education in general, but 
specifically for individualism, which I ultimately argue bridges the gap between libertarian and 
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anarchist education by explicitly politicizing the project of subjective liberation. Before making 
that case, however, I want to advance and discuss some representative examples of each horn of 
Suissa’s dilemma, both theoretical and as instantiated in actually existing schools.  
Libertarian Education  
 Two of the most well-known recent anarchist educational theorists, Paul Goodman and 
Colin Ward, represent a more libertarian position on educational questions. Both Goodman and 
Ward saw the formalized education system as having become so corrupt and stifling that they 
questioned the need for formal schooling entirely, a hallmark of libertarian educational thinking, 
advocating instead various forms of informal community-based, organically evolving educative 
organizations and structures, often centered around the utilization of urban spaces as sites of 
educational growth. For Goodman and Ward, both fundamentally urbanists and early proponents 
of what Henri Lefebvre called “the right to the city,”368 contemporary urban spaces would ideally 
serve as large-scale, open classrooms that would ultimately eliminate the need for any formalized 
education or a specific educational site called a “school.” The open-endedness and near infinity 
of experiences available to urban children (and the adults around them), ought to be utilized for 
educational purposes and free development of children, specifically what Ward called “education 
for mastery of the environment.”369 Both Ward and Goodman believed that direct contact with 
the physical spaces of daily life was the most effective means of coming to understand not only 
those spaces themselves, but the people who occupy them, the political implications of their 
design and conditions (e.g. poverty, segregation, etc.), and one’s role in the broader community. 
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Goodman, a prominent forerunner of the de-schooling theories of Ivan Illich,370 described his 
vision of this radically open urban education in his 1942 novel The Grand Piano, writing  
It seems to me prima facie that we have to use the City itself as our school. Instead of 
bringing imitation bits of the City into a school building, let us go at our own pace and 
get out among the real things. What I envisage is gangs of about six kids, starting at nine 
or ten years old, roving the City with a shepherd empowered to protect them, and 
accumulating experiences tempered to their powers.371 
 
Goodman believed, with Emerson, that the highest value in contemporary capitalist society was 
conformity, and that the schools had come to reflect that truth. He argued for a revitalization of 
traditional progressive education, but with an even stronger emphasis on the individuality of each 
child and a higher degree of “permissiveness in all animal behavior and interpersonal 
experience.”372 Ward is somewhat more moderate in searching for “a compromise between the 
radical ideas of the deschoolers and our own expectations of schooling for our own children,”373 
but still fundamentally calls for a breakdown of the traditional organized educational system and 
an entirely open school, without walls or other barriers, and a curriculum fundamentally dictated 
by the immediate needs of the local community and the interests of the children, rather than a 
grand anarchist political program.  
 Perhaps the most famous actually existing example of libertarian education in this sense 
is A.S. Neill’s Summerhill School, founded in 1921 in Suffolk, England. For Suissa, Summerhill 
is distinctive of the libertarian view of education and is also an excellent example of what 
separates anarchist education proper from its libertarian alternatives. Neill, whose educational 
methods are sometimes placed under the umbrella of “existentialist” education, put strong 
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emphasis on non-intervention with the development and behavior of children, advocating what 
he referred to as “self-regulation” on the part of children.374 As Suissa points out, “Neill 
conceived of freedom in a primarily individual, psychological sense,”375 and indeed much of 
Neill’s approach to childhood and education was driven by psychological concerns. Specifically, 
for example, Neill was deeply interested in the effects of repression and discipline on the 
development of children’s sexuality and ways in which allowing existentialist self-expression 
might counteract what he sees as the pernicious influence of sexual repression. He even goes so 
far as to claim that “To find a new orientation to sex is the most difficult task of the parent and 
teacher.”376  
 Neill was also stoutly apolitical in his pedagogical vision, even to the point of potential 
relativism, which is a radically different attitude from the anarchist’s explicit centering of social 
and political reform in their worldview. Suissa cites a telling quote from an interview Neill once 
gave, in which he seemed to endorse a relativistic view of pedagogical neutrality, saying “Life is 
so difficult to understand that I personally cannot claim to settle the relative educational values 
of anyone.”377 Neill was, in this sense, fundamentally committed to the total freedom of 
individuals and saw that freedom as abstractable from social forces in precisely the way objected 
to by many critics of individualism. In a strange inversion, Neill’s deeply isolationist 
individualism and relativist approach can even be said to participate in the objectionable 
individualism of Rand and Rothbard, fetishizing free choice and the development of exceptional 
individuals even to the detriment of larger-scale socio-political concerns. Neill seems to directly 
endorse this type of view when he states, “When the individual and social interests clash, the 
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individual interests should be allowed to take precedence.”378 Neill’s thinking is of course 
distinct from the that of Goodman and Ward, who both implicated capitalism and oppressive 
political structures directly in their calls for libertarian education, but the methodological 
practices advocated by all three thinkers are importantly similar, and can be characterized as 
libertarian in the sense Suissa uses the term. The concluding sections of this chapter will 
illustrate how an individualist education based on the left-anarcho-individualist view advocated 
in Chapter Three importantly differs from the educational thinking of both Ward and Goodman, 
as well as Neill. 
Anarchist Education Proper: The Case of The Stelton Ferrer School 
 Representative of proper anarchist education, as opposed to the pseudo-anarchist 
libertarianism of Neill, is the thinking of anarcho-communist Mikhail Bakunin, one of the most 
well-known anarchists in history. Bakunin held that even in a fully realized anarcho-
communalist society, both education and work would be compulsory for every person. Bakunin 
believed that this was the only equitable, fair way to ensure that no individual’s labor was 
exploited by another.379 Of course, Bakunin shared the critique of schooling under State 
authority, and even more so under the influence of capitalism, and, as Suissa notes, was very 
open in terms of how precisely education would be structured in an anarchist society and to what 
ends it would be put,380 but still held to the necessity of formal structures of education in a 
general sense. Slightly more prescriptive in his anarchist educational theory is Peter Kropotkin, 
who explicitly advocated for a certain type of vocational education as fundamental to anarchist 
society. Education, for Kropotkin, is primarily  
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to teach him [the child] the elements of knowledge and the good methods of work, and, 
above all, to give him that general inspiration which will induce him, later on, to put in 
whatever he does a sincere longing for truth, to like what is beautiful, both as to forms 
and to contents, to feel the necessity of being a useful unit amidst other human units, and 
thus to feel his heart at unison with the rest of humanity.381 
 
For Kropotkin, and the anarchist tradition of education in general, one of the critical goals is to 
attempt to instill in children a sense of their place in the world and a sense of obligation toward 
their fellow men. I do not mean here that children are to be told their place in the sense of 
Althusserian indoctrination into a pre-established role in capitalist production, but rather a 
communication of the ideals of cooperation, mutuality, and interdependence that generally 
characterize the anarchist society advocated by the anarcho-communists and the like. Again, like 
Bakunin, Kropotkin here sees work as a necessary part of that society, and so calls for vocational 
training to be a component of the educational system. He sums up his view on education by 
claiming that learning should come “through the eyes and the hand to the brain.”382 Unlike the 
relativist libertarianism of Neill, proper anarchist education foregrounds issues of class 
consciousness, anticapitalism, antiracism, and a positive vision of the common good and political 
organization. For these thinkers, the conception of freedom most relevant to the educational and 
social project is collective, including much more than simply relieving individuals of this or that 
restriction on their thought or behavior. Suissa cites anarchist educator Fransisco Ferrer’s 
denunciation of attempts to depoliticize education as fundamentally hypocritical. Rather, he 
explicitly advocates for direct political content in schools, writing, “We should not, in the school, 
hide the fact that we would awaken in the children a desire for a society of men truly free and 
truly equal.”383 
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 The reference to Ferrer is particularly relevant here, as he is perhaps the most well-known 
and successful anarchist educator in modern history, having founded the Escuela Moderna 
(Modern School) in Barcelona in 1901. The school was the culmination and confluence of many 
of Ferrer’s most closely cherished ideals. The Escuela was profoundly radical for the time and 
context, advocating the political education of working-class children for their own class 
consciousness and outside of the purview of the Catholic Church, an institution which at that 
time closely controlled nearly all education in Spain. In The Origin and Ideals of the Modern 
School, one of a tiny number of Ferrer’s few writings to ever appear in print, he wrote that 
“Governments have ever been careful to hold a high hand over the education of the people. They 
know, better than anyone else, that their power is based almost entirely on the school.”384 Ferrer 
also rejected the strict discipline that tended to accompany formal education at the time, instead 
arguing that in order to ever truly learn or engage deeply with their own education, children must 
be given the freedom explore, consider, and reject ideas and approaches as they see fit. They 
must be educated, that is, to become freethinking and self-actualized adults. Ferrer’s ultimate 
goal was that the children who attended the Modern Schools would eventually become the men 
who would lead a working-class revolution. Though Ferrer’s school ultimately closed due to his 
being swept up in various political events in Spain, including a prison term and eventual 
execution, his school inspired what would become the longest-lasting and most influential 
radical educational experiment in American history, namely the Stelton Ferrer School, which 
began in 1911 in New York City. It will be worthwhile to spend some time detailing the 
historical rise and fall of the Ferrer school, as it is importantly illustrative of the tension between 
libertarian and anarchist education identified by Suissa. 
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Originally called simply the Ferrer School, the school was founded by notable American 
anarchist Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and others. In her essay “Fransisco Ferrer and 
the Modern School” which appeared in her 1910 collection Anarchism and Other Essays, 
Goldman treats Ferrer as a type of political martyr, writing that upon his execution “the obscure 
teacher, became a universal figure, blazing forth the indignation and wrath of the whole civilized 
world against the wanton murder,” and proclaimed that “his spirit would rise in just indignation 
against the iron regime of his country.”385 Goldman, along with other American anarchists and 
leftists, would form the Fransisco Ferrer Association and Center in New York City in 1910. 
While the Ferrer Association was not a strictly anarchist project, from the beginning anarchists 
took leading roles in the organization. Goldman and Alexander Berkman were prominent Ferrer 
Association figures, as were Leonard Abbot and Joseph Cohen, both well-known anarchists in 
New York. Harry Kelly, an anarchist who served as the first professional organizer of the Ferrer 
Association wrote of the group in 1913 that a “libertarian impulse” was at the base of the 
Association’s work: 
The predominating spirit is anarchistic; yet it cannot be too strongly insisted on that the 
association as such is not committed to any special economic theory or political ideal… 
The interpretation of freedom and justice and how to attain them differ, but free 
expression of opinion and interchange of ideas is the working method.386 
 
The Ferrer Center of New York became an important anchor for educational experiments and 
adult programs, with men and women of all economic classes coming to the Ferrer Center to 
learn and socialize.  
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 The school was eventually forced to move from the city due to the involvement of 
individuals associated with the Center in a botched attempted assassination of Standard Oil 
chairman John D. Rockefeller.387 Harry Kelly, another anarchist figure involved in the school, 
wrote of that time that “It was felt to be unfair to the children and harmful to their development 
as free spirits to grow up in an atmosphere of violent partisanship and fierce revolutionary ardor 
inevitable with men and women engaged in a daily struggle with the powers of darkness.”388The 
school was able to procure around 140 acres of land under the incorporated name of the Ferrer 
Colony Association, and then resold small plots of the land to families and individual 
prospective colonists for around one hundred and fifty dollars per acre, leaving room for some 
profit that was intended to begin construction of a new schoolhouse and other infrastructural 
considerations.389 On May 16th. 1915, the school formally opened and thirty-two young students 
came by train from the Ferrer School in New York to the new Ferrer Colony School, which came 
to be known as the Stelton Modern School. Perhaps no school was more consistent in the 
implementation of and commitment to these progressive values in curriculum and pedagogy than 
the Stelton Ferrer school. While the school struggled to maintain a consistent staff, going through 
four principals in its first year, the teachers and children saw incredible success and happiness. 
There was no formal curriculum or schedule of activities, and students set and pursued their own 
intellectual or personal goals. There was no standard for when children “should” read or do 
certain levels of mathematics. The only demands made on a course of study was that it was 
fulfilling to the child undertaking it. Education at Stelton was designed to cultivate responsibility 
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in the children. The school had a weekly meeting where children could make suggestions on 
school policy and make decisions on matters of discipline. A former student, Ray Miller, 
summed up the nature of a Stelton education in a discussion with anarchist historian Paul Avrich, 
stating: 
We did everything ourselves – we were gardeners, we were typesetters, we were cooks – 
we did everything with our own two hands. Instead of merely reading A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, we put on the play, and put it on outdoors. The grownups got involved 
too. I never avoided taking part in anything, whereas in high school everything seemed 
like a chore, even though I always got good marks…Stelton was not only a school but a 
community; it wasn’t just education – it was living. 390 
 
The 1920s represented the most fruitful and consistent time in the Modern School's existence. 
Husband and wife team Elizabeth and Alexis Ferm, took over the school in 1920 and under their 
leadership "the Modern School became one of the most radical experiments ever to take place in 
the history of American education."391 The Ferms had significant experience in alternative 
education. Before coming to Stelton, the pair had founded and run their own school, the 
Children's Playhouse, in Dyker Heights, Brooklyn, and later founded one of the first so-called 
storefront schools on the Lower East Side, which is where they met and befriended Emma 
Goldman. Elizabeth Ferm was particularly influenced by the ideas of the German educator and 
founder of the kindergarten movement Friedrich Froebel who was a leader in the progressive 
education movement and argued for ideals of self-creation and self-direction in education. At 
Stelton, the Ferms promoted both manual and creative work, such as printing, weaving, 
carpentry, basket-making, pottery, metal work, gardening, singing, dancing and other sports; 
they built a series of workshops in the schoolhouse, although the children still had the choice of 
                                                          
390 Paul Avrich, The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 253.  
391 Avrich, The Modern School Movement, 256.  
153 
 
studying more traditional academic subjects within the library, which was named after Peter 
Kropotkin, appropriately, given the schools fusing of vocational and intellectual training.392 This 
program led to a remarkable creative flowering among the children, who produced, among other 
things, the Voice of the Children, which they wrote, illustrated and printed entirely themselves, 
using a printing press provided by anarchist publisher Joseph Ishill, who would go on to found 
the influential anarchist publishing company Oriole Press. Eventually, however, the Ferms began 
to be questioned by some of the parents who wanted a more radical, politicized education for 
their children, and objected to the lack of attention paid to academics. Refusing to modify their 
methods, the Ferms left in 1925.  
Though the Ferms would return to the school in 1933, their initial departure can be seen 
as the beginning of the end of the Stelton Ferrer School, and the Ferrer colony itself. The 
politicization of education in the colony that initially led the Ferms to leave the school would 
only intensify through the 1930s and 1940s, with internal disputes between committed anarchists 
and those who, with the rise of the Soviet Union, shifted their political allegiances in a more 
communistic direction.393 At the same time, during the rise of Nazism in Germany, many of the 
Jewish residents of the colony rediscovered their religious and ethnic identities and either left the 
colony to support the war effort or began to shift away from anarchism to a more nationalistic 
form of political engagement, causing further ideological tensions within the community. In 
general, there was significant disagreement in terms of how to handle the threat of fascism and 
whether or not the wars against it should be supported (in Spain, for example).394 As so often 
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happens with the political quarrels of adults, these internal disputes bled into the school as well, 
with bitter fights about what types of materials should be in the library, and how political the 
school should be, with some advocating for keeping the school out of the political arena and 
others demanding explicit political and ideological foci in the education of their children.  
 Even more damaging than the internal struggles, though, was the purchase by the United 
States government of a large parcel of land directly next to the colony. Not only did this militate 
against the fundamental goals of the colony, i.e. escaping city life and the influence and gaze of 
the government, but it also caused tangible problems for the colony. For example, when the 
construction of Camp Kilmer on the land was complete, over 70,000 soldiers moved into the 
barracks. This caused a significant uptick in break-ins and vandalism in the colony, and there 
was even one documented case where a young woman was raped by a solider.395 By the middle 
of the 1940s there were only fifteen children left in the school, mostly very young, and the 
school finally closed in 1953. The Stelton Ferrer School represents both one of the greatest 
achievements of anarchist education in history, and also illustrates the fundamental tension at the 
heart of anarchist educational projects, namely that “between child-centered pedagogical practice 
and…anarchist goals and values.”396 In many ways, the Stelton School was brought down by the 
manifestation of this tension between those who wanted the school to remain apolitical, focusing 
on libertarian educational methods, and those who wanted to explicitly politicize the curriculum 
and mission of the school, representing the explicitly anarchist strain. At this point, I want to turn 
to the educational thinking of the individualists, and argue that individualism as described in 
Chapter Three can effectively serve as a bridge between the educational tensions that exist 
between libertarian and anarchist thinking, as defined by Suissa.  
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Left-Anarcho-Individualist Education and Civic Epiphenomenalism 
 The left-anarcho-individualist tradition in education, such as it is, and in following the 
general pattern of its engagement with both anarchism and libertarianism in general, has 
significant points of agreement as well as critiques of those two traditions. Though, with some 
exceptions, the individualists wrote comparatively little on educational matters, and rarely in any 
sustained way, there is much to be gleaned from the place education has in their thought, as well 
as extrapolated from their other commitments. Ultimately, I argue that individualists bridge the 
gap between libertarian and anarchist education by fundamentally politicizing subjectivity and 
the everyday subjective experiences that form our understandings of the world. While endorsing 
many of the traditional anarchist political principles, the left-anarcho-individualists hold that still 
these do not need to be formally instilled in children, but rather that education for politicized 
subjectivity naturally produces feelings of mutual cooperation and genuine democracy. In this 
sense, the educational theory of the left-anarcho-individualists might be referred to as a type of 
democratic epiphenomenalism. 
 While endorsing the attitude of anti-conformity expressed by both the libertarians and 
anarchists regarding educational matters, the individualists extend this critique further even to 
the position of the anarchists themselves. Specifically, the individualists target the idea that 
education should be aimed at producing a positive vision of the Good Citizen or Good Anarchist, 
as in Kropotkin or Ferrer’s understandings of the goals of education. What is important to 
highlight here is not the specific content of Kropotkin or Ferrer’s understanding of what makes a 
good Citizen, but the fact that they both insist that the good Citizen has some positive content at 
all, determined in advance, and to be cultivated by the educative process. It is at this point that 
the left-anarcho-individualist critique is most radical. Thus far the individualist has concurred 
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with the critique that schools as they currently exist, as sites of blind conformity to pernicious 
social trends and as mere extensions of state power to which the anarchist of any stripe is ex 
hypothesi opposed. However, the individualist objects even to what might be called the ideal 
form of formalized education, that is, a world where we have a vibrant public sphere already in 
existence and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the ideal of the Good Citizen needed 
for the maintenance of that public and the functioning of the educational system in producing 
precisely that type of citizen. The anarchist, on Suissa’s understanding, holds that the problem 
with education in its current form is the mistaken understandings we have as a society about the 
content of the concept of the citizen and the way society ought to be structured. If only we 
understood these things in a more enlightened way, presumably along the lines that they propose, 
and were able to bring the students that our educational system is creating into line with that 
vision, there would be nothing left to object to in the concept of even compulsory schooling.  
 For the individualist, debates about the content of the type of person that schools should 
work toward teleologically are mere distractions from the real problem of education, which lies 
in its very structure. The ubiquitous critiques of the oppressive, homogenizing nature of 
schooling in capitalist America, by which we produce only unthinking capital-C Consumers, 
who take it as their highest calling in life the production and consumption of material goods, is 
itself only an inverted mirror image of the same oppressive homogenizing nature of schooling 
which would inevitably continue in the hypothetical anarcho-communist utopia, by which we 
produce only capital-C Citizens, Communists, Anarchists, Comrades, or whatever who take it as 
their highest calling in life to preserve the public sphere and engage in good deliberative 
communalist relations with one another. To put the point differently, for the anarchist, the 
problem with current educational system lies in our understanding of the type of person we are 
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training up, whereas the individualist locates the problem in the fact that we are training people 
up at all. That is, the individualist case against formal education is fundamentally structural; the 
content of any given manifestation of that type of education is immaterial. For the anarchist, both 
the capital-C Consumer and the capital-C Communist or capital-A Anarchist are equally 
homogenizing as teleological goals of education, and equally oppressive. This line of anarchist 
critique is echoed in Max Stirner's admonishing of the French revolutionaries for failing to 
engage in true structural change, but only substituting a new content into the same oppressive 
structures which had previously existed. He writes, “The revolution was not directed against the 
established, but against the establishment in question, against a particular establishment. It did 
away with this ruler, not with the ruler...”397 and later, in perhaps the clearest statement of the 
anarchist opposition to the possibility of piecemeal radical change, “Much as may be improved, 
strongly as 'discreet progress' may be adhered to, always there is only a new master set in the old 
one's place.”398 The individualist objection to formal schooling is precisely parallel. Even 
revolutionary reform agendas hoping to install a new democratic or communalistic ethos into the 
structure of the formal school system are always only replacing the old master (Nationalist 
indoctrination, consumerist ideology, etc.) with a new one (the ideal of deliberative citizenship, 
working class solidarity, etc.), which ultimately serves exactly the same structural purpose, 
namely to homogenize the identities of irreducibly unique individuals under the umbrella of a 
teleological vision of what a person should be.399  
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 Nietzsche, who wrote in perhaps the most sustained way on education out of all the 
individualist thinkers, directly attacks the concept of education for citizenship and productive 
contribution even in ideal social scenarios such as Bakunin’s social anarchist communalism. He 
makes a distinction between survival and education, and goes on to argue that the two are 
fundamentally distinct, and indeed incompatible, and must be approached separately. He writes,  
A person needs to learn much to live, to fight his battle for survival – but everything he 
learns and does with that aim, as an individual, has nothing to do with education and 
culture…No course of instruction that ends in a career, in breadwinning, leads to culture 
or true education in our sense; it merely shows how one can save and secure the self in 
the struggle for survival.400 
 
Nietzsche at times appears to endorse the libertarian view of Goodman that schools as 
institutions ought to be done away with entirely both because of their inability to fully capture 
the individuality of each student as well as the greater forms of educational experience that take 
place in the world at large, outside of the schoolhouse. He asks, with respect to actualized 
individuals, “how could their incalculable nature be the basis of an institution?”401 and goes on to 
suggest that the path to the creation of these genuine forms of subjectivity beyond social 
conformity lies outside institutions of any kind, writing “The most remarkable, instructive, 
decisive experiences in life are the everyday ones; the enormous riddle before everyone’s eyes is 
precisely what almost no one sees as such.”402 For Nietzsche, education must be separate from 
questions of mere survival and imposed ideals or social forms, so as to allow the flourishing of 
individuality. He writes “Here, with me, you will be in complete control of your own individual 
personality; your gifts will shine forth in their own right, bringing you – you! – into the first 
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rank.”403 It may appear that Nietzsche is endorsing a generally libertarian understanding of 
education, a la Niell. However, what is critical about Nietzsche’s view, and that of individualism 
generally, is that it is precisely the individual pursuing what Emerson calls “his own secret,”404 
that creates the conditions for social progress. As David Roof characterizes Nietzsche’s views 
“individuals serve society best when they learn self-trust, evaluate their contemporary morals, 
and envision a new world…Society is benefited when individuals seek their own personal 
happiness and well-being.”405  
 Though he did not approach educational questions directly, Raoul Vaneigem develops 
this Nietzschean view of how individual self-actualization produces social progress as an 
epiphenomenon. Vaneigem speaks of “radical-subjectivity” as the production of a certain type of 
united front of subjectivities produced from the mutual recognition of subjective desires for self-
fulfillment and actualization. He writes, “You cannot save yourself on your own or achieve 
fulfillment in isolation. How can any individual who has gained some measure of insight into 
himself and the world fail to recognize a will identical to his own in those around him – the same 
quest, the same starting points?”406 Vaneigem holds that while each individual subjectivity is 
irreducibly unique, each participates in what he refers to as the “identity reflex” (as distinct, to 
refer to Chapter Three, from identification), which is the recognition of the same “will to fulfill 
oneself by changing the world, to live every sensation, every experience, every possibility to the 
full.”407 Here Vaneigem appeals to the Nietzschean distinction between survival and culture, 
arguing that if we ignore our desires for life, living freely and honoring our subjective 
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actualization in favor of mere survival, we will ultimately undercut the possibilities of communal 
life, which is itself based in radical subjectivity. As he writes in an echo of Emerson’s 
characterization of society in “Experience,” “Who wants a world where the guarantee of freedom 
from starvation means the risk of death from boredom?”408 Jean Leca refers to this type of 
emergent citizenship as a type of alchemy, citing, appropriately, one of the leaders of the French 
Revolution, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, who wrote that “Each person fights for what he loves: 
that is what is called speaking in good faith. To fight for everyone is only the effect.”409 
Educationally, the focus must be on the generation of subjective understanding first, because it is 
self-knowledge that enables the recognition of the self in others, and that recognition will 
naturally produce a social world predicated on the recognition of common subjectivity. As 
Emerson pithily suggests, “Isolation must precede true society.”410  
 Max Stirner develops this vision of democratic epiphenomenalism in his short essay on 
education “The False Principle of Our Education: Or, Humanism and Realism” as well. Grasping 
Stirner's vision of the goals of the educational project is crucial for an understanding of how he 
sees the relationship between the school and the rest of society. “The False Principle of Our 
Education” was published in four parts during April of 1842 in the short-lived Rheinische 
Zeitung, of which Marx would later serve as editor. In the essay, Stirner outlines two historically 
popular positions on the nature of education, which he dubs “humanism” and “realism” 
respectively. This distinction is not critical, but it is important to note that Stirner took humanism 
to be a type of perennialist focus on “understanding the old classics,” a programme which was 
pursued under the auspices of a type of aristocratic or “exclusive” education, and saw realism to 
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be motivated by the “drive toward a universal education accessible to everyone”411 and which 
emphasized practical skills for the navigation of day-to-day existence.412 Against these two 
conceptions, he opposes what he ultimately calls “personalis[m].”413 While some interpreters 
argue that this essay was little more than Stirner sharpening some of his conceptual tools “in the 
ambience of an educational theme”414 in preparation for writing The Ego and its Own, I maintain 
that the work contains a substantial view of the aims of education and the figure of the student 
which is carried over into that work, rather than “replace[d]” or “abandon[ed]”415 in Stirner's 
later development. 
 The implications that Stirner's views on authority and individuality have for education 
are, in a sense, obvious. Following the spirit of the rest of Stirner's philosophy, education of the 
personalist sort ought to be a process of encouraging and facilitating self-actualization, self-
understanding, and self-expression. Jeffery Shantz glosses Stirner's view in the following way, 
“For Stirner, education should assist individuals to be creative persons rather than learners. 
Learners lose their freedom of will in becoming increasingly dependent upon experts and 
institutions for instruction on how to act.”416 This characterization seems fair to me, so long as 
one keeps in mind exactly how far Stirner's analysis wants to take the idea of “creative persons,” 
that is, radically beyond the spaces of logic, reason, and language, as well as applying one's 
creative powers to one's own selfhood, in a constantly regenerative, playful process. As Stirner 
puts the point, education must concern itself with cultivating “eternal characters in whom 
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constance [sic] only consists in the unremitting floods of their hourly self-creation and who are 
therefore eternal because they form themselves each moment, because they set the temporal 
concerns of their actual appearance out of the never-withering or aging freshness and creative 
activity of their eternal spirit.”417 This is diametrically opposed to the stagnant, stultifying, rote 
education that Stirner sees in the traditional doctrines (and which he might argue we still are 
embroiled in today), which simply accumulates information and skills “like the frozen-limbed 
supreme court, heaps documents upon documents, and plays for the millennia in delicate 
porcelain figures” with what he calls “immortal childishness.”418 The traditional forms of 
education can only ever give us control over the things of nature and the physical world (science, 
engineering, etc.) and our own internal natures, desires, and beliefs (psychology, religion, 
philosophy), but cannot self-actualize us in the way required by individualism. Stirner goes out 
of his way to make clear that he does not reject these types of education and understanding 
entirely, but rather holds that they can only ever be in the service of the free individual, and not 
the other way around. He writes,   
I receive with thanks what the centuries of culture have acquired for me; I am not willing 
to throw away and give up anything of it: I have not lived in vain. The experience that I 
have power over my nature, and need not be the slave of my appetites, shall not be lost to 
me; the experience that I can subdue the world by culture's means is bought at too great a 
cost for me to be able to forget it. But I want still more.419   
 
Stirner joins Vaneigem and Nietzsche in denouncing the imposition of static identities in the 
educational process, including, again, ideals of Citizenship, Anarchism, and so on. Speaking of 
the French Revolution, he criticizes the ideals of the movement on precisely this basis, writing 
“It was not the individual man-and he alone is man-that became free, but the citizen...the 
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political man, who for that very reason is not man but a specimen of the human species, and 
more particularly a specimen of the species Citizen.”420 He uses the capital 'C' in citizen here to 
signify his skepticism of the idea that being a good citizen ought to be thought of as a person's 
highest calling, or as the criteria for living a good life. Elsewhere, he links the idea of putting 
citizenship first with the idea of finding one's worth in “being a good Christian”421 which he 
reminds us is a notion which the advocates of citizenship often think of themselves as having 
rejected as antiquated. For Stirner, though, trading “good Christian” for “good Citizen” is simply 
to swap objects of sacred reverence, neither of which has any more warrant than the other.   
 Stirner sees the order in which development of the qualities of personal freedom and self-
assertion, on the one hand, and citizenship, on the other, take place as critical to the ends of 
personalist education. He echoes the other individualists on the natural emergence of the 
Deweyan democratic sensibility when he rights, it is “only the free and personal man who is a 
good citizen”422 and he cautions that “We are not yet everything when we move as useful 
members of society; we are much more able to perfect this only if we are free people, self-
creating people.”423 If we ignore the individual aspects of education for radical subjectivity and 
attempt to teach citizenship directly and explicitly as the dominant traditions in education have 
done, we end up with individuals full of “pride and every wind of covetousness, eagerness for 
office, mechanical and servile officiousness, hypocrisy, etc.”424 Though he has no quarrel with 
the ultimate goals of anarchist society, he argues that putting the cart of civics before the horse of 
individualism has been the fundamental flaw of anarchist educational thought. In this division 
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between man and citizen, Stirner echoes Rousseau's famous binary, introduced in the first pages 
of Emile, where Rousseau suggests that when we are “Compelled to oppose nature or our social 
institutions, we must choose between making a man and a citizen, for we cannot make both at 
once.”425 While Rousseau appears to cast this relationship as an exclusive disjunction, I contend 
that Stirner holds a somewhat more nuanced picture. Specifically, I think we are justified in 
concluding that Stirner sees the qualities of a good citizen, not as opposed to those of a good or 
natural man, as does Rousseau, but as supervenient on them. That is to say, good citizens emerge 
from good men without any additional training or specific instruction. The cultivation of the free, 
radical subjectivity of each individual is the entirely the educational project, properly 
understood; there are no civics classes or governmental projects that must be undertaken by 
students in Stirner's view, and indeed such training is self-defeating, as Stirner suggests in his list 
of the qualities produced by traditional modes of education. The good citizen is simply an 
epiphenomenon of the self-work that must be undertaken perpetually by individuals, and the 
qualities that we want in citizens will naturally emerge if we focus our attention on cultivating 
the qualities we want in individuals qua individuals. Clarity here is crucial, in personalist 
education, we are not violating Rousseau's dictum, creating both man and citizen at the same 
time; we are creating only individuals, but citizens and social relations emerge thereof naturally. 
In an age where government has been bureaucratized and systematized beyond 
imagination, and in the advent of technocratic rationalism's commandeering of the most 
fundamental aspects of our human lives, it is worth re-asking what kinds of people we want 
looking after these things, and how we go about finding them. Is it people who have been trained 
in the “best practices” of governmental bureaucracy and administrative managerialism, and who 
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can reliably and quickly execute their action items, though they have never set foot in a class on 
ethics? Is it people who can sway the votes of millions of people and hit all of the right notes 
when interviewed on national television but who have no relationship or investment in their own 
conscience? Do we want people, in Stirner's words, of “dialectical sophistication” but who also 
represent “commonness of thought and will?”426 I believe that the individualist project in 
education suggests that we ought to cultivate and encourage individuals, in the true sense, for 
whom the answers to the questions of government and civil society fall out of larger questions of 
ethics, worth, and happiness, rather than the other way around. While embracing the broadly 
libertarian view of pedagogy for self-understanding, the individualists also reject the 
depoliticization of education. Rather, the individualists hold that self-understanding is itself 
political, and the everyday experience both of oppression, anger, humiliation, as well as joy, 
friendship, and hope, are the foundations of revolution and resistance, and must be tapped for 
those purposes. Learning takes the form of learning about oneself, and ultimately learning to see 
that same fount of creativity and subjective assertion in others. To return to Cavell’s Emerson, 
who says “‘follow in yourself what I have followed in mine and you will be saved,’”427 the 
individualist project in education, through radical subjectivity and democratic 
epiphenomenalism, adds, “Follow in yourself what I have followed in mine and we will all be 
saved.” 
Practical Considerations 
 There are a number of significant practical questions that the left-anarcho-individualist 
view of education leave unanswered but which are important to address. For example, questions 
of pedagogical and parental authority, about whether or not there should be discrete institutions 
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called “schools,” and questions of whether or not schooling in itself is a problematic form of 
imposition, and at what age it becomes problematic. It is first important to note that these 
questions are not unique problems to anarcho-individualism and arise with respect to most other 
forms of anarchism as well, opposed as all anarchisms are to unjustified hierarchical 
relationships of control. As we saw in the tension between libertarian and anarchist education 
discussed earlier in this chapter, there is little agreement among anarchists on many of these 
questions. For the individualist, the answers to many of these questions, as with social 
formations and relationships of any kind, must always be experimental, provisional, and open to 
re-evaluation. In this sense, it is impossible to give definitive or overly prescriptive answer to 
them, but I will address briefly some pragmatic possibilities for a left-anarcho-individualist 
educational future. 
Pedagogy and Teacher Authority 
 Recalling the discussion of left-anarcho-individualist ethics in Chapter Three, it is worth 
restating that the individualist does not give up evaluative language altogether, and retains the 
conviction that certain styles of living are preferable to others. At the same time, the individualist 
would reject the imposition of those styles of life onto another, despite their evaluative 
preferability. Given this latter claim, it is fair to ask what individualist education would teach at 
all, if anything, and how pedagogy would have to be reformed in light of the individualists 
ontological and political commitments. One potentially attractive approach to these questions is 
offered by anarchist philosopher Alejandro de Acosta, who argues for a type of “antipedagogy” 
that views teaching in the way it has been historically understood as fundamentally 
impossible.428 de Acosta’s claim is particularly relevant to individualism and its goal of 
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cultivating self-actualized individuals, as he suggests that to assume the role of the teacher or 
pedagogue is actually to subvert that goal, to assume yet another identity, or in his terms “ego-
mask,” that signals “the inevitable calcification of the urge to teach into the kinds of systems we 
call pedagogies.”429 Insofar as the individualist rejects rigid systems of prescriptive rules for 
interaction (be they moral, pedagogical, or whatever) and obscuring identifications and social 
roles, the role of teacher and pedagogue is to be subverted. For de Acosta, teaching is impossible 
because it implies a final purpose, endpoint, or terminus. He writes that we ought rather to 
embrace a view of learning, study, and self-work that “is interminable…endlessly frustrated and 
frustrating.”430 Education must be revaluated so as to reflect the experimentalist spirit of 
individualism and the sense that there are not definite or final outcomes to be aimed at other than 
a fulfilled sense of self, something which manifestly cannot be taught in the way that term is 
commonly understood.  
 In place of traditional understandings of teaching, de Acosta suggests a more minimalist 
understanding of modeling styles of life. de Acosta does not argue that modeling behaviors or 
ways of being for students is desirable in that it is more likely to produce some result or other 
(e.g. getting the students to mimic or adopt that behavior), but only that is an entirely inevitable 
side-effect of human relationships, and the educative relationship is a human relationship like 
others. Modeling, however, is subject to experimentation, resistance, and reinterpretation that 
calcified systems of pedagogy and traditional information transfer are not. He writes “A model 
may be imitated, counterimitated, or met with sovereign indifference. We might cooperate, we 
might fight, or we might ignore each other. In that social chaos, in its interstices of order and 
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stillness, someone might learn something.”431 In this sense, I argue that individualist pedagogy, 
or antipedagogy, is fundamentally open, viewing the educational relationship as indeterminate 
and messy in the same way that other human relationships are. At best, I can show or model how 
I have come to interact with and express myself, but I can never prescribe or teach that to you. 
The path of self-discovery and actualization is, as it were, made in the walking.  
Schools as Social Institutions 
 Given the views of pedagogical authority expressed above and the general view of social 
institutions held by individualists discussed in Chapter Three, the individualist view of schools 
seems to follow relatively directly. That is, like all social institutions, schools, if they exist at all, 
must be open, malleable, and never calcified into rigid structures. The libertarian vision of Paul 
Goodman, which breaks down the walls of the school entirely and opens the entirety of 
environmental space as educative seems to me to be amenable to the left-anarcho-individualist 
picture of pedagogy and social institutions. If the definition of “school” is expanded to mean 
anywhere that educative experiences take place, or organic emergent moments of learning, the 
individualist has no objection. However, when schools become something like permanent 
institutions set aside from society for the express purpose of education, the individualist, I 
believe, would object. “Schools” on the individualist picture, should be thought of not as static 
state or even community institutions, but spaces of learning wherever they arise. Should a lecture 
or a debate or any other form of learning break out, that place is a school. The individualist 
rejects compulsory education and rather opts to let the world and the people that populate it 
educate one another, as they inevitably always do. Compulsory education set aside from the rest 
of the world is to be rejected, that is, not because it is undesirable (though individualism is, of 
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course, deeply suspicious of anything compulsory), but because it is unnecessary. In this sense, 
anarchist educational spaces such as the Ferrer School would indeed conflict with the 
individualist educational program in some respects. It was, for example, explicitly part of that 
school’s goal to separate itself from the rest of the world and society, something the individualist 
sees as hampering the range of experiences available to children. The individualist might also 
disagree with the explicit motivation of the school to instill a sense of class solidarity in its 
students, opting rather for children to come to learn organically from their daily experiences and 
informal interactions with others and the world around them.  
Conclusion 
 In attempting to rehabilitate the tradition of left-anarcho-individualism as a tool for the 
Left and specifically for educators searching for inspiration and practical forms of resistance to 
neoliberal global capital, it is important to reiterate what I have not attempted. I have not argued 
that individualism is the only answer available to the Left or that it perfectly responds to all 
aspects of the problematic of capital. I have not suggested that the individualist vision is even 
attainable in any sort of large-scale sense, and have even argued in favor of the power of the 
small-scale. My goal has not been to convert individualists, but rather to present a vision of 
individualism that other forms of Left thinking can view as an ally rather than the locus of that 
which they oppose. 
 Thinking back to the conservative appropriation of individualism that came with the 
advent of American economic atomism in the work of Josiah Warren and Benjamin Tucker, and 
the eventual fusion of the various strains of Wayne-ian rugged individualism with Rand’s 
morality of selfishness, Hayek’s Austrian economic theory with Reagan’s perverse 
understanding of bootstrapping narratives, what becomes apparent is that the Right is incredibly 
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capable of and willing to build within itself alliances between a variety of ideological subspecies. 
Though Rand and Hayek could barely stand to be in the same room with one another,432 they 
recognized in each other’s philosophy the seeds of a shared vision of the world. Though Murray 
Rothbard and other anarcho-capitalists scoff of the vigorous nationalist patriotism of John 
Wayne or Ronald Reagan, they happily deploy Reaganite narratives of rugged-self-reliance and 
the morality of “making it on one’s own” to advance a shared agenda. The Right has proven to 
be must more willing to take on allies despite areas of disagreement than has the Left, generally 
speaking. Michael Apple has documented this fact extensively in the context of educations 
specifically, arguing that it is precisely in the areas of tension on the Right and, critically, in 
“how these tensions are creatively solved”433 by the Right that the Right finds its power and 
ability to effect social change. If the Left is to counter the totalizing effects of neoliberal global 
capitalism in education and elsewhere, it must study and learn from how the Right has been able 
to so deftly resolve tensions between and unite groups a diverse as libertarian economists, 
traditional rural workers, and evangelical Christians. The Left must expand its toolkit in the face 
of a global hegemony that is both deeply entrenched and constantly anticipating, as Sloterdijk 
noted, the next move of critique or resistance. To that end, I have suggested that individualism is 
fundamentally compatible with various fundamental Left commitments, such as democracy, 
respect for identity, anticapitalism, and the like. That is, I have argued here that left-anarcho-
individualism should be one tool in the toolkit of the Left, to be strategically deployed as a form 
of resistance, of identity play and subversion, or as a positive vision of the world-to-come as the 
context dictates. Like the individualist understanding of the self and social forms, individualism 
itself is subject to revaluation, experimentation, and mutation. If the Left has any hope of 
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genuinely turning the tide of social change, it will need to creatively deploy a diverse suite of 
tactics, ideologies, and positive visions and inspirations. I argue, finally, that individualism can 
serve an important role in an expanded Left toolkit.  
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